Burma Update
News and updates on Burma31 May 2011
News on Burma - 30/5/11
Government disrespects the people's will: Suu Kyi – Saw Yan Naing Irrawaddy: Fri 27 May 2011 \ Ignoring the result of the general election in 1990 was disrespectful to the will of the Burmese people, said pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi on Friday, calling it "a historically inappropriate policy that damaged the image of the country." Suu Kyi made the comment at headquarters of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), in Rangoon's Sanchaung Township where more than 200 people had gathered on the eve of the 21st anniversary of Burma's 1990 election. The NLD won a landslide victory in the election in 1990, winning 392 out of 485 parliamentary seats. However, the regime refused to hand over power to the party. Suu Kyi was quoted by reporters in Rangoon as saying: "We have always opposed the rejection of the 1990 election result. It is not because we want power. It is an inappropriate policy because they [government] broke their promise to the people. They gave the people hope, and then broke that hope." She added: "To maintain good image of a country, the government has to respect the will of the people." On the anniversary of the 1990 election victory, Suu Kyi also told the recently free political prisoners not to be afraid, and urged them to stay involved in the political movement for the interest of the people of Burma, said sources in Rangoon. "My father [Gen Aung San] said that those who dare to resist have courage," she said. "If we are afraid to continue our work, then all the time we have spent in prison is meaningless." Suu Kyi spoke at the ceremony before more than 30 political prisoners who had been freed on May 17. Burma released some 14,600 prisoners on May 17 after announcing an amnesty. However, only 47 political prisoners were among those released. NLD members, Burmese opposition politicians, ethnic leaders and family members of political prisoners also attended the ceremony. Some police were nearby taking notes and photographs of the gathering, sources said. Suu Kyi also said that the amnesty granted by the government can be only called "mercy," according to Win Htein, an NLD member, and personal assistant and close aide to Suu Kyi. Tin Oo, the deputy chairman of the NLD, also spoke at the ceremony, saying that the government did not offer an honest amnesty as it released very few political prisoners. Suu Kyi said that a country where democracy prevails has practices such as free elections and the rule of law. Detaining political activists unlawfully is against the spirit of democracy, she added. Meanwhile, Win Tin, a senior advisor to Suu Kyi who was scheduled to speak at the event, was unable to attend the ceremony as he was hospitalized on Thursday evening suffering from a liver problem and serious skin infection. * The Irrawaddy correspondents in Rangoon contributed to this article. Internet cafés must reapply for a business license – Tun Tun Mizzima News: Fri 27 May 2011 New Delhi– All Burmese 'public access centre' Internet cafes have been ordered to reapply for a business license from the state-owned Myanmar Post and Telegraph (MPT), according to an MPT official. Previously, Internet cafes had to apply to Myanmar Info Tech and Yadanabon Teleport, but MPT took over the process in April 2011. It issued an advisory to all Internet cafes to reapply within 30 days starting April 25. However, some of the Internet cafes did not receive the advisory, sources said. The advisory said a fine of 30,000 kyat (US$ 36.58) per month may be issued or a license revoked if annual fees and dues are not paid within 90 days of the expiration date. License fees can be paid at the Naypyitaw and Rangoon Division Directorate of Communication, or, in states and regions at postal offices. License fees have been lowered. Previously, Internet cafes paid 500,000 kyat ($610) for initial fees for installation of cables and equipment, an annual fee of 600,000 kyat at the rate of 50,000 kyat per month. MPT now charges 500,000 kyat ($610) for installation and an annual fee of 360,000 ($440) at the rate of 30,000 kyat ($36.58) per month. According to the most recent data, there are 802 Internet cafes registered with Myanmar Info Tech. A total of 584 cafes are in the Rangoon municipal area, 21 in Mandalay and 197 in other towns and cities. All Internet cafes are instructed to register a customer's name, contact address, phone number and ID number, or a passport number for foreigners. The information is sent to the Directorate of Communication monthly. Cafes are also required to block banned software and programmes on their computers and they are subject to inspection by the authorities. MPT has issued a ban on using floppy drives, CD drives, USB ports and other external drives in computers. Internet cafes are responsible for monitoring and blocking information which can jeopardize state secrets and state interests. Violation of the regulation carries a maximum prison term of five years under the Official Secrets Act. Computer users are frequently charged under section 33(a) of Electronics Law Act which carries a maximum prison term of 15 years. More than 40 people have been imprisoned under this act including blogger Nay Phone Latt and comedian Zargana, according to the Thai-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP-B). Recently, former army captain Nay Myo Zin, who worked with the South Dagon Township blood donation group, was arrested and charged under the Electronics Law Act. Chery automobile to build plant in Myanmar – Wuhu SinoCast via LexisNexis: Fri 27 May 2011 China's Chery Automobile Co., Ltd. and its Burmese partner both agreed to invest in the construction of a KD (knocked down) plant with an annual production capacity of 3,000 to 5,000 vehicles in Myanmar. The move is part of the Chinese automaker's efforts to meet the increasing demand in Myanmar. Currently, its international arm has accumulatively had orders for nearly 10,000 QQ3 cars, but because of a limited production capacity, the local need cannot be met fully. An executive with the international arm disclosed that at the beginning of 2011, Chery Automobile and the Burmese government joined hands in the QQ3 SKD (semi knocked down) project. The first batch of components and parts for QQ3 products was shipped at the end of January 2011, and the first QQ3 rolled off the production line in late March The model has immediately become popular with local people. Myanmar, a market with huge potentials, will mean a great opportunity for Chinese automakers, said analysts. How the Constitution restricts multi-party democracy in Burma: U Myo and Lane Weir Mizzima News: Fri 27 May 2011 Burma's 2008 Constitution, touted as bringing 'democratic' reforms to the country, has instead institutionalized bias in favour of the army and the ruling elite. Heralded as a crucial part of the military government's 'roadmap to democracy', the 2008 Constitution was put to a referendum on 10 May, 2008. Though many reputable Burmese groups and international organizations claimed the process was fraudulent, the government hailed the referendum as a success that showed high approval for the new Constitution. Unfortunately, the entrenchment of the new Constitution has been a victory for the ruling elite, not for the Burmese people. The claim put forward by the new government is that the 2010 elections marked a transition to a multi-party democratic system. However, the 2008 Constitution's provisions restrict opposition parties and organizations, entrench continued military presence in the national government and grant impunity to past and present government officials With respect to the rule of law, the 2008 Constitution is unfair and unjust, depriving the Burmese population of their political right to the genuine multi-party democratic system stipulated by the new Constitution. A careful look at the articles of the country's new Constitution illustrates the inconsistencies between the claim that the Constitution and subsequent election mark a turn to multi-party democracy and the limits placed on potential for a democratic system by the provisions of the new Constitution. Section 7 of the 2008 Constitution provides that the 'Union practices genuine, disciplined multi-party democracy'. However, Section 407 states that where a political party infringes one of several stipulations, 'it shall have no right of continued existence'. These stipulations include a prohibition on parties that have direct or indirect contact with groups or associations deemed 'unlawful' by the government, parties that directly or indirectly receive financial or material support from foreign governments or associations or from religious organizations and groups that 'abuse religion for political purposes'. Section 408 states that where a party infringes one of the stipulations, their party registration will be revoked. These provisions are easily subject to abuse, granting wide powers to the government, clearly impeding Section 7's promise of a 'genuine' multi-party democracy. These arbitrary restrictions merely concentrate power in the hands of the ruling party. Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that, 'all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law'. This idea, manifested in the 'one person, one vote' principle, is absent from Burma's 2008 Constitution. Sections 74, 109(b) and 141(b) clearly illustrate this problem. Section 74 stipulates that in addition to elected officials, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw [Burma's bicameral legislature] is to be comprised of Defence Services Personnel nominated by the Commander-in Chief. Section 109(b) states that 110 individuals, or one-third of the total number of representatives, can be nominated by the Commander-in-Chief to the Pyithu Hluttaw [lower house]. Section 141(b) provides that the Commander-in-Chief reserves the right to nominate 56 individuals, or one quarter of the total number of representatives, to the Amyotha Hluttaw [upper house]. Sections 74, 109(b) and 141(b), therefore, permit the presence of government-appointed military representatives in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. This means that the 2008 Constitution allows for 25 per cent of the officials in the Hluttaw to serve as unelected appointees. This represents a significant departure from the 'one person, one vote' principle. More broadly, it reflects an unjust departure from a multi-party democratic system in which officials are duly elected. Similarly, Article 14 of the ICCPR states that 'all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals'. However, Article 445 of the 2008 Constitution states that 'all policy guidelines, laws, rules, regulations, notifications and declarations of the State Law and Order Restoration Council and State Peace and Development Council [SPDC]… shall devolve on the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. No proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils or any member thereof or any member in the Government, in respect of any act done in the execution of their respective duties'. It is clear that SPDC military regime officials and their government allies are granted immunity by the provision. This is in sharp contrast with the principle of accountability within a functioning multi-party democracy. What elements are required in a multi-party democracy? Freedom of expression and the freedom of association are two fundamental principles of democracy. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that 'everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers'. Freedom of expression is necessary in order for true political dialogue in the public sphere and, therefore, is a necessary precondition for genuine multi-party democracy. The right to freely form associations is also fundamental to a functioning democracy. Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that 'everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association'. This right is also reflected by Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These rights mean that workers, farmers, students and religious groups must be legally entitled to form unions. Similarly, it allows people to form and join political parties. The ability to do so is a necessary precondition for a multi-party democratic system. Why is a multi-party system so important to Burma? A genuine multi-party system is essential to re-establishing the rule of law in Burma. Unfortunately, Burma has not seen this type of government since General Ne Win imposed a one-party system following his coup in 1962. The presence of many ethnic minorities is one reason a multi-party democratic system is so essential to the rule of law in Burma. It would allow for various regions to be governed by those with the closest understanding of the issues faced by groups and individuals in the locality. Ethnic minorities would be represented in the political sphere and would be less inclined to resort to violence. A thriving multi-party democratic system would ensure that ethnic, social and political minorities have their voices heard in the Hlattaw. Opposition groups representative of minorities would be able to represent the views of those groups on an ongoing basis. In a genuine multi-party democracy, as opposed to the current political situation in Burma, opposition groups are not merely present during electoral periods. Instead, they serve a vital role to the functioning of government in a continuous manner. The mere existence, then, of multiple parties during elections does not ensure a functioning democracy. Instead, opposition parties must be given a level of respect at all times by ruling parties. Opposition parties must be given the opportunity to get involved in the legislative parties as good governance flows from a dialogue between parties. At present, Burma's one-party state heavily restricts any potential for a multi-party democracy and, therefore, fails to represent the diverse interests of the Burmese population. Despite promising a genuine multi-party democracy, the current Burmese Constitution only serves to restrict the activities of potential opposition groups and entrench the continued political presence of the ruling elite. Myanmar, China seal friendship with loan agreements – Ben Blanchard Reuters: Fri 27 May 2011 Beijing, – Myanmar and China sealed their friendship with loan and credit line agreements worth more than 540 million euros ($765 million) on Friday, as the former Burma's new president praised the Chinese as a trustworthy, selfless ally. "China is a friendly neighbour of Myanmar's worthy of trust and has provided vigorous support and selfless help for Myanmar's economic development," Myanmar's new civilian president, Thein Sein, told Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, state television reported. Wen said China was willing to provide what help it can to help Myanmar's development and ensure the "smooth progress" of oil and gas pipelines being built across Myanmar into southwestern China, seen as crucial to China's energy security. Thein Sein and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed nine agreements, including a cooperation framework agreement for a 540 million euro line of credit from China Development Bank to Myanmar's Ministry of Taxation and Finance. Other loan deals were agreed between various Chinese and Myanmar ministries, while another covered a hydroelectric project. No further details were given. Thein Sein, a loyalist of the reclusive former paramount military leader Than Shwe, is no stranger to China, having met top Chinese leaders in the past in his previous official capacities, including as prime minister. While Western nations slammed Myanmar's election last year as a sham, China has shown no such concerns. Hu offered his "warm congratulations" to Thein Sein for his appointment as president after the elections, which Myanmar lauded as the culmination of efforts to return the country to civilian rule. "I believe your visit to China will