Burma Update

Rangoon is now Beijing's best buddy in Southeast Asia and China's influence is visible everywhere across Burma

By LARRY JAGAN
BangkokPost: 21 June 2007

Burma has now become China's most important ally in Asia. China's support for the Burmese junta has recently strengthened immeasurably, as the Chinese leaders have made Rangoon the cornerstone of their revised strategy towards Southeast Asia in the face of what it fears is the growing and unwanted influence of the United States in the region. Since the beginning of the year there has been a flurry of diplomatic and business visits between the two capitals, with the aim of boosting economic, trade and technology ties. This included a secret mission by the Burmese army chief, General Thura Shwe Mann, to Beijing in May.

But their burgeoning relationship is not without some irritation, as Beijing realises its close relationship with its unpopular Asian ally is likely to increase pressure on them from Burmese political activists and the international community.

In early June, Burma's acting prime minister Thein Sein visited Beijing where he met senior Chinese legislators from the National Peoples' Congress and discussed a wide range of issues including political and economic matters. Almost immediately the Burmese government hosted a large delegation from Beijing, from the China-Asean Association which included government officials, legislators and businessmen. China is anxious to explore cooperation with Burma in almost all economic and business areas. During the visit of provisional Chinese officials three months ago, some 600 businessmen from both countries discussed mutual cooperation covering timber, bamboo and furniture, rubber, hydroelectric projects, construction, mining, transportation, tea products, beverages, sugar mills, textiles, fertiliser and chemicals, electric and electronic products, livestock and fisheries, machine parts and farm equipment.

Some time ago China decided that Burma was crucial to its economic development, especially for the more backward southern regions of the country which have lagged behind the economic development along China's eastern coast. But until recently, China's leaders have feared that Burma's military junta lacked real legitimacy and could collapse overnight, leaving Beijing's military and economic investment in the regime worthless. There is no doubt that China's greatest fear remains Burma's stability. More than a million Chinese farmers, workers and businessmen have crossed into Burma in the last 10 years and are working and living there. The Chinese authorities fear that any upheaval in Burma would result in a mass exodus of Chinese back across the border, creating increased industrial and social unrest in their border regions.

In the past few years Chinese businessmen and provincial government enterprises have boosted their investment in Burma: Lashio, Mandalay and Muse are virtually Chinese cities now. Even in Rangoon, the Chinese are involved in building a special tax-free export zone around the port.

China already has major oil and gas concessions in western Burma, and is planning overland pipelines to bring it to southern China.

Burma is an important strategic transit point for goods produced in southern China. They want to transport these by road to the Rangoon port for shipment to India, the Middle East and eventually Europe. Repair work is under way on Burma's antiquated internal road system that links southern China, through Mandalay to Rangoon.

Now there are fresh plans to rebuild the old British road through northern Burma that would connect southern China with northeast India. The Chinese have agreed to finance the construction of this highway using 40,000 Chinese construction workers. Some 20,000 would remain after the work was completed to do maintenance work on the road.

''When this happens the northern region of Burma will be swamped by Chinese government officials, workers, lorry drivers and businessmen _ it will no longer be Burma,'' according to a senior Western diplomat-based in Bangkok who has followed Burmese affairs for more than a decade.

Already along the Burmese border with China, every small town has restaurants and stores run by migrants from China, many have been there for more than a decade. Chinese teachers are also being recruited to work in the Chinese-language and bilingual schools that are popping up in many of the major cities in northern Burma. Already in the major border towns in Shan state like Mongla and Muse, only the Chinese currency _ the renminbi or yuan _ is used; Chinese calligraphy dominates the landscape: billboards, street signs and shopfronts almost all use Chinese characters exclusively; very little Burmese writing can be seen.

In some towns along the border the clocks are set to Beijing standard time rather than Burma's clock to facilitate cross-border contact, according to local Burmese officials.

The Chinese authorities are planning to use Burma as a crucial transit point, not just for the products grown or manufactured in southwest China, but as a means of transporting goods from the country's economic power-houses along the eastern seaboard.