be advantageous to increasing our mutual understanding and will write a new page in 21st century friendship and cooperation between China and Myanmar," Hu said, according to a pool report. Economic relations are booming. Bilateral trade rose more than half last year to $4.4 billion, and China's investment in Myanmar reached $12.3 billion in 2010, according to Chinese figures, with a strong focus on natural resources and energy projects. Xinhua said China's largest privately owned automaker, Chery Automobile, was planning a car plant in Myanmar with annual capacity of up to 5,000 of its compact QQ model. The news agency did not say when the factory may begin production. Diplomatically, China provides Myanmar with crucial cover at the United Nations, fending off calls for tougher action demanded by the West on Myanmar's poor human rights record. For its part, Myanmar gives China access to the Indian Ocean, not only for imports of oil and gas and exports from landlocked southwestern Chinese provinces, but also potentially for military bases or listening posts. In October, China's state energy group CNPC started building a crude oil port in Myanmar, part of a pipeline project aimed at cutting out the long detour oil cargoes take through the congested and strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait. [ID:nTOE60D08W] [ID:nTOE67P06B] But relations have not all been smooth. China has frequently expressed its concern at instability along their often mountainous and remote border, where rebel groups deeply involved in the narcotics trade have been fighting Myanmar's central government for decades. In August 2009, refugees flooded across into China following fighting on the Myanmar side of the border between rebels and government troops, promoting an unusually public show of anger from Beijing towards its poor southern neighbour. Both sides must "coordinate their management to maintain stability on the border", Hu told Thein Sein, state television said. ($1 = 0.706 euros) (Editing by Sugita Katyal and Robert Birsel) Myanmar allows local distribution of Thai newspapers Deutsche Presse-Agentur: Fri 27 May 2011 Myanmar has for the first time allowed the local distribution of Thailand's two English-language newspapers, company sources said Friday. Success International Publisher, a private Myanmar company, was granted a distribution license for the Bangkok Post and The Nation daily newspapers. "I got the license three days after applying for it (at the Commerce Ministry)," Success International's managing director Nyo Aung said. Success International has distributed The Straits Times and Business Times of Singapore in the Myanmar market for years, but was hesitant to ask permission to distribute the Bangkok Post and The Nation because of their often-critical coverage of Myanmar. "Now the government has changed, so I thought it was a good time to apply for the license," Nyo Aung said. All foreign publications must be censored by Myanmar's Information Ministry before they are distributed domestically. Myanmar, which was been under military rule from 1962 to 2010, has a notoriously suppressed local media. Foreign correspondents, with a few exceptions, have been barred from being based in the country for decades. General elections on November 7 brought the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party to power. But, given the USDP's top-heavy military membership, it is deemed an unlikely proponent of democratic reforms and press freedoms. Is Burma China's satellite state? The answer is yes – Aung Zaw Irrawaddy: Fri 27 May 2011 President Thein Sein, a former military general and protégé of dictator Snr Gen Than Shwe, is on a three-day state visit to China to pay a formal courtesy call to the leaders in Beijing and to cement what is fast becoming a strong relationship. Indeed, we should not forget the historical relationship between the two countries: in 1949, Burma was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China. But that doesn't mean that the relationship has always been smooth sailing. Anti-Chinese riots were widespread in Burma in 1967, while for its part, China played an active role in supporting communist insurgents in Burma. We must not forget that Beijing has at times played tough with the incompetent generals of Burma, most notably during the Kokang Crisis in August 2009 when Beijing reprimanded Burma over the instability at their common border when some 37,000 refugees fled into Chinese territory. Beijing was reportedly enraged, and Burma quickly dispatched high-ranking officials to mend the fence. On the issue of trade and investment, China plays a key role—extracting natural resources from Burma's ethnic states. China made huge investments in hydropower, oil and gas, totaling $8.17 billion, Xinhua reported last year, citing the regime's own statistics. Indeed, by the end of March this year, China's investment in Burma has risen to US $15.5 billion from $12.3 billion at the end of 2010. There is no doubt that the Chinese invasion of Burma is visible in the growing numbers of Chinese migrants and businessmen in Burma's second largest city, Mandalay, as well as in Shan and Kachin States where they have opened shops and businesses, and regularly buy land. It is believed that over the last 20 years, hundreds of thousands of Chinese have migrated to Burma. Many of them have obtained Burmese nationality cards through corrupt immigration officials. China's persistent presence in Burma is significant—many local Burmese have begun learning Mandarin to help secure jobs, prompting a joke in Burma that the future leaders of the country will be fluent in Chinese next time they visit Beijing. Shortly after the Burmese military crushed a pro-democracy movement 22 years ago, China was one of the first neighboring countries to back the newly installed junta, providing it with arms, jet fighters, naval ships and ammunition. Since then, its unwavering support for the regime in Burma has only grown. Before 1988, China had supported and financed hardcore Burmese communist insurgents that waged bloody civil war against the Burmese regime. China's strategic shift toward Burma shows a more pragmatic approach than its previous ideological war. Indeed, sadly, the policy shift does nothing more than preserve the brutal regime in Burma, and plays a destructive role toward Burma's embattled democracy movement. Outside of Burma, Beijing's policy toward Naypyidaw has raised heated debate between pro-sanctions and anti-sanctions groups. The argument now is that it is time to counter China's growing political and business clout in Burma. Western companies and governments feel that this is all just a case of too little, too late—time to follow Beijing's footsteps. Li Junhua, the current Chinese ambassador to Burma, told Xinhua news agency that Thein Sein's state visit would certainly push the two countries' strategic and mutually beneficial cooperation toward a new high. Burma's military leaders often call China their "most important friendly neighbor," and they can now continue to develop their strategic relations with Beijing after putting to bed November's general election. But it takes two to tango—Beijing realized that Naypyidaw has much to offer. Burma has offered strategic access to the Bay of Bengal. Underlining this deepening strategic cooperation, Chinese naval ships last year made a port call for the first time in Burmese territorial waters. During his visit, Thein Sein is expected to discuss in depth the issue of China's navy docking in Burmese ports, and the Chinese desire to provide naval protection for its oil and gas facilities at the Burmese seaport of Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal. Informed sources have said that Chinese officials are not suggesting a Chinese navy base in Burma, but simply having the permission to dock their warships at Burma's ports while they are patrolling the Indian Ocean and Somali coast. Returning from a counter-piracy operation in the Indian Ocean in August 2010, two warships, the Guangzhou and the Chaohu, docked at Thilawa Port, near Rangoon, for a five-day visit. Other issues of mutual concern, such as border security, military relations and business agreements, are expected to take a back seat on this particular visit. China has also played a friendly intermediary role between Burma and North Korea since the two countries formally restored diplomatic relations in 2007. Interestingly, the previous regime's secret military missions to North Korea were taken via China. It can safely be said that Beijing approves of and backs Burma's desire to develop military contacts with North Korea. Overall, it looks like China's role as a big brother to Burma will continue, and we can foresee China and Burma developing deeper military ties. China also protects Burma from the teeth of the UN Security Council. Various Burmese military leaders have either quietly or openly expressed admiration for China's economic growth—it is the model they want to follow in their quest for economic reform. In fact, they fondly talk about Shanghai's skyscrapers, with no mention of New York. No doubt then that China is an important ally for the repressive regime to fend off the scathing opinions of Western governments, which have long criticized the junta's appalling human rights records and are now backing the establishment of a UN Commission of Inquiry into crimes against humanity in Burma. China protects the regime and bullies the Western critics to back off any Naypyidaw when it faces a crucial censure or resolution. Since November's deeply flawed election has won international backing, Chinese officials will strengthen their hand with the confidence that Naypyidaw owes them, and that they have much more to gain from Burma's new government. Ambassador Li praised Thein Sein's first presidential speech delivered, suggesting that it provided a strong signal to the people of Burma and the international community that the new government will make greater efforts in developing the economy, speed up its rate of opening doors to the outside world, improve the living standards of its people, and strengthen the ties between different nationalities based on foundations laid by the previous government. Li told Xinhua that Burma's new government is more self-confident and more active diplomatically, after seeing Thein Sein at the Asean Summit in Indonesia. Consequently, as Beijing spreads its wings of influence in Asia, Thein Sein's visit will be seen as an important step in ensuring that close neighbor Burma remains a strategic ally in the foreseeable future. It doesn't matter to Beijing how many political prisoners are being locked up or how many ethnic minorities are slaughtered in the ongoing civil war in Burma—as long as the regime is stable, and China's national interests are untouched. To Chinese, as the saying goes—it doesn't matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it can catch mice. Burma: demographics of disciplined democracy – David Scott Mathieson Open Democracy: Fri 27 May 2011 What if you held an election and you weren't sure how many people showed up? A simple question regarding the veracity of the last elections held in Burma, on 7 November 2011: how many people actually live in the country? It may seem straightforward, and after all it's a fundamental question when determining voting lists, and yet there is a great variety of estimates. Burma has not had an effective nationwide census for decades: previous ones took place during British colonial rule in 1931, under the post-war social-democratic government in 1953, and by the self-described socialist government in 1983. The population in the last census, despite that count not being able to access considerable parts of the country due to civil war, was 35,442,972. What is Burma's population now, in 2011? The Rangoon-based United Nations agency, the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), released a map in 2009 with a breakdown of the population of all of Burma's fourteen administrative units (states and divisions/regions); based on figures from Burma's ministry of home affairs, it finds the total population to be 44,209,146. The Lonely Planet tourist guide (2009) claims 47.4 million. The United States's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates the population at 48,137,741. Many newspapers reporting on the Burmese elections variously say 50, 51, 52, 54 or 57 million – numbers all likely based on internet searches through disparate figures on a variety of websites. United Nations millennium development goals (MDG) data compiled in 2008 projects the 2010 figure for Burma at 50,495,000. The statistical yearbook for 2008 of Burma's ministry of national planning and economic development gives the population figure as 57,504,000. The latest official figure in 2010, from the Burmese government's ministry of immigration and population, estimates that 59.12 million people live in Burma: 29.39 million men, and 29.73 million women. These numbers stem from a census of some kind conducted in 2007, in cooperation with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The survey estimates that the population growth rate is 2.02% annually. So, estimates from the lowest to the highest figures in just a two-three-year timescale – in calculations from the Burmese government, the United Nations, and international organisation – produces a differential of 15 million people. Isn't that gap a little too wide to conduct anything approaching a credible election? The politics of verticality The Burmese electoral process itself, few observers would now disagree, was a gigantic fix to ensure military dominance. Its ingredients were rigged electoral laws interpreted by a pro-military electoral commission; the arrest and incarceration of more than 2,200 political opponents; a behemoth military party called the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) that, with 18 million nominal members and a nationwide structure of offices and financial assets is difficult to beat; and a constitution that guarantees wide-ranging operational latitude and invests ultimate power in the Burmese military. On voting day, 7 November 2011, the USDP won more than 77% of the seats in the two national-level parliaments, and a clear majority in the fourteen regional and state-based assemblies. The electoral commission announced that 22 million of the 29 million eligible voters cast ballots, a turnout of around 75%-80%. The USDP won more than 875 of the 1,157 seats open to contest in the three levels of assemblies. In addition, a military quota ensured by the constitution reserves one-quarter of seats to serving military officers, underlining the Burmese military's overwhelming domination of all political decision-making. There were reports of widespread irregularities, including the use of advance-voting ballots to swing seats in favor of the USDP during the closing stages of ballot-counting. But look beyond the rigged process to the basics of the elections. A central law of psephology (the statistical analysis of elections) is to establish an accurate estimate of the population, clearly demarcated electorates and the eligible voters contained therein, and a system of tallying votes. It is not known clearly how closely observed these prerequisites were ahead of the vote, though significant questions can be asked. The very task of estimating Burma's population is predominantly part of the system of authoritarian control. To monitor society, the authorities have long employed a draconian system of household registration. Every house must have a list of inhabitants that are regularly reported to local authorities, at the suburb (or in Burma, the ward), or village level. Visitors are either denied permission to stay overnight or must be registered with the authorities. It is prohibited for foreigners to stay overnight in a private Burmese home, and all hotel-registration lists are reported daily to local police and immigration authorities. This system is vertically integrated. Regular population numbers of small communities are relayed up to the next stage of monitoring control: from village to village tract, next to township, then to state or division/region level, and ultimately to national authorities. This is not unique to authoritarian systems, but in practice it grants latitude to local authorities to act in any way to ensure that good news flows up the system. In a country such as Burma where avoiding the attention of authorities is a basic survival strategy, compliance by officials and citizens to accord with expectations is often the norm, despite questions of veracity or efficiency of the information. Positive news is an essential ingredient of loyalty in repressive states. The inconvenient variables What few analyses of the Burmese population include is the number of demographic factors that challenge any accurate assessment: displacement through conflict and development projects, work migration to neighbouring countries, transmigration to look for work inside Burma, statelessness (of the Rohingya Muslim minority, hinterland hill-tribes, and other marginalised populations), and haphazard or incomplete citizenship registration. Burma remains an extremely poor country, sharing rugged and underdeveloped borderlands with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos, and Thailand; with simmering conflict, especially in the eastern borderlands; and with a bewildering ethno-linguistic patchwork of peoples, defined by the SPDC as amounting to 135 "national race groups". This is a shortlist of seven inconvenient intervening variables that any assessment of Burma's demographics must face Internal displacement For more than a decade, there has been a major problem of conflict and development-induced displacement in eastern Burma. The annual survey of the Thailand-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) estimates that 460,000 civilians were internally displaced in 2010: in a mixture of nominally government controlled areas, ceasefire militia enclaves, and free-fire zones contested by state and anti-state forces. These populations are a mix of recognised citizens of the Burmese state, and those whose births were not officially registered but have spent most of their lives under insurgent administration. In several townships in border areas, no voting was held on 7 November; the areas included the Wa special region in the north, and parts of the country where conflict is still raging in the Karen and Shan states. Those unable to vote include tens of thousands of hill-tribe minorities such as the Lahu, Akha, Palaung and others, especially in the northern states, who live on the fringes of state control and have never been officially counted. Refugees There are more than 140,000 documented refugees in nine (unofficially) recognised camps in Thailand. These numbers have stayed largely constant since 1984 when the first major waves of refugees started to cross. More than 60,000 refugees have been resettled to third countries from these camps since 2005. The ethnic Shan have only one very small recognised camp; most of the people fleeing across that border enter the migrant-worker population, and easily number several tens of thousands. India has approximately 50,000 ethnic Chin refugees in Mizoram, and several thousand in Delhi. Refugees also travel to Malaysia, where some people estimate 30-50,000 people from Burma are there, either working or applying for refugee status. Some refugees retain their citizenship. The Rohingya Muslim minority Burma's most persecuted ethno-religious minority is the estimated 1 million Rohingya. They have been the target of large-scale and brutal military expulsions into Bangladesh (in 1978 and 1991), and denied citizenship and basic rights for three decades. Many Rohingya were (paradoxically) granted voting rights in 2008 and 2010 through the issuance of temporary identity-cards, and Rohingya political parties were permitted to contest the election (in which they were trounced, though military-aligned Rohingya businessmen were permitted to contest and win seats through the USDP). An estimated 250,000 Rohingya live as refugees or undocumented migrants in Bangladesh, tens of thousands more as migrant labor in the middle east and Pakistan. Chinese migration to northern Burma Chinese migration to Burma has demonstrably increased since the early 1990s, especially to Burma's second largest city, Mandalay. Many Chinese migrants purchase citizenship, using business contacts with officials to secure it; others are temporary labourers, such as the tens of thousands of road-builders and dam-construction workers in Kachin state. There are no hard official figures on the size of this migration, but the presence of recent Chinese immigrants in northern Burma is clear to any visitors, and a source of periodic tension between ethnic Burmese and the new arrivals. Migrant workers Burmese labourers leave their country in massive numbers, some for short-term work, others for many years. The standard figure for Burmese workers in Thailand is 2 million, but in the absence of a fully functioning registration system, official figures are much lower. Migrant workers from Burma also travel to Malaysia and Singapore, in lesser numbers, but where working conditions are often marginally better. Some of these workers were permitted to vote in the elections, if they were legally recognised as migrant workers, and cast advance ballots at Burmese embassies. Some migrant workers refused to vote, fearing that officials would be able to exhort money from them or their families back in Burma if they engage with embassy officials. Struck off household lists Many people, especially Rohingya, who leave Burma because of persecution or for work are often struck off household-registration lists because they have left the country illegally. Many migrant workers leave their Burmese ID card inside Burma, with their parents or family members, as it is illegal to take the card outside of Burma. Dissidents and others who have illegally left the country for clandestine training or work are regularly charged with breaches of the migration act and sentenced to long prison terms. Internal labor migration It became clear after cyclone Nargis in 2008 that large numbers of landless labourers who had been working in the Irrawaddy delta (and may not have ever been counted either as temporary residents or as residents) were amongst the 140,000 listed officially as dead or missing count. The experience of the constitutional referendum of 2008 is instructive in other ways. When Human Rights Watch interviewed survivors of the cyclone from 2008-10, we encountered many who said they were not included in village-household lists because of their isolated location; many said they were never given the opportunity to cast votes as local authorities completed it for them. The swift counting of the tally in 2008, not an arduous task in a simple yes-or-no vote but still a challenge considering Burma's lack of development and infrastructure, was reached within a couple of weeks, and publicly announced down to the individual vote: a 92% approval of the constitution from a 98% voter turnout. It seems obvious that the repressive apparatus of state control in Burma is bottom-up: local authorities know they must deliver positive, even if erroneous, news to the next layer of control all the way up to central authorities in Naypyidaw. There are many other variables of transmigration not taken in to account in official figures: how many people in Burma move within the country for work but fail to register with the authorities? At an extremely and necessarily rough estimate, are 3-5 million people not included as Burmese citizens with voting rights? Authoritarian truthiness Charles Seife's new book Proofiness: The Dark Arts of Mathematical Deception details how governments and corporations throw around deceitful figures. He writes: "In skillful hands, phony data, bogus statistics, and bad mathematics can make the most fanciful idea, the most outrageous falsehood seem true. They can be used to bludgeon enemies, to destroy critics, and to squelch debate." The obsession with numerical detail by Burma's authoritarian system is a prime example of what Seife calls "disestimation": granting credibility to a figure that is derived with too much uncertainty. An accurate estimate of the population is crucial for conducting elections; and it must be hoped that a genuinely free and fair election in Burma will take place one day. It is also crucial for increasing development projects and the disbursal of humanitarian assistance. What Burma's new parliament, a reshuffled version of the former ruling military council, needs to do in 2011 is to prioritise credible population statistics that serve the needs of local development in health, education, land management, and economic reforms (such as urgently needed micro-financing projects). These fundamentals are being lost in the haze of a system of control, and the various responses by communities to maintain survival. If the United Nations system circulates widely different figures, how will they coordinate with national authorities and local communities to reach those in acute need? Any agenda for international engagement with Burma has to include reconciling the variables of communities that are not included on official registers; and more consideration of people who are used by the state when it suits them, and ignored when it doesn't. http://www.opendemocracy.net/print/59738 Aung San Suu Kyi to test limits of freedom with Burma tour – Julian Ryall The Telegraph: Thu 26 May 2011 Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese democracy leader, is to test the will of the nation's military-controlled government through a series of public speeches outside Rangoon. Six months after the government ended her seven-year spell of house arrest, Ms Suu Kyi has made it clear that she intends to go ahead with rallies that will culminate in a visit to Burma's former capital, Mandalay, The Times quoted a close political ally as saying. "She told me recently that she has decided, and that she will go to the countryside in one or two months' time," Win Tin, a close friend of Ms Suu Kyi and one of the founders of the National League for Democracy, told the Times. Mr Win, who spent 20 years as a political prisoner, said he had received indications from the government that there was no threat to Ms Suu Kyi's personal safety, but that clashes between her supporters and the military were possible. Ms Suu Kyi's decision to tour the country will be welcomed by her supporters, who have been disappointed at the slow rate of political change in Burma and the NLD's failure to be more forceful in politics since her release. Exile groups have been calling for the Nobel Peace Prize winner to "test the waters of her supposed freedom" and to campaign outside the capital, although there are risks attached to this strategy. The last time that Ms Suu Kyi campaigned outside Rangoon, in 2003, her vehicles were attacked by government-sponsored protestors. She narrowly avoided serious injust herself, but was arrested and ordered to be held under house arrest until last November. In all, she has spent 15 of the last 22 years in detention. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/8537223/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-to-test-limits-of-freedom-with-Burma-tour.html Burmese continues fleeing to Northeast India – Nava Thakuria Weekly Blitz: Thu 26 May 2011 Officially Burma (Myanmar or Brahmadesh) may have transformed into a democracy after the 2010 November general election, but the ground realities for the poor Burmese remain the same. And the outcome is the continuous fleeing of Burmese to neighbouring India, Bangladesh and Thailand. If the earlier exodus was of pro-democracy political activists, now more and more common Burmese are leaving the poverty stricken country. For India, the burden of refugees primarily from Chin State of Burma is carried by Mizoram. With its around10 lakh population, the Burma and Bangladesh bordering Indian State gives shelter to nearly 80,000 migrants. Leaving aside two thousand Burmese recognized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and staying in New Delhi, the rest arescattered in Mizoram, Nagaland and Manipur. "The people outside Burma start believing that the country has changed after the polls. But in reality, the election was fought and won by mostly the military men. So even after the military brand State Peace and Development Council, which ruled Burma for decades, is dissolved and the Parliaments are functioning, the common people are suffering a lot," said a Burmese youth, now staying in Indian bordering town Saiha. The youth, who migrated from Chin to Mizoram few months back for a better life and presently working as a daily labour, also added that there are serious crisis of food in Chin State after the phenomena of bamboo flowering last year. The Burmese government in Nay Pie Taw remains reluctant for the relief and rehabilitation of Chin people. "When some parts of Mizoram also faced the bamboo flowering in early 2010, there were constant flow of relief from New Delhi and also international aid agencies. But for our people in Chin, neither the government initiated to send relief nor it allowed the outside aid agencies to serve the people in distress," asserted the educated youth, who wanted anonymity, during an interview with this writer at Aizawl recently. Pu Kim, a Burmese political activist who is recognized by the UNHCR and now based in New Delhi, argues that the so-called change of Burma for democratization is useless, as the military clout remains powerful and the judiciary has still no jurisdiction over the armed forces in the country. "Many historic political events may take place in Burma in the last few months including the November election, release of pro-democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, running Parliament sessions at Nay Pie Taw and the demolition of the SPDC, but these changes are seemingly not adequate for the people and hence many of them have fled the country," commented Mr Kim, while speaking to this writer from New Delhi. Facing the situation, the Mizoram government also finds it difficult to deal the migrants from Burma. As India does not have a refugee policy, it often emerges as a major challenge for both the authority and the civil society groups in a situation like that of Mizoram. For the Chin people, Mizoram emerges as a place of their choice, as both Chin and Mizos share similar religious identity and food habits. Moreover they are almost look alike and Mizo people in general embrace the Chin as their brother and sisters. But in some occasions, when few Chin youths were found involving in petty crimes, the majority Mizo civil society groups get irritated. Even the most influential Young Mizo Association had warned the Chin people to leave Mizoram as they were polluting the Mizo society. The resentment of Mizo civil society had compelled a senior Burmese political leader to tender apology in front of the people of Mizoram. Addressing a consultation meeting on the 'implication and consequences of regime change in Burma' after the November 2010 elections at Aizawl on May 6, Dr Tint Swe, a former Burmese MP seek apology for all anti-social activities carried out by a section of Chin people. The senior member of National League for Democracy (led by Suu Kyi), Dr Tint Swe also claimed that the recently concluded election in Burma has not brought any changes to the common people and they are still ruled by the same group of military under the camouflage of a democratic regime. Hence he urged the government of India and the citizens of Northeast to continue supporting the Burmese peoples' struggle for real democracy. Organized by Burma Centre Delhi in collaboration with Chin Human Rights Organizations, Aizawl and Grassroot Development Network, Mizoram and hosted by Zo Indigenous Forum the consultation meeting wasattended by various civil society groups, journalists and activists of the region. Addressing