''By shifting the transit route away from the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits to using Burma's port facilities to reach South Asia, the Middle East and Europe they hope to avoid the dangers of crowded shipping lanes and pirates _ the Malacca dilemma as Beijing calls it,'' a senior Chinese analyst told the Bangkok Post on condition of anonymity.

But Beijing is also well aware that the junta's failure to implement political reform may backfire, not only for Rangoon, but on China as well. Already under increased international criticism for its unswerving support of what the international community regards as pariah states _ especially Burma, North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe _ Beijing has begun to distance itself and take a more active role in trying to influence its allies to be more flexible. That has certainly been the case as far as Rangoon is concerned.

Beijing has been far more pro-active behind the scenes in pressing Burma's military rulers to introduce political and economic reform as quickly as possible. They have also quietly raised the vexed issue of the detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, suggesting that she be freed. But when Gen Thura Shwe Mann told the Chinese leaders in May that this was impossible as she still posed a security risk, they backed off.

Instead, they are now pressing both Washington and Rangoon, behind the scenes, to start a secret dialogue to try to overcome some of the issues which keep Burma internationally isolated.

Beijing is also alarmed by Rangoon's nuclear ambitions and the recent deal with Moscow to build a nuclear reactor in Burma. China's leaders have already communicated their displeasure and warned the Burmese they could not rely on Chinese assistance if anything went wrong.

China's leaders were also extremely annoyed at Rangoon's re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

''They no longer trust North Korea and were dismayed that two important neighbours had effectively gone behind their backs and resumed relations,'' according to a Chinese government source.

Officially, of course, Beijing welcomed the development.

But despite these irritations, China's leaders have realised that Burma is by far its strongest ally in Southeast Asia.

For some time Beijing has eyed suspiciously the growing American influence in the region, especially in what it regards as its backyard and natural sphere of influence _ Cambodia and Vietnam, and to some extent in Laos as well.

China's leaders now fear that in Thailand the opposition Democrat party is going to sweep back into power if elections are held according to plan in November or December. The Chinese also see the Democrats as avowedly pro-US and have already threatened to overhaul or rescind the Free Trade Agreement between Bangkok and Beijing. And, of course, Beijing would not welcome Aung San Suu Kyi coming to power in Rangoon, as they regard her as an American puppet.

So for Beijing, this growing potentially hostile environment in Asia means their only trustworthy and truly anti-American ally in the region remains Burma's military regime.

IPS: 15 June 1007
By Gustavo Capdevila

GENEVA, Jun 15 (IPS) - The International Labour Organisation (ILO) expressed profound concern about the persistence of forced labour in Burma, while it is closely monitoring the implementation of a mechanism for victims to file complaints, which was recently agreed with the Southeast Asian country's governing junta.

But the ILO's assessment of the case confirms that forced labour remains widespread in Myanmar (the name given to the country by the military government), and in fact continues to expand, ILO executive director Kari Tapiola told IPS.

None of the recommendations of a survey commission sent by the ILO have been put into practice yet, the international agency reported.

Forced labour is widely used in Burma, especially by the army, says a report by the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards presented to the International Labour Conference, which ended its annual three-week session Friday.

In 1989, the London-based rights watchdog Amnesty International was the first to denounce that tens of thousands of people in Burma were subjected to forced labour.

But nearly 10 years later, in 1998, "when I came here, Myanmar still denied that there was a problem of forced labour," ILO director general Juan Somavía told IPS.

The military regime eventually acknowledged that it did exist. In response, the ILO tripartite (government, labour and business) governing mechanism adopted supplementary provisions to pressure the military junta in Rangoon.

Somavía said that when the junta allowed the ILO to open an office in Burma to monitor forced labour, complaints from victims immediately began to come in.

But two years ago, the situation became much more difficult after a military coup was carried out within the regime, and a different faction of officers took power, he said.

The ILO Governing Body reported last November that every effort had been made to resolve the problem, and that it had decided to present the issue for United Nations Security Council scrutiny.

At that time it was clear that the military government had no intention of continuing to work with the ILO, said Somavía.