the gathering, Vanlal Ngaia, Chairman of Mizoram Committee for Democracy in Burma reiterated that the regime change in Burma does not seem to bring any change in the condition of pro-democracy activists and general people of Burma. "The only change we have seen is the military uniform into civil dresses. Therefore people preferring for democracy around the world should work persistently for full restoration of true democracy in Burma," he added. Dr. Alana Golmei, advocacy coordinator of BCD also urged the people of Northeast to have a closer people to people contact and work together for peace and human rights in the region and Burma. She further said that both the Burma polls and its 2008 Constitution were criticized and condemned by the UN, the EU and Burmese pro-democracy campaigners for adopting undemocratic norms and rejection of democratic principles and human rights. So, she added, no change is taking place in Burma after the technically new and elected government as the human rights situation in Burma remains the worst. "The people of Mizoram have a deep relation with Burma as our Chin brother and sisters live there. My understanding is that Mizo, Chin and Kuki are the same people with same religious and linguistic identity. That is why we feel pain when our Chin brothers face problem and suffer under the regime of Burma," commented Muanpuia Punte, vice-president of Northeast Students Organization. He also added that both the Burma polls and its 2008 Constitution were criticized and condemned by the UN, the EU and Burmese pro-democracy campaigners for adopting undemocratic norms and rejection of democratic principles and human rights. http://www.weeklyblitz.net/1460/burmese-continues-fleeing-to-northeast-india Myanmar get ready for foreign investment Business Area: Thu 26 May 2011 Within the next five years until 2016, Myanmar prepare to welcome foreign investment. According to Xinhua notes on Thursday (26/05/2011), Government of Myanmar's economic growth target set at the rate 10.5 percent since the beginning of the fiscal year period beginning in April 2011. Until March 2011, Myanmar has poured funds 36.05 billion U.S. dollars to suck foreign investment. In 1988, Myanmar was adopted market-oriented economic policy. Now there are 31 countries and regions that invest in Myanmar. China, including Hong Kong, led by an investment of 15.5 billion U.S. dollars. In second place is Thailand with a value of 9.56 billion U.S. dollars. Furthermore, South Korea (2.915 billion U.S. dollars), Britain (2.695 billion U.S. dollars), and Singapore (1.818 billion U.S. dollars). Myanmar Flag The sectors are the target of foreign investment is the electrical energy to the position of 14.5 billion U.S. dollars of investment, oil and gas (13.8 billion U.S. dollars), mining (2.8 billion U.S. dollars), manufacturing (1.7 billion U.S. dollars), as well as hotel and tourism (1 billion U.S. dollars). http://businessarea.org/myanmar-get-ready-for-foreign-investment-273139.html Shan govt militias 'aiding opium trade' Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 26 May 2011 Burmese army troops and local militias in southern Shan state are reportedly taking bribes from local farmers in return for allowing the continued cultivation of opium, despite government assertions that it is stamping out the trade. A man in Nansang, one of seven townships in Shan state alleged to be heavily involved in the industry, said that bribes ranged from 50,000 kyat ($US55) to 80,000 kyat ($US90) per acre of opium grown. Farmers in areas run by government-backed militias from the ethnic Pa-O group were being forced to hand over a certain quantity of the drug. "Now all the local populations are growing opium – this is their only source of income since there are no regular jobs available," said the Nansang resident. "Now every household in villages [near to the seven townships] are growing opium," he said. "They have to bribe the army and Pa-O militias, of which there are two – Red and White Pa-O." He added that Chinese were increasingly buying up areas of land in the state's southern regions, also to cultivate poppies. A resident of nearby Pinlon said that it takes around one million kyat ($US1,150) to grow an acre of poppies for opium – those who cannot afford the cost are often found helping out on farms during harvest seasons, earning around 10,000 kyat ($US12) a day. With average annual wages hovering around $US400, the financial incentives to work in Burma's lucrative opium industry are therefore substantial. The Pinlon local said that university students and even children of soldiers are often seen helping out with cultivation of poppies. Shan state has long been Southeast Asia's biggest source of illicit drugs, and once held the distinction of being the world's top producer of heroin until it was usurped by Afghanistan in the late 1990s. A damning report by the US State Department in March said that Burma had "failed demonstrably" in its proclaimed efforts to eradicate the country's narcotics industry. The UN Office on Drugs and Crimes estimates that between 2006 and 2009, opium cultivation in Burma increased from 21,500 hectares to 31,700 hectares, despite repeated assertions in state media of success in its elimination programmes. Another report released last year by the Thailand-based Shan Drug Watch claimed that junta-backed militias had taken over ethnic armies as Burma's main drugs' producers. Rising hostilities between ethnic armies and the Burmese had, according the report's lead author, Khunsai Jaiyen, prompted a clampdown on their drug production and mobility. Stop blaming the victims – Zoya Phan Irrawaddy: Thu 26 May 2011 The problems facing Burma are complex, and it is only natural that there will be different opinions on how the international community should respond. Debate is healthy and essential, and should help lead to better policy making. But more and more I see those who disagree with the policies of the National League for Democracy, and who disagree with those western governments which are applying economic and political pressure for reforms, go beyond healthy debate about policy. More and more I see them blaming the victims of the dictatorship for the problems in Burma, and just as bad, making excuses for the dictatorship. They do this in a variety of ways, sometimes openly, more often they do it subtly. One of the most recent examples was after the failure to release political prisoners last week. Instead of releasing all political prisoners, or as happened in the past, releasing those political prisoners who are ill, to avoid the embarrassment of them dying in jail, all that happened was that one year was taken off the sentences of all prisoners. I thought this was yet another sign that Burma's new dictator, Thein Sein, is just as bad as Than Shwe. But according to some so-called experts and advisors I was wrong. What they try to imply is that Thein Sein wanted to release political prisoners, but I and those like me who have campaigned for their release, and those governments who support their release, made him keep the political prisoners in jail. They imply we forced Thein Sein to keep political prisoners in jail by saying they should be freed, as he didn't want to be seen to back down to the West. It's our fault there are political prisoners, not his. This is seriously what some people are implying. One evening, when I was 16 years old, I was sitting in the civilian village where I lived, doing my school homework. Suddenly there was the crackle of gun fire. There were screams, and then the thud and boom of mortar bombs landing. The Burmese Army was attacking our village. There was no warning, and they were shooting to kill. We ran for our lives, and those who survived ended up in a refugee camp in Thailand. Apparently, according to some diplomats and academics, it was my fault this happened. My fault because when the Burmese army comes to our Karen villages to kill, to rape, skin people alive, crucify people, burn our homes and throw babies into the flames, some people take up arms to try to defend their children, their wives and their neighbors. By trying to protect our people, we force the Burmese army to attack us. It's not their fault, is what they imply. We make them do it. Again, this is what some people seriously argue. Aung San Suu Kyi has spent 15 of the past 22 years in detention. But according to some so-called experts and historians that is also her own fault. They say that the dictatorship was forced to keep her detained because she is hard-line and inflexible. She kept insisting on the results of the election her party won being accepted. She kept talking about human rights and democracy. This is, apparently, unreasonable and hard-line, so of course the generals had to detain her. The fact that practically every year for the past 20 years her party, the National League for Democracy, has proposed some kind of compromise with the regime, and that every proposal was rejected by the dictatorship, isn't mentioned. What matters is trying to portray her as the problem, not the generals. They say she should have compromised, although on what isn't explained. They imply it was hard-line and confrontational of her in 2003 to travel to parts of Burma to meet people. Of course the dictatorship would have to do something, like attempt to assassinate her, and beat more than seventy of her supporters to death. Apparently, she made them do it. I thought poverty in Burma was caused by the dictatorship. In the past 22 years their spending on the military has ranged from between 80 and 25 percent of the government budget. At the same time, spending on health and education is almost the lowest in the world. I thought that the fact that Burma is the second most corrupt country in the world, and that the generals have allowed a dozen or so close business cronies to take over the most profitable industries in the country, squeezing out any small or medium size enterprises, were factors that contributed to underdevelopment and poverty. I was sure that the fact that the generals steal billions of dollars of government revenue was important. I thought the fact that hidden away in overseas bank accounts they have enough money to provide basic health care for everyone in Burma, was also a factor. But here again, apparently I was wrong. It is sanctions that cause poverty in Burma, I keep hearing from some so-called experts and think-tanks. It seems the history of why sanctions were applied isn't important. The fact that they were introduced against Burma's rulers because of the appalling human rights record of the dictatorship and the link between increasing abuses and increased trade and investment isn't mentioned. Nor is the fact that trade and investment had helped the regime double the size of the army, and they used that army to attack civilians. The money wasn't spent on health and education, or alleviating poverty. Also seemingly not worth mentioning in this debate is that most sanctions, especially those from the EU, are pretty toothless, or that almost all sanctions are targeted at the dictatorship and its business cronies, not the general population. Nor do they provide evidence of sanctions hurting ordinary people. Over and over they repeat the lie, sanctions are to blame for poverty, they don't pin the blame on the dictatorship. I thought that the dictatorship could reform any time they want to. That the fact that they don't shows they are determined to stay in power, even if that means shooting at unarmed monks on the streets of Rangoon. Apparently I am wrong again. According to some observers, and even some diplomats, the generals in Burma want to reform. But they say we stop them from reforming. They say we criticize them, we say mean things about them, and this forces them to stay in power. Every time they try to reform, we say it's not good enough, and they get discouraged. Apparently, by constantly sending envoys and calling for dialog, we push them into a bunker mentality where it is impossible for them to talk to anyone. They imply that if we just were a bit nicer (like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations?) they'd change. They twist facts to argue that if we relax the pressure on the dictatorship to enter into dialog, there would be dialog, and once we can sit down and talk with the dictatorship they'll realize it is all a big misunderstanding, and introduce democratic reforms. Apparently, giving lots of our aid money directly to the generals would also help this process. The arguments outlined above might sound ridiculous to me, but read between the lines of reports from the International Crisis Group, the arguments made by officials from the European Union External Action Service, and a sadly large number of foundations, academics and so-called experts, and these are the arguments they are making. What is frightening is how seriously they are being taken. The truth is no-one is forcing the dictatorship to do what it does. Only they are responsible for their actions. To try to excuse them, to blame the victims, or those helping them, provides comfort and protection to people responsible for the most appalling human rights abuses, and who are determined to cling on to power at any cost. The behavior of the regime is inexcusable. It is time to stop making excuses for them. Stop blaming the victims. * Zoya Phan is the Campaigns Manager at Burma Campaign UK. Her autobiography is published as "Undaunted" in the USA, and "Little Daughter" in the rest of the world. Corruption in Burma, Part VII: Censor board hurdles – Sandy May Mizzima News: Wed 25 May 2011 Rangoon – In Burma, there is a state censorship board, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division (PSRD), under the Information Ministry. All kinds of books, cartoons and journals need to pass their manuscripts or stories through the censorship board prior to publication. The board has authority to remove anything from the manuscripts, and they typically provide comments as to why they removed 'unsuitable' material. Moreover, the board has authority to decide to whom they should grant a publishing license. With this power, it is alleged that officials from the censorship board have become deeply involved in corruption. Unless you pay bribes The initial hurdle that all publishers face is obtaining a publishing license. A female publisher, who asked not to be named, told Mizzima that she was adamant that she would not pay a bribe. 'I applied for a license to publish a magazine. I attached all the required documents to my application form. But, I did not pay a bribe to any official or approach any authority. So, for more than two years after I applied, I did not get the license. Recently, I was finally granted the license, but I said I would not take it because I have published magazines under my friend's license', she said. Her friend, who is the license owner, said, 'I heard that my friend applied for a license to publishing a magazine. We for the time when she would get the license, but in vain. 'At this point, I understood what was going on. With the help of my dad, I tried to get a strong recommendation from a minister. Then I went to the censorship board and applied for a license and attached the minister's recommendation. And I paid bribes of hundreds of thousands of kyat to the relevant officials from the censorship board. Then, within 20 days, I was granted the publishing license'. That was not the end of the story. 'But, this was not all I needed to do. I needed to prove that I had stayed away from party politics. But, that was also easy if I had enough money. I paid 500,000 kyat (US$ 610) to the police officer in charge, and he produced proof that I was not involved in party politics. Then, I received a publishing license. There are many steps in the process. But, if you have the testimonial of an important person, the process can be speeded up. Now, I'm publishing magazines'. The woman who did not pay a bribe said she wanted to know how much time it would take to get the license without paying a bribe. 'That's why I did not pay bribes', she said. 'Now I know it takes an extremely long time unless I you pay bribes'. A publisher who tried to upgrade his magazine publishing license to a journal publishing license said, 'I think getting a license to open a beer bar is easier. To get approval to do good things is difficult'. But there is a way if you have money. 'I spent 2 million kyat to get my magazine publishing license. I bought it from a reseller who is a member of staff of the censorship board. They got the license for free in a few days because they had testimonials by a minister. But, I had to pay 2 million kyat to them', the publisher said. 'Earlier, they told me that updating the magazine publishing license to a journal publishing license was easy. But, later I was told that I needed approval from a minister. Now, I've lost the desire to publish journals', he said. There are many resellers. According to people in the publishing business, to buy a license for publishing news journals, the applicant must pay a minimum of 4 million kyat; for a license for other journals, you must pay a minimum of 3 million kyat; and the minimum price of a magazine publishing license is 2 million kyat. The official rate to apply for licenses varies from 100,000 kyat to 300,000 kyat. Observers say that in the real world the close associates of the authorities get their licenses almost free and then resell the licenses to other people for hundreds of thousands of kyat. All this takes place even though the regulations state that nobody can resell or lend a publishing license. White Tiger party to cooperate with Thai company for mining in Shan State – Hseng Khio Fah Shan Herald Agency for News: Wed 25 May 2011 Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), better known as the White Tiger party, the second winning party in Shan State at the 2010 elections, is planning to work together with some Thai companies in mining projects in Shan State as well as others business projects, according to party's finance chief Sao Than Myint. Apart from mining projects, the companies have also proposed, when the party members and some 10 representatives of the companies met on 23 May, at the party's office in Rangoon, that they were willing to help develop local communities including their agricultural projects, said Sao Than Myint. "They said they wanted to help in agricultural and farming including technical methods," he said. The party however has yet to reach any agreement with the companies as it still have to discuss and hold meeting with Executive Committee (EC) again whether the projects should be conducted or not. In addition, they party and the companies will also have to make some survey first what kinds of ore the companies are interested to extract, where and which part of the state that the projects would be set up, Sao Than Myint added. Currently, the companies have reportedly more interest to work in areas where there is a shared boundary with the Thailand like eastern and southern Shan State. "Whatever it is we haven't given them commitment because we are still having discussion with EC members. Then we will have another meeting with the companies," Sao Than Myint said. If both sides can reach an agreement, the party members then will submit a letter for permission to the state government and to the union government if necessary, for approval. Regarding their projects, the groups say they will also make consideration for environment problems the projects may cause to local people. The party however says it will not handle any project directly. "The party will not be directly involved in business. We will lay down principles and hire someone to handle on behalf of the party. He/she then will operate the project in the name of the party's company," Sao Than Myint added. The company name is called "Top White Tiger", according to the party. Now, the party is producing detergent powder with "White Tiger" logo. The raw materials are imported from Malaysia. New players enter, but the China-Burma game continues – Aung Linn Htut Irrawaddy: Wed 25 May 2011 On Thursday, Burma's new president, ex-Gen Thein Sein, will pay his first official state visit to China. Although Thein Sein will for the first time be playing a leading role in Sino-Burmese diplomacy, what will happen in the future between these two neighboring countries may be predicted based on their present and past relationship. Previously, successive Burmese governments were particularly careful in dealing with China. Such caution dates back to the Bagan Dynasty, when Burma was destroyed by the Chinese during the reign of Burmese King Narathihapatae. Later, just after Burma gained independence from the British in 1948, the country was engaged in a war of aggression with the Chinese Kuomintang army during the administration of Premier U Nu, resulting in three Burmese border towns being handed over to China. Then further conflict broke out while Burma was ruled by the late dictator Gen Ne Win, during which China, assisted by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), deployed its troops and spies in the Kokang, Wa, Ahkhar, Shan and Kachin areas of northeastern Burma. The Burma-China border was also quite tense during Burma's nationwide pro-democracy uprising in 1988. Relations between Beijing and the Burmese government, then led by the Burma Socialist Programme Party, were not in good shape. And using the pretext of a US aircraft carrier entering Burmese waters, China reportedly deployed two army brigades along the border with plans to invade upper Burma and conquer Mandalay. When the US did not invade, China canceled its original plan and reportedly shifted towards supporting the CPB in a serious operation to take over the area east of the Salween river. After the CPB was defeated in the Mong Yang Operation, China again changed its tactics with respect to Burma. First, it withdrew its support for the CPB leadership and allowed ethnic groups to break away from the party and form their own militias. In addition, the Chinese and Burmese intelligence services began low-level communications. Then in 1989, Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng followed Beijing's advice and contacted Burmese Maj Than Aye, head of intelligence unit No. 9 based in Lashio, Kachin State, to discuss peace without disarmament. Lo Hsing Han, a former drug lord, served as a liaison between the two parties and a cease-fire deal was reached. The Kokang offer was accepted by Burmese Gen Saw Maung and Brig-Gen Khin Nyunt, then the leaders of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), with the approval of Ne Win, who had resigned his official post in 1988 but retained a great deal of influence over state affairs. Later, many armed ethnic armed groups based along the Sino-Burmese border followed the Kokang example and entered into cease-fire agreements with the SLORC. Snr-Gen Than Shwe and Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, both holding the rank of Maj-Gen at the time, were not happy with the cease-fire agreements, but they dared not protest against deals entered into by their superiors. After taking office, however, Than Shwe used to say he was dealing with the Chinese not out of desire but because it was unavoidable. He never shook hands with leaders of cease-fire groups from the northeastern part of the country, and frequently told divisional and regional commanders at quarterly meetings that those groups would be attacked one day. In 1994, a Chinese national was caught in possession of spy communication devices at a check-point in Lashio. During interrogation, it was learned that he was a Kuomintang [Taiwan] agent spying on mainland China. Consequently, Burmese authorities arrested a Taiwanese intelligence agent with the rank of colonel in Rangoon and nine other agents based in Mandalay, May Myo [Pyin Oo Lwin], Lashio, Kut Khaing and Muse. The agents said they were not spying on Burma, only collecting information about Yunnan Province to send back to Taiwan. When Than Shwe received a detailed report about the situation, he said, “These Taiwanese don't cause any trouble for us, so let them free and ask them to give us whatever information they collect regarding mainland China.â€� At the time, Thein Sein was the Colonel General Staff Officer for Than Shwe. After the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in the 1990 election, China was the first country to recognize the party's victory by sending its ambassador to Burma to the NLD. But after the SLORC refused to transfer power to the NLD, Beijing focused on its economic interests and sold US $2 billion worth of second-handed fighters, tanks, cannons and heavy and light weapons to the Burmese military. Despite the fact that Burma had no foreign income at the time, Saw Maung had to buy the items on credit in order to gain support from China, a permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) member. When Beijing asked for payment when Than Shwe was in power, he said Burma was unable to retire the debt and blamed Saw Maung for purchasing old or worn-out equipment. As a result, China held a grudge against Burma. But China warmed to its neighbor once again when UNOCAL, a US company, and TOTAL, a French company, extracted natural gas in Burma. China started making investments in Burmese hydro-power projects around the year 2000, and also requested the Burmese government to allow its cargo ships from Yunnan to travel down the Irrawaddy River to the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, Beijing offered to construct a deep-sea port at Bamaw in the Irrawaddy Division, build a road between Bamaw and the Chinese border and clear the Irrawaddy River as it had done the Mekhong. China requested that in exchange, Burmese authorities agree not to check ships that sailed along the Irrawaddy River with the Chinese flag. The Burmese regime, at the time called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), initially agreed to the Chinese proposal. Afterwards, however, former Chinese president Jiang Zemin was reportedly angered during his state visit to Burma in 2001 because Than Shwe withdrew his agreement to the deal just when the two countries were about to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding passage along the Irrawaddy. As a result, the relationship between the two countries became tense. Than Shwe then changed his political tactics, first using Suu Kyi as a scapegoat and then releasing her from house arrest in May 2002 in order to improve relations with US president George W. Bush. However, Burma came under serious pressure from the US and European countries following the May 2003 attack on Suu Kyi's entourage, also known as the Depayin Massacre, after which she was once again placed under house arrest. To contain pressure from the international community, the regime once again moved close to China. Consequently, interests in the Burmese energy, mining and irrigation sectors were transferred to Chinese companies. Instead of the nearby India, off-shore natural gas from western Arakan State was sold to Beijing. And when Khin Nyunt was ousted in 2004 and Chinese authorities became concerned about the plight of ethnic armed groups in Burma's northeastern region, Than Shwe's regime hurriedly sent former Gen Shwe Mann, the current speaker of the Lower House of Burma's new Parliament, to China to calm the situation. In late 2008, the Chinese foreign minister met with Than Shwe and told him to follow UNSC instructions, and Than Shwe reportedly became furious with the foreign minister for telling him what to do. As a result, soon after the departure of the foreign minister from Burma, Than Shwe said that he wanted to change the route of the planned oil and natural gas pipelines between Burma and China. Instead of using Kyaukpyu, Arakan State, he now wanted to use Sittwe, the capital of Arakan State, as the starting point for oil and gas transfers. A senior Chinese leader immediately came to Burma and appealed to Than Shwe not to change the route. Since then, Beijing has never urged the regime to release Suu Kyi or enter into dialog with the opposition. In November 2008, the Burmese regime sent Shwe Mann to China to garner support for its new Constitution. The timing was coincidental with Than Shwe pressuring ethnic armed groups to transform into members of its border guard force (BGF). Chinese authorities reportedly told Shwe Mann not to use violent means in dealing with the ethnic armed groups, but the regime launched a military offensive against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDDA), the Kokang group led by Peng Jiasheng, for not agreeing to the BGF plan. The attack resulted in the exodus of tens of thousands of refugees from Burma to China and once again caused serious tension between the two countries, as Beijing was reportedly furious with the regime for not respecting its request. To ease the situation, Than Shwe sent Shwe Mann to Beijing, but Chinese leaders were reportedly not satisfied with Shwe Mann's explanation and instead asked the regime to assign someone higher than him to handle the matter. A delegation led by Maung Aye was therefore sent to China and and was pressured into signing a Memorandum of Understanding on six projects, including the Kyaukpyu oil pipeline and hydro-power plant. Later, Beijing asked the international community to support Burma's 2008 Constitution. In addition, China's support for Burma's 2010 election and the resulting new government has been evidenced by the recent visits of two Chinese political and military leaders to Burma. According to reliable sources in Naypyidaw, the current capital of Burma, Chinese leaders who have visited Burma in 2011 gave their full support to the new government and discussed regular meetings between Chinese and Burmese army officials at the border to resolve problems in a friendly manner, joint military training and the purchase of ordinance, and investments in oil and gas pipelines, hydro-power plants and deep-sea ports. The sources said that the Chinese leaders did not speak one word about Suu Kyi, but asked the Burmese government to use dialog to deal with matters related to cease-fire groups in northeastern Burma. Based on an analysis of the past and present relations between the two countries, one can predict that China will be particularly dangerous for Burma in the future and the situation will be very worrisome for the Burmese people. Burmese military leaders, who may have thought they are good at the political game, have played China against the US and India, but they are now in a position to only follow whatever Beijing asks them to do. China has not only acquired many parts of Burma's economy, it has to a certain extent dominated ethnic relations and culture. Burma's current military leaders, including Gen Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, are reportedly not happy with the situation, but they do not know all the details of what their seniors previously did and agreed to do. As a result, they do not know what words and actions are right and wrong with respect to China, so they have to follow Than Shwe's instructions. If they continue the way they are going, Burma will indeed become a part of China, or a Chinese colony, as many people say. Or the discontent of the Burmese people will grow and lead to anti-Chinese riots, which will end up in conflict between the two countries. * Aung Lin Htut is a former Burmese military intelligence officer and deputy ambassador to the US who is currently living in Washington. Five facts about China-Myanmar relations Reuters: Tue 24 May 2011 Myanmar's new civilian president, Thein Sein, arrives in China on Thursday for a three-day state visit. Here are five facts about the complex relationship between China and Myanmar: *In 1949, Burma, as Myanmar was then known, was one of the first countries to recognise the People's Republic of China. But relations soured in the 1960s following anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon (now called Yangon). * Following a crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 1988, the West imposed broad sanctions on Myanmar. China stepped into the void, providing aid and weapons and ramping up trade. Beijing has continued to provide broad diplomatic support for Myanmar's, though the powerful military remains wary of their enormous northern neighbour. * Bilateral trade rose more than half last year to $4.4 billion, and China's investment in Myanmar reached $12.3 billion in 2010, according to Chinese figures, with a strong focus on natural resources and energy projects. * Myanmar gives China access to the Indian Ocean, not only for imports of oil and gas and exports from landlocked southwestern Chinese provinces, but also potentially for military bases or listening posts. In October, China's state energy group CNPC started building a crude oil port in Myanmar, part of a pipeline project aimed at cutting out the long detour oil cargoes take through the congested and strategically vulnerable Malacca Strait. * The relationship has had rocky patches of late. In August 2009, refugees flooded across into China following fighting on the Myanmar side of the border between rebels and government troops, angering Beijing. Myanmar has since promised to maintain stability on the border. In 2007, China's Foreign Ministry published an unflattering account of Myanmar's new purpose-built capital Naypyitaw, expressing surprise that the poor country would consider such an expensive move without first telling its supposed Chinese friends. (Writing by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Alex Richardson) A bottom-up approach to democracy: The question of federalism in Burma – Banya Hongsar Shan Herald Agency for News: Tue 24 May 2011 Restoring Burma's democratic political system is the new destiny of Burma's citizens. Different approaches, strategies, and principles will have to be used based on the concepts of those involved on the ground. The aspiration for unity can be fostered in grassroots practice when a commitment is made to uphold the principle of human rights and equality. The concept of federalism must come before democracy in Burma, as we have seen in recent political events. The desire of all ethnic people to establish federalism in Burma is a popular topic of debate after the election in November 2010. A military-affiliated government has transformed itself as an alternative government under the new constitution. Pro-democracy activists and political resistance forces have been struggling to foster a new united campaign, while the nation has been divided on various fronts. The question of federalism in Burma is not a relevant topic to most of Burma's observers and experts from Western nations. However, most ethnic armed force leaders believe that it is only way to move away from the current political stalemate. According to the UN Information Center in Rangoon, "Recognizing the significance of the government's commitments, we must stress that implementation is key. I underscored the opportunity and responsibility that the government now has to translate its commitments into effective action. Domestically and internationally, expectations are high that it will start taking concrete steps soon". In addition, a press statement by Mr. Vijay Nambiar, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, in May stated that President U Thein Sein will be playing a win-win game with the UN and U.S. engagement for a wider acknowledgement of his new government in the international community arena. The newly elected military-affiliated government for the Union of Myanmar will not help Burma grow into a peaceful and prosperous nation under the rule of laws. The newly formed government is not committed to better governance or to sharing power with the ethnic states based in parliament unless the local Members of Parliament align with the government. Local activists and politicians should be seeking greater political participation in local issues such as health, education, and economy, while they also have to strive for better access to state budgets and resources which are mainly controlled by military-linked businesses and sectors. I am a citizen and activist of Burma who would like to see Burma transform into a democratic nation. I will seek a place to bring this debate with relevant facts and arguments from the past and current events of Burma. A sensible way of building a new nation under a federalist model will never be perfect in modern politics unless peoples' participation in decision-making process is in place. It is a new political ground that Burma — as a nation that has to prepare that political inclusiveness — is the foundation of building a flourishing democracy in this century. A nation of multi-ethnic diverse people has to support local and national policies that each voice is lawfully heard and protected. The best form of federalism engages different political interest groups and ensures that local issues to the broader national issues on health, education, employment and legal protection to all citizens of the country are heard. Burma is a land of peace in the history, but the country has been torn a part due to lack of trust and respect between multi-ethnic political leaders and the Burmese army's generals. For the last 50 years, the nation has been ruled by military might and, as a result, the nation has declined, in dysfunction and is marginalized in the modern world stage. The Burma majority ethnic needs to address this decline and if modern political leaders decide to pursue a federalist platform, then they need to rebuild Burmese trust in their government. The best model will include the principle of political change in the country with a sense of social justice within the community of each ethnic group and neighbouring borders. Activists, new political leaders, and those who seek political power in the meantime should foster a mentality of change in the spirit of evolution and revolution. The seven ethnic states and regions with high proportions of ethnic people are required to be incepted under a sensible constitution in due time. It is in Burma's interest that the nation should be seeking lasting peace and prosperity like other countries in the region. However, any conflicts over issues can not be solved unless political leaders share the burden of the nation on social, political, and economic implications. A federalist model in Burma should also seek technical assistance from local, national, and international constitutional lawyers and experts. Burmese constitutional experts and modern political leaders have been working on it for some time both privately and publically in liberated areas. But the federalism project like National Reconciliation Program (NRP) and other programs like Transitional Justice on Burma have limited resources and practical network with grassroots inside the country. Burma's pro-democracy campaigners nationally and internationally are wise to set up a kind of "Burma Federalism Project" locally and nationally with the support of other civil society network. It is the network that could reach to local media, civil society and other groups like workers where a community education session could also commence within the community. A similar project should be setting within the community in all state and region under the laws that citizen could explore new idea for co-existing with peace and unity in purpose. A mentality of community should be fostered within the community's attitude and behavior. Buddhist culture has been living within the majority of Burma's peoples more than a thousand years. Imposing a new institution in social and political terms will require time and space to be integrated within the community. It is not only a systematic to be changed for nation's prosperity and lasting peace, it also requires institutional changes with moral responsibility. This is the hard question for Burma: Can institutional change be achieved in such a closed political landscape? Western observers and experts on Burma rarely look at the nature of the society on its societal and cultural functionality in social and political terms, even though they have the best intentions for the Burmese. They have been seeking a solution for Burma that falls under the banner of "democracy, human rights and national reconciliation" for some years now. A close-minded political culture has been deepening among Burma's people prior to British rule in early 1880s. A self-observed community in religion and traditional beliefs has been living with the mentality of the generation of the 19th century while open-minded generation of the 21st century tends to seek liberalisation. Local politicians fail to capture the changing pattern of old and new generation while they mobilize the movement in the early 1990s. After 60 years of militarization and nationalism of the Burmese, a question of federalism in the 21st century must be examined based on rulers' attitudes. A newly formed government and parliament is dominated both the national and state assemblies by the former military personals. The ethnic leaders have been calling for political dialogue both formally and informally to the ruling military regime for over 20 years, but the ruling Burmese dominated new government will never make or give a gesture for any proposals. The ruling military regime lacks vision for the formation of federalism apart from blaming the ethnic leaders and people with a propaganda of "disintegration of the Union" in the last 60 years. Despite ethnic leaders reaching consensus on many historical accords for a genuine with a balance of power between the national (federal government) and state governments by a new model of constitution proposed by Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) in 2004, the military government ignored the initiative for once and for all. I will advocate and explore a sensible way for Burma to be governed under the principle of federalism in the 21st century with a sense of national pride from all citizens of the country regardless of race, religion, and ethnicity. It is time that a mature political vision and a bold movement among local people for fostering public participation in local issues from schooling to hospitals and from road construction to town planning in which each citizen has a say on local issues that matters to us. Although the question of federalism in Burma has been under shadow under the banner of democratization in recent events after the release of pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, the aspiration of the movement has never been diminished among ethnic and majority Burmese democracy activists. The only sensible model of federalism will sustain Burma's lasting political stability in the 21st century. An attempt at "socialism" failed from 1962 to 1988 amidst political manipulation by the ruling military government. Over 20 years of military rule will never sustain peace and security among the community in the country and beyond. A newly crafted a shameful constitution and newly elected government lacks federalism and democratization with a principle of 'free and fair' society. Burma watcher and prominent journalist Bertil Lintner warned, "Recent openness in other areas should not be viewed as a sign that newer leaders are more liberal-minded. Rather, this suggests that the new generation is perpetuating the same cycle of repression, openness, and then repression again that the older generation perfected." In addition, the Australian National University recently convened a conference about Burma with an estimated over 70 guests from researchers, scholars, policy makers from Australian government, Burma democracy activists and speakers from the Union of Myanmar. Some speakers also shared the view of the new government is willing to "change, reform and cooperate" under the new legislative framework while the majority are silence on this assertion. A lack of trust and respect between Burmese and non-Burmese ethnic people, especially among political leaders should be healing both spiritually and mentally. A sensible model of sharing power and balance of power between Burmese- dominated officials within the government and non-Burmese ethnic elites those who are based in urban should be fostering a mature relations and win-win positions for common good to common purpose. Lacking mature respect and trust among Burmese and non-Burmese elites will delay federalism in Burma regardless political conviction in our era. An aspiration of formation of genuine federal governance in Burma is not only a lasting political solution, but also a lasting regional human security in terms of armed conflict and internally displaced person. Burma will be a nation of progressive in social and political order if the country is equally ruled by each ethnic government in their own state and division under the rule of laws. A political movement on a campaign for federalism will never achieved unless local young people and young women in our generation share common interest for education, health and economy development among local Burmese and non-Burmese people in the same country. New political leaders and democracy activists have little choice but to take bold action on community setting where they could engage local issues on health, education and socio-cultural development for the best interest of each citizen of the country. Federalism is not only bargaining for sole political power, but also for the sake of sharing power, responsibility and resources among local people. Hence, therefore, the rule of laws is the foundation of the movement in our era. I have lived in a Western country for more than 10 years under the rule of laws, democracy and practice of federalism from local and national issues. In Australia, I am informed by media, government's agency and public notices. I have the the right to be informed and to be engaged with the issues in my local area and it has been a good experience. I have been observing and learning from the practical lessons that local government has major role to play in local education, health and social and cultural development for the local people. It is Burma's best interest that local government in each state and division have constitutional power under a parliamentary framework in which the government could implement independently without intervention of the federal government. Federalism like Australia has strong social and political capitals because citizens are informed in all local and national issues prior to decision making process through the government. It is a good time that local activists and other new political and social interest forces build a consensus for where to take it from here. Burma will be ruled by military elites and its linked businesses in the foreseeable future unless a new campaign for a genuine federal state is formed in our new generation. No one will lose anything by supporting a better and fairer model of federalism in Burma. It is the foundation of Burma for the 21st century. Unity is strength and diversity is wealth for Burma. U Ko Ko Hlaing said recently in the Myanmar Time journal, "The president was 'likely' to declare a general amnesty at the 'time he sees fit'." Indeed, equality under the laws must uphold the rule of laws based on the principle of human rights in this new era of democracy. The president also welcomed those whose opinions are different and wanted anti-government groups to participate in the democratic process, provided they accept the constitution. This assertion is not balanced, but a welcoming gesture for further political debate in the country. On the contrary, Lintner again warned that, "For instance, the new constitution gives the commander in chief of the armed forces the power to directly select one-fourth of all parliamentary seats, and allows the president to hand over power to the army in the event of a 'national crisis' — a term so vaguely defined it could mean a popular pro-democracy uprising. There is no indication that Gen. Thein Sein has any intention to change this." Lintner clearly read the