The ILO and the junta also disagree over the military punishment meted out to those who dare bring complaints of forced labour. The ILO has considered the possibility of requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

"On that very specific issue we now actually have an agreement," said Tapiola, referring to the complaint mechanism agreed on Feb. 26. "So of course now we are looking at this agreement, at how it works. But the option of bringing a matter for an advisory opinion at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is always there."

"The question (of the ICJ) was because the government has one interpretation and we had another one and we said the people should not be punished for complaining about forced labour," said Tapiola.

Somavía said the government reacted to the pressure from the ILO Governing Body and agreed to once again open the doors to allow the ILO to receive complaints of forced labour from whistleblowers. That began to occur in March, he added.

The director general said the ILO attempted to show the democratic forces in Myanmar that the agency is doing what it can.

"The relationship between the ILO and Myanmar is one where we are now on a trial basis implementing an agreement where we receive complaints on the use of forced labour and then we pass them on if they seem to be serious complaints, for the government to follow up on," said Tapiola.

"The government has followed up on a couple of cases and people have even been punished to the extent that some people have been put in prison. But this is a recent phenomenon and we have to see how it works," he added.

The ILO has a convention on forced labour (No. 29) dating back to 1930, and another on the abolition of the practice (No. 105) from 1957, and defines forced labour as "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily."

In a 2005 report, the ILO estimated that at that time, there were at least 12.3 million victims of forced labour around the world. Of that total, 9.8 million are exploited by private agents, more than 2.4 million have been trafficked, and 2.5 million are forced to work by the state or by rebel military groups.

The ILO reported that forced labour was found on every continent, in virtually every country, and in every kind of economy.

Particularly stubborn are "traditional" forms of forced labour, like chattel slavery and debt bondage, said the report.

Another form, bonded labour, is widespread among indigenous people in some parts of Latin America, while slavery-related practices persist in areas of Asia. In Europe and North America, meanwhile, increasing numbers of women and children fall victim to trafficking for the purpose of sexual or labour exploitation, added the ILO. (END/2007)

By Larry Jagan
AsiaTimes Online: 13 June 2007

BANGKOK - Beijing's support for the junta in Myanmar has strengthened immeasurably over the past six months as China's leaders now see the country as the cornerstone of their strategy toward Southeast Asia. The internationally shunned military regime has become a crucial part of Beijing's policy toward Asia in the face what it fears is the growing influence of the United States in the region.

As a result, there has been a flurry of visits between the two capitals, the most important being the recent trip by Myanmar's acting prime minister, Thein Sein, to Beijing. There has also been increased diplomatic and business contact between the countries as both governments have sought to strengthen their new relationship. Both countries are keen to boost bilateral trade and investment ties as well as develop social and cultural exchange programs.

But on the political front, irritations remain, with Beijing quietly pressing Myanmar to introduce concrete political reform as soon as possible.

"It is no coincidence that the generals announced the planned resumption of the National Convention in mid-July just as the junta's prime minister arrived in southwest China," Win Min, an independent Myanmar analyst based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, told Asia Times Online.

The National Convention will have drawn up a new constitution by the end of the year, junta leader Than Shwe told a senior Chinese diplomat who visited Myanmar this year. For months it seemed the National Convention would not resume its deliberations until after the rainy season, possibly in November. It would seem that the sudden decision to move forward on the roadmap is a gesture toward Beijing. Thein Sein announced that this forthcoming session of the National Convention would be its last.

Thein Sein, who is also the key person overseeing the National Convention, reportedly briefed senior Chinese leaders on the country's constitutional drafting process and the subsequent referendum. At the same time, Thein Sein was given a lesson in Chinese-style democracy as he was the guest of China's parliament, the National People's Congress. The members of the NPC are selected through an indirect, tiered system that only allows direct elections at the first stage of the process, where delegates are elected who then elect representatives at the next levels - the provincial and then national assemblies.

"It is clear that the regime is now planning changes to the principles of the new constitution that have already been drafted," an informed source in Yangon told Asia Times Online. "This is likely to involve borrowing some significant components from the Chinese system - and may mean adopting a National People's Congress approach to parliamentary democracy and following the Chinese constitution on giving some form of ceremonial autonomy to ethnic areas."