mindset of the army's general based on the history of the past and the present. A closer look should be examined by local politician whether the president keeps his own words. A constitutional and institutional change will never be completed unless an attitude change is accomplished among local people in cultural diverse ethnic nationality. David Scott Mathieson, a senior researcher in the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, asserted that "needs of local development in health, education, land management, and economic reforms, including urgently needed micro-financing projects. These fundamentals have been lost in the haze of a system of control and the various responses by communities to survive under continued military rule (with a thin civilian facade for now)." Over 400 farmers lost their local farm land from 1996 soon after the government of Union of Myanmar (the former ruling junta) confiscated in Mon State during the construction of Unocal –Total gas project for security and building a new army camps in the village's farms. Land rights must adequately address in the new laws for the survival of local farmers and peasants. Workers and farmer's rights under the laws should be debated in the local state and division assembly as an urgent matter. Federalism in Burma will only succeed when people of Burma from all ethnicity share the pain and gain. A political power without morality is a sin. A free and fair society will maintain peace only when people respect a dignity of a person. This is the campaign that I am devoted to walk along with global friends who wish Burma success in the 21st century. "Federalism is one mechanism for reconciling as far as possible. The autonomy of diverse regions within a nation with a sufficient degree of national and governmental unity," Christopher D. Gilbert asserts in his book Australian and Canadian Federalism. He added that, "Perhaps the more diverse are the regions comprising a federal nation, the looser and more de-centralized that nation's federalism needs to be." The faith of over 50 million people in Burma is on President U Thein Sein's hand. He has an opportunity to liberate them as once for all or he lives with guilt of political coward if he lacks of courage to restore a united Burma under his own principle of "clean government, fair government, just government" as he claimed in his opening speech in March. Federalism is not a treat to the sovereignty of Burma/Myanmar. It is strength of the nation that competes to the world new social, economy and political changes in the 21st century. Statement of the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Mr. Tomas Ojea Quintana FCCT, Bangkok via Mizzima News: Tue 24 May 2011 This is the final day of my mission to Thailand which began on 16 May 2011. I visited Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son and Bangkok this time in my efforts to gather information about the situation inside Myanmar where I have not been able to visit. This information is important for preparation of my next report to the UN General Assembly later this year. I met with various stakeholders including civil society and community based organizations, experts, UN officials, and diplomats. I also met with the Foreign Minister of Thailand and Myanmar's Ambassador to Thailand. I spoke with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi by telephone. The UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution shortly after I presented my last report this March that asked me: "to provide an assessment of any progress made by the Government in relation to its stated intention to transition to the democracy to the General Assembly." My findings from this mission are that the situation of ethnic minority groups in the border areas presents serious limitations to the Government's intention to transition to democracy. Violence continues in many of these areas. Systematic militarization contributes to human rights abuses. These abuses include land confiscation, forced labor, internal displacement, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence. They are widespread, they continue today, and they remain essentially unaddressed by the authorities. I am concerned that the Government is not finding a political solution to solve the ethnic conflicts. The authorities have now reached the final step of their 7-step roadmap to democracy, but democracy requires much more. The Government has said that the Parliament is the only venue for discussion on national reconciliation. Even though the establishment of national and state and regional legislatures is important, these venues alone are not sufficient. These democratic institutions are very new, and I see some positive signs in them, but it is too early for them to function effectively and to manage this important and complex issue that has a direct impact on ongoing human rights abuses and compromises stability. We also have to keep in mind that the electoral process excluded several significant ethnic and opposition groups, so their voices are not being heard in these fora. In Mae Hong Son, I met with a number of Karenni groups. Kayah State is one of Myanmar's smallest but most militarized states. The group told me of their concern about the new conscription laws. According to their information, which has also been echoed by other ethnic groups from other states, village men have been requested to provide lists of names of people to serve. A number of refugees have fled out of fear of being conscripted including women, Only Karenni living in towns but not in villages have birth certificates or identification cards which would pose a serious problem for verifying who is over the age of 18. This could exacerbate Myanmar's critical problem of child soldiers. Another issue that was raised was the problem of infrastructure projects in Kayah State. These projects have been leading to well-documented human rights abuses throughout Myanmar. Now there appear to be several more new projects in development. Myanmar requires strong rule of law in order to guarantee the rights of the people in context of these infrastructure projects. Communities need to be consulted in a meaningful way, which does not appear to have been done in most cases. Revenues from these projects should be recorded appropriately and used to benefit the people of Myanmar for the realization of their economic, social and cultural rights. The private companies that are involved in these projects also have a responsibility to not be complicit in human rights abuses. Finally, the groups highlighted the dire situation of economic, social and cultural rights in Kayah State. Young people leave for jobs in neighbouring countries. Children are sent by parents to refugee camps in Thailand for basic education opportunities because schools are not available in much of the state and the quality of the schools is inadequate. In respect to the recently announced release of prisoners, I must say that the release was insufficient because most of the prisoners of conscience remain in prison. It was not an amnesty but a commutation of sentences by one year only. This decision of the Government was also a disappointment because it did not provide the strong signal of commitment to national reconciliation. National reconciliation requires the full participation of all key stakeholders, including prisoners of conscience, some of whom are ethnic minority leaders. I would like to see a concrete and timebound plan announced by the Government for the systematic release of all prisoners of conscience. In previous reports, I highlighted the situation of elderly and sick prisoners to be of special attention. Also key to national reconciliation is the issue of truth, justice and accountability. The Government and the people of Myanmar need to address this matter urgently as I have repeatedly said in my reports and statements. I have also stated that the primary responsibility lies with the Government to undertake independent, impartial, and timely investigations of serious human rights violations. The international community also has a role to play particularly if the Government fails to meet this responsibility. As I have suggested previously, a commission of inquiry might be one way to address the issue. I discussed the issue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. She supports a commission of inquiry absolutely. She said a commission of inquiry is a commission of inquiry, not a tribunal. I agree with her. The idea of a commission of inquiry is that it would be an instrument to bring about transition to democracy, national reconciliation and establishment of accountability. It should pursue the truth and facilitate reparations. It should also end and prevent ongoing human rights abuses. Through this mission, I see some positive signs in the developments. In the first and only sitting of the Parliament so far, MPs despite limitations were able to raise some important questions from the human rights perspective. These questions included the possibility of a cease fire in Kayin State, the issue of citizenship status of Rohingyas, and whether amnesty would be granted to Shan political prisoners. Some interesting discussions about economic, social and cultural rights seem to have begun, including a national seminar on poverty reduction that is taking place right now. I have started to address the important matter of economic, social and cultural rights in my last report to the Human Rights Council. At the state level, there appears to be some participation by ethnic minority parties in the legislatures. Finally, the new President's speeches have led to some expectations for positive change. He provides some interesting ideas that could be developed into benchmarks for progress. We will have to watch closely to see how this is translated into action. It is my hope to be able to visit Myanmar as soon as possible to continue discussions with the authorities and other stakeholders about progress being made towards the transition to democracy and concerns about the ongoing serious human rights situation in the country Suu Kyi says 'we must rely on ourselves' – Jim Andrews Mizzima: Mon 23 May 2011 Chiang Mai – Burma's political opposition can expect little support from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and India and must now depend on its own efforts to win democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi has told a German TV panel. 'We know in the end we must rely on ourselves, and that is not a bad thing', she told the panel, in a programme broadcast on Sunday to Asia by the German world news channel Deutsche Welle, in cooperation with the Hertie School of Governance. The pro-democracy leader Suu Kyi joined the round table discussion devoted to the future of Burma from what was described as a 'secret location' in Rangoon. Suu Kyi said she was particularly 'saddened' by India's 'disappointing role' because of the links with Burma that stretched back to colonial times. The Indian government has reportedly been attempting to improve their relations with the authorities in Burma, aware of the growing influence of China in the Southeast Asian country. New Delhi has stressed that they have strategic and economic interests to protect in Burma and that the struggle for democracy is up to the Burmese people. As for Asean, Suu Kyi said the organization could learn much from the way African countries sorted out their problems together. 'One of the problems is that Asean talks about non-interference, in contrast to African countries', she said. The members of the 53-state African Union take an active interest in developments in member states, and have on occasion deployed peacekeeping troops in several troubled states. She lamented what she said was the lack of international support and poorly coordinated international aid, claiming Europe was 'too disunited' when it came to Burma. She noted during the discussion that people in Burma, subject to the censored media, had been following events in the Arab world with great interest. The protests of 'Arab Spring' in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen had raised questions in Burma's exile media as to whether there might be a repeat of Burma's 2007 'Saffron Revolution' protest against the military junta, though observers claim the situation in Rangoon is very different from the streets of Cairo. Suu Kyi said she was encouraged by the interest young Burmese appeared to be showing in politics. 'This has been one of the greatest changes I have seen since being released (from house arrest)'. 'Young people are much more interested now (in politics), particularly because they are frustrated and they see they must bring about change themselves. '[Burma's] youth has decided it must empower itself. Young people are becoming much more self-reliant'. Nevertheless, 'pervasive fear' still hindered political progress in Burma, Suu Kyi said. Burma needed an independent judiciary as a top priority, she said. Rule of law would result in freedom for the country's political prisoners—one of the preconditions for change. UN envoy: Myanmar does little to stop rights abuse – Todd Pitman Associated Press: Mon 23 May 2011 Bangkok – The United Nations' human rights envoy to Myanmar said Monday that the country's nascent civilian government has done little to address widespread abuses, including forced labor and extrajudicial killings, since replacing the ruling junta in March. Elections last year for a new parliament and the installation of civilian leaders this spring were supposed to be the final steps of what Myanmar's military leaders had hailed as their "roadmap to democracy." But U.N. envoy Tomas Ojea Quintana told reporters in Bangkok that "democracy requires much more." Myanmar's government is currently refusing to allow Quintana to visit the Southeast Asian nation. The envoy spoke after a weeklong trip to Thailand to talk with refugees from Myanmar. Thailand is home to more than 100,000 people who have fled the neighboring country. Quintana said violence continues along Myanmar's eastern border region, and ethnic minority groups there are victims of "land confiscation, forced labor, internal displacement, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence." These abuses "are widespread, they continue today, and they remain essentially unaddressed by the authorities," Quintana said. In Myanmar's eastern Kayah state, for example, both men and women have fled out of fear of being conscripted into the military, he said. There is such a deficit of schools there that some parents send their children to refugee camps in Thailand for basic education, he added. Ethnic groups living in the eastern and northern border areas have sought more autonomy since Myanmar's independence in 1948, and the government maintains uneasy cease-fires with most armed groups in those regions but faces low-level rebellions by others. Human rights organizations have long accused the military of forcing civilians into forced labor, particularly as porters. The military has ruled Myanmar with an iron hand since 1962, and critics charge the new government is merely the latest iteration of the repressive regime. Last week, Washington's deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Joseph Yun, also expressed concern about the new government's human rights policies. The Myanmar Times, meanwhile, quoted Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin as urging Yun to refer to the country as Myanmar rather than Burma. The former junta changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989, but many regime opponents and pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi still call the country by its former name. The paper quoted the minister as telling Yun: "You might think this is a small matter, but the use of 'Myanmar' is a matter of national integrity. … Using the correct name of the country shows equality and mutual respect." The U.S. Embassy in Myanmar declined to comment on the report. Though the U.S. long tried to isolate Myanmar, the Obama administration has switched to a policy of engagement in hopes of coaxing democratic change. Washington still insists that the government release political prisoners, estimated at more than 2,000 by the U.N. and human rights agencies. Myanmar's government last week released more than 14,000 prisoners from jails across the country under a clemency program, but Quintana and international rights have criticized the program because most political prisoners remain in detention. Over the weekend, the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, said 22 political detainees at Yangon's main Insein Prison began a hunger strike to protest living conditions, including poor food and health care that have given rise to a scabies outbreak. "National reconciliation requires the full participation of all key stakeholders, including prisoner of conscience," Quintana said. Treatment of ethnic minorities in Myanmar limiting path to democracy – UN expert UN News Centre: Mon 23 May 2011 A United Nations human rights expert on Myanmar said today that the continued treatment and condition of ethnic minority groups in the country's border areas presents was seriously restricting the Government's intended transition to democracy. "Violence continues in many of these areas, while systematic militarization contributes to human rights abuses," said Tomás Ojea Quintana, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, in a statement. "These abuses include land confiscation, forced labour, internal displacement, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence. They are widespread, they continue today, and they remain essentially unaddressed by the authorities." Mr. Ojea Quintana, who was not able to visit Myanmar, spoke after wrapping up an eight-day visit to neighbouring Thailand. He said he saw "positive signs" in the elections of new national and regional legislatures earlier, but added that "it is too early for them to function effectively and to manage this important and complex issue that has a direct impact on ongoing human rights abuses and compromises stability. " He said the electoral process excluded several significant ethnic and opposition groups, "so their voices are not being heard in these fora." Regarding a recently announced release of prisoners, the independent expert said most prisoners of conscience remain in jail. "I would like to see a concrete and time-bound plan announced by the Government for the systematic release of all prisoners of conscience." Last week Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary-General's Special Adviser for Myanmar, told the Security Council that the prisoner release was short of expectation and insufficient. Mr. Ojea Quintana said: "Through this mission, I see some positive signs in the developments. In the first and only sitting of the Parliament so far, MPs, despite limitations, were able to raise some important questions from the human rights perspective." The Special Rapporteur also noted the beginning of discussions about economic, social and cultural rights and some participation by ethnic minority parties in the legislatures. "The new President's speeches have led to some expectations for positive change. He provides some interesting ideas that could be developed into benchmarks for progress. We will have to watch closely to see how this is translated into action." President Thein Sein was elected by Parliament in February. "It is my hope to be able to visit Myanmar as soon as possible to continue discussions with the authorities and other stakeholders about progress being made towards the transition to democracy and concerns about the ongoing serious human rights situation in the country." Mr. Ojea Quintana, who has served in an unpaid and independent capacity since May 2008, reports to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva Burmese government land grab: Farmers without rights – U Myo and Lane Weir Mizzima: Mon 23 May 2011 In 2002, Saytoktaya Township farmlands were illegally occupied so that the government could build a military service factory. Fields and crops were bulldozed and no compensation was given. In May 2009, authorities in Arakan State confiscated farms for the purpose of providing land for a Chinese gas pipeline construction project from the Indian Ocean to mainland China. The promised compensation never materialized In December 2010, the government permitted a large Chinese company, Two Diamond Dragon, to confiscate hundreds of acres of farmland from local people in Kachin State. These are just examples of a rash of cases over the past decade in which the Burmese authorities have been grabbing farmers' land in pursuit of royalties and tax revenues, seemingly oblivious of the heartache caused to farmers, workers and families who are suddenly left with virtually no means of support. As a result, many workers and farmers are left with no option but to leave Burma to pursue work as migrant labourers in neighboring countries, particularly Thailand. Jackie Pollock, the director of the MAP Foundation in Chiang Mai, Thailand, says that for migrant labourers 'moving away from their homes, families and friends to work in Thailand is a huge decision. But there is comfort for those migrants that move knowing that they have a home to return to'. But, as Pollock points, 'for those who migrate because their land has been confiscated, even this last shred of security is torn from them, making the migration a traumatic experience.' An analysis of Burmese domestic law clearly illustrates the illegality of these land confiscations, resulting in heightened vulnerability and insecurity for Burmese workers and farmers. The problem in domestic law After struggling under British colonial power, the 1947 Constitution brought in prior to independence, the following year, represented liberation for the Burmese people. Under colonial rule, there had been no rights for peasants and workers. However, under the new Constitution, and subsequent laws passed by the legislature, protection for peasants and workers emerged. Section 30 of the Constitution provided that the 'State is the ultimate owner of all lands' and that 'subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the State shall have the right to regulate, alter or abolish land tenures or resume possession of any land and distribute the same for collective or cooperating farming or to agricultural tenants' and that 'there can be no large land holdings on any basis whatsoever. The maximum size of a private land holding shall, as soon as circumstances permit, be determined by law'. These provisions marked an attempt to provide land and security to small farmers and workers in Burma. Prior to independence, the wealthy elite owned large estates that they, along with the colonial government, had confiscated from small farmers. The majority of farmers, then, were forced to work as tenants on these estates. Tenants were required to pay exorbitant rents, in the form of crops, to the landowners. Unable to pay the rent, many farmers accumulated enormous amounts of debt and suffered from heightened vulnerability. Farmers across Burma aspired to own the farms that they worked. Following independence in 1948, the constitutional provisions on land, described above, were supplemented by the Tenancy Law and the Land Nationalization Act. The Land Nationalization Act, for example, set out to ensure that land was owned by farmers in small holdings by giving the government wide powers over the use and distribution of land. However, subsequent amendments to these laws, particularly the Tenancy Law, enabled large landowners and the government to continue leeching more and more resources from the farmers. Corrupt government officials and large landowners used the Tenancy Law as a mechanism for quashing the rights of Burmese farmers and workers. Compounding the problem is the issue of low wages. Laws passed in December 1948 and November 1949 set basic minimum wages for farmers. Unfortunately, the governments of General Ne Win and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) ignored these laws. Instead of aiding those that the 1948 and 1949 governments attempted to benefit, they have disregarded the basic needs of farmers and instead governed for the benefit only of the government and its cronies. The current government continues to govern in contrast to both the 1948 and 1949 laws and international standards on minimum wages by setting the level far below an adequate amount. Burmese workers earn a minimum wage of just 12,000 kyat (US$ 13.2) per month, in stark contrast to the 30,000 kyat minimum that Burmese government employes receive. By comparison, Burmese workers receive the lowest compensation among Asean countries. For example, what a Burmese worker earns in a month, a Thai worker is guaranteed in just three days of work. Not being able to earn a living that meets their basic needs is forcing many workers to seek employment in neighbouring countries. In sharp contradiction to the current treatment of workers in Burma, the 1963 Tenancy Law and the 1963 Law Safeguarding Peasant Rights were intended to protect farmers. The Law Safeguarding Peasant Rights, for example, stipulates in Section 30 that 'notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any existing law, a Civil Court shall not make a decree or order for: (a) a warrant of attachment for or confiscation of agricultural land; neither for employed livestock and implements, harrows and implements, other animate and inanimate implements, nor the produce of agricultural land, (b) prohibition of work upon or entry into agricultural land, (c) prohibition of movement or sale in whole or part or use of employed livestock and implements, harrows and implements, other animate and inanimate implements, or the produce of agricultural land and (d) arrest in detention of a peasant in connection with any matter included in paragraphs (a) (b) and (c)'. Ongoing illegal government action The reality today is that the rights of farmers and workers are not being protected in accordance with the law. This was illustrated on March 9, 2011, in proceedings in the Burmese legislature, the country's new Parliament. On that day, three representatives in the legislature, Aung Thein of Ywangan Constituency, Aung Zin of Pazundaung Constituency and Ye Tun of Hsipaw Constituency, posed questions that received responses inconsistent with Burmese domestic law. For example, Aung Zin asked why, in contrast to the purposes of the 1963 Tenancy Law and the 1963 Law Safeguarding Peasant Rights which aims to protect the interests of farmers owning small land holdings, the land of peasants was now being confiscated and nationalized in order to construct large factories and contract resources to foreign companies for the purpose of developing large agricultural holdings. This, he suggested, had turned farmers back into tenants. He asked if the government could justify the apparent inconsistencies between domestic law and government action. The Minister for Agriculture and Irrigation, Htay Oo, responded by arguing that the government was acting to serve the interests of peasants who constituted the majority of the population and that these actions were taken in accordance with domestic law. He failed to provide reasons as to why this was the case. The government's actions cannot be justified. Clear contradictions between government action and domestic law can be seen on three grounds. First, the government attempted to use the powers conferred on them by the Land Nationalization Act to justify the confiscation of farmland from small farmers. However, it was the intent of the legislature when it passed the act to enable the government to provide land for farmers, not to aid government officials in their attempts to line their own pockets by making contracts with foreign multinational companies. The government permits these activities as they are then able to collect taxes from the foreign companies. The intent of the Land Nationalization Act and the actions taken by the government are clearly inconsistent. Second, the actions taken by the government in actively engaging in confiscation, or enabling the confiscation of farmland, represents a clear violation of the Law Safeguarding Peasant Rights. As documented by the International Labour Organization, the government has arrested and detained farmers who have protested the illegal confiscation of their land. Finally, the government has violated the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. Section 36 (d) of the Constitution provides that the state 'shall not nationalize economic enterprises'. By confiscating land from small farmers in order to provide land and resources to foreign companies for the benefit of government officials, the 2008 Constitution has clearly been contravened. Life for farmers and workers in Burma is growing increasingly more difficult. The minimum wage fails to provide the 'just and favourable remuneration' that ensures 'an existence worthy of human dignity' that is guaranteed by Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a result, many Burmese citizens are forced to leave their families and communities to work as migrant labourers in neighbouring countries. Further, the government's efforts to confiscate the land of small farmers in order to profit from foreign investors has increased the vulnerability of many Burmese citizens. These actions have been taken in sharp contrast to both Burmese domestic and international laws. The government has provided no reasonable justification for their actions and, therefore, the government is acting in an illegal manner inconsistent with their responsibilities to the Burmese population. Myanmar to get RI rifles – Dina Indrasafitri The Jakarta Post: Fri 20 May 2011 Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro says the government hopes to sell Indonesian-made SS-2 assault rifles to Myanmar. "[Myanmar] looked at the SS-2. We have been offering it," he said Thursday after the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in Jakarta. Purnomo said that the nation's arms trade was currently conducted by Indonesian Incorporated, which represented Indonesia's state-owned weapons maker, PT Pindad; the Defense Ministry and the Defense Industry Policy Committee (KKIP). "Myanmar is already in the process of transition. They already had an election. It has to be done in phases," Purnomo said. Col. Jan Pieter Ate a special assistant to the Indonesian Defense Minister, said that in principle Indonesia would not limit its arms sales to any nation, including ASEAN member nations. "They should control their own markets rather than countries outside ASEAN," he said. Jan Pieter said that Indonesia's policy on arms sales was related to the ASEAN defense industry collaboration. "It's all right if we want to sell [arms] to Malaysia, Laos or Vietnam, and Myanmar. What we do not hope for — and we do not compromise in this — is if the weapons are used to threaten other countries," Jan Pieter said. He added that Indonesia's stance was firm, waving off the possibility that Indonesian-made weapons might be used on civilians. "The main purpose of weapons is to defend a country. This appeals to us as well," Jan Pieter said. Weapons sales might help Indonesia support Myanmar's shift towards democracy, he added. "With such a relationship, we will have better access to the country to improve democracy. If one [nation] does not have a relationship with another, it would be hard to influence one another. One of the ways is through trade, and defense is one of the ways [to do that]," Jan Pieter said. University of Indonesia security analyst Andi Widjajanto said the idea of selling Indonesian weapons to Myanmar was more positive than negative. "An 'embargo' of light weapons to Myanmar will in fact push the junta to enter the black market," he said. Giving Myanmar the option to remain in the international weaponry market would cause the transnational criminal network supporting arms smuggling to lose revenue, he said. |
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