Thein Sein is also believed to have outlined Than Shwe's planned sweeping changes in the military command and the shakeup in the cabinet, according to a senior Myanmar government source.

Win Min said: "The Chinese have always been informed well ahead of time of any significant planned changes, with the exception, of course, of the arrest of [Myanmar's] former prime minister and intelligence chief, Khin Nyunt."

At the time Khin Nyunt was Beijing's main man in the military regime, and was often called Myanmar's Deng Xiaoping - something that angered Than Shwe. Now the Chinese have broadened their contacts with the regime, maintaining close and cordial relations with all three top generals - Than Shwe, Maung Aye and Thura Shwe Mann.

A senior Asian diplomat who closely follows Myanmar affairs said China's leaders are "intent on not making the same mistake they did before by relying on only one ally within the regime. Instead, they have cultivated close contacts with all three men they see as the key leaders in the country."

For a while Beijing courted army chief Thura Shwe Mann, expecting him to be the main man of the future. He has made several visits to China over the past two years, including a secret trip to Beijing last month.

Now more cautious about its relations with the regime, China has been careful not to be seen to favor only one member of the junta. For years the Chinese leaders feared the possibility of Maung Aye succeeding Senior General Than Shwe as Myanmar's top leader, for they regarded him as pro-India and relatively anti-China.

But Beijing's attitude changed in the wake of a secret mission by Maung Aye to Kunming and Beijing in the middle of last year. He was hosted by Chinese military commanders and an understanding was struck, according to a senior Chinese government source in Beijing.

"Military men understand each other and talk the same language," the Chinese source told Asia Times Online. "They sat down together, talked and joked, as they drank strong liquor and got drunk together."

Senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) representatives from Beijing also told ethnic leaders they met in Kunming recently that they did not have a problem with Maung Aye.

Many activists from Myanmar have long feared that Beijing supported the country's rulers unquestioningly, but this has not been the case, especially in the past. China's leaders have consistently feared that Myanmar's military junta lacked real legitimacy and could collapse overnight, leaving Beijing powerless and its military and economic investment in the regime worthless, according to a senior CCP cadre who deals with foreign-policy issues.

China's greatest fear remains that Myanmar is extremely unstable and poses a security risk, especially along its southern border. More than a million Chinese - farmers, workers and business people - have crossed into Myanmar in the past 10 years and are working and living there. The Chinese authorities fear that any upheaval in Myanmar would result in a mass exodus of Chinese back across the border, creating increased industrial and social unrest in their sensitive border regions.

China's other concern is that Myanmar's economy, far from expanding and producing business and investment opportunities for Chinese businesses, especially those based in bordering Yunnan province, is actually contracting. Two decades ago, China's leaders and economists saw that the development of their relatively backward southwestern provinces would rely on expanding bilateral trade with its southern neighbors, particularly Myanmar. So far Myanmar has not fulfilled that early promise.

In the past few years, Chinese businesses and government enterprises have boosted their investment in Myanmar - Lashio, Mandalay and Muse are virtually Chinese cities now. Even in Yangon over the past two years, Chinese business has expanded enormously. The Chinese are also involved in the building of a special tax-free export zone around the port of Yangon.

"The number of Chinese restaurants in Yangon has grown, and the quality of the food served there is far better than in Bangkok," said a Thai-Chinese businessman.

A few years ago, when things looked bad for the economy, Chinese workers and business people left Yangon, according to an ethnic-Chinese businessman who owns one of the best-known Chinese restaurants in the city. "The clientele - mainly Chinese from the mainland - steadily dwindled away. Now, it's virtually impossible to get a table without a booking," he said.

For the Chinese authorities, Myanmar has also become a strategic transit point for goods produced in southern China. They want to transport these by road to the Yangon port for shipment to India, the Middle East and eventually Europe. Repair work is under way on Myanmar's antiquated internal road system that links southern China through Mandalay to Yangon.

Now there are plans to rebuild the road through northern Myanmar to northeastern India. The Chinese have agreed to finance the construction of this highway using 40,000 Chinese construction workers, according to Asian diplomatic sources in Yangon. Some 20,000 would remain after the work was completed to do maintenance work on the road.

"When this happens, the northern region of Burma will be swamped by the Chinese - government officials, workers, truck drivers and businessmen. It will no longer be Burma," said a senior Western diplomat based in Bangkok who has followed Myanmar affairs for more than a decade. (Many in the West, including the US government, do not recognize "Myanmar" as the country's official name; the junta renamed it from "Burma" in 1989.)

The Chinese authorities are planning to use Myanmar as a crucial transit point, not just for the products grown or manufactured in southwestern China, but as a way of transporting goods from the country's economic powerhouses along the eastern seaboard.

"By shifting the transit route away from the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait to using Myanmar's port facilities to reach South Asia, the Middle East and Europe, they hope to avoid the dangers of crowded shipping lanes and pirates - the Malacca dilemma, as Beijing calls it," a senior Chinese analyst told Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity.

Some time ago, the Chinese authorities decided that the only way to insure their existing investment in Myanmar was to strengthen it. "More than six months ago, China's leaders sanctioned increased economic and business ties with Myanmar," said a Chinese government official. "This will be in all areas, but especially the energy sector."

China already has major oil and gas concessions in western Myanmar, and is planning overland pipelines to bring it to southern China. The Chinese have also agreed to finance and build several major hydroelectric power stations in northern Myanmar.

But Beijing is also well aware that the junta's failure to implement political reform may backfire, not only on Myanmar, but on China as well. Already under increased international criticism for its unswerving support for what the international community regards as pariah states - especially Myanmar, North Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe - Beijing has begun to take a more active role in trying to influence its allies to be more flexible.

That has certainly been the case as far as Myanmar is concerned. Beijing has been far more proactive behind the scenes in pressing the country's military rulers to introduce political and economic reform as quickly as possible.

They have also quietly raised the vexing issue of the detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, suggesting that she be freed. But when Thura Shwe Mann told Chinese leaders last month that this was impossible as she still posed a security risk, they backed off. Instead, they are now pressing both the US and Myanmar, behind the scenes, to start a secret dialogue to try to overcome some of the issues that keep Myanmar internationally isolated.

Beijing is also unimpressed by Myanmar's nuclear ambitions, and the recent deal with Moscow to build a nuclear reactor in the country. China's leaders have already communicated their displeasure, according to Chinese government source, and warned them that they cannot rely on Chinese assistance if anything goes wrong.

China's leaders were also extremely annoyed at Myanmar's re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. "They no longer trust North Korea and were dismayed that two important neighbors had effectively gone behind their backs and resumed relations," said a Chinese government source. Officially, of course, Beijing welcomed the development.

But despite these irritations, China's leaders realized that Myanmar is its strongest ally in Southeast Asia. For some time Beijing has eyed suspiciously the growing US influence, especially in what it regards as its back yard and natural sphere of influence - Cambodia and Vietnam, and to some extent in Laos as well.

China's leaders now fear that in Thailand the opposition Democrat Party is going to sweep back into power if elections are held according to plan in December. The Chinese see the Democrats as avowedly pro-US and have already threatened to overhaul or rescind the free-trade agreement between Bangkok and Beijing.

China's only trustworthy and truly anti-American ally in the region is Myanmar, so strategically the junta in the new capital Naypyidaw has become increasingly important to Beijing and seen as pivotal to its relationship with Southeast Asia as a whole.
While there may still be irritations between the junta and China's leaders, neither side is going to allow them to endanger what over the past six months has become a very special relationship indeed. It is one in which Beijing is likely increasingly to give Naypyidaw everything it wants.

Larry Jagan previously covered Myanmar politics for the British Broadcasting Corp. He is currently a freelance journalist based in Bangkok.

Just 20 years ago, there were less than a hundred internet users in Thailand. The number has since risen to about seven million, according to the state-run National Electronics and Computer Technology Centre (Nectec).

In the early days, the internet was used only by academics; now it is used by people from all walks of life.

According to Nectec, internet use has burgeoned since 2003, with Thai users now accessing entertainment, business, news, games, government and education sites _ with chatlines and other forums now a focal point of many people's lives.

Users surf entertainment websites more than any others _ up to 40% in some months. News attracts only 6-8% of users. There are about 24,600 websites in the dot th domain available to serve their needs, according to Nectec.

However, some sites are judged inappropriate for the country's eyes and the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has the power to shut down or block websites it deems inappropriate or a threat to national security.

According to Freedom Against Censorship Thailand (FACT), the ICT ministry blocklist of May 28, 2007 lists 11,329 websites banned in Thailand, including "an increase of 90 political websites over April".

BangkokPost: 7 June 2007

BangkokPost: 7 June 2007

Story By PIYAPORN WONGRUANG

Chai slowly turned off his mobile phone after being informed by his office colleague that he had an urgent appointment to attend to and that Chai would have to come back into work.

The previous nights had been long and tiring for Chai and his staff. They had to stay awake, their eyes fixed on websites they had been informed might contain political content detrimental to national security.

Now they would have to stay awake again, for another night.

Chai, who does not want his real name used, headed glumly back to his office.

"Two of our guys have just knocked off and I'm not sure who will be able to stay tonight," he is told.

Since the Sept 19 coup, telecom officials like Chai and his colleagues, about six of them, have spent much of their time - often at night when most people are asleep - closely monitoring websites the authorities fear might disseminate provocative content.

The internet activity comes at a critical time, when there are political divisions in society. The internet can deliver messages instantly and in an interactive way and those in power fear the content may trigger violence, which could cause major damage to the country.

According to the Information and Communication Technology Ministry, websites deemed harmful to national security are becoming more involved in the political turmoil.

In the past, they largely concentrated on external issues, on violence in the South and on transnational crimes like drug trafficking and financial fraud. Now, they are dealing with political issues.

New websites disseminate messages attacking political opponents, in sophisticated operations that are difficult to detect.

The ministry has formed a special team to closely monitor them, and sometimes this requires a lot of time and effort.

Chai says there were times when he was hesitant to judge if the content of a website he was watching challenged national security.

Sometimes they contained messages which openly attacked the government or high-profile figures on the Council for National Security. Sometimes they carried information about the monarchy or controversial political events.

Monitoring staff became frustrated trying to decide whether the content was aimed at stirring up public discontent and therefore should be silenced or curbs placed on it.

It is a very complex issue as the internet makes it possible to reach out in a sophisticated manner, he said. There were sounds, pictures and movies which deliver the messages attractively and instantly.

Is he worried? "Yes, we are, because we all know we are in a period when society is divided," he said.

To help them recognise politically provocative websites, Chai and his staff have been instructed to concentrate on content which tries to persuade people to act politically in public - for example, websites which invite people to gather and demonstrate.

This has not been easy, however. Occasionally they must take what they have stumbled across to a ministerial committee supervising internet filtering to decide whether the website is provocative to such an extent that it should be blocked or otherwise curbed.

The team also hears from a national security unit which monitors web content and sometimes asks Chai's team to take further action.

Once they get their instructions, Chai and his staff ask either the internet service provider (ISP) or webmasters they are in contract with to block some content or close down the site.

"We don't always get a swift response, though," said Chai. "The ISPs need proof from us too and sometimes the people we deal with have gone on holiday, so we cannot contact them quickly."

Chai's colleague Nee is tasked with coordinating with those people. She, too, has to stay at work if required - and this means she has to leave her mother at home alone.

She accepts this as being her duty as a government official, and says she does not want to see any further social divisions in the country.

"Everything will go downhill if we allow our society to become more and more divided," she said.

The team has been regularly monitoring around 10 websites including the highly controversial http://www.hi-thaksin.net.

The interim government has blocked about 35 websites, compared to about 13,000 websites closed during the previous government, according to the ministry.

ICT Minister Sitthichai Pokaiyaudom said the ministry has used the criminal code to deal with provocative content such as pornography and lese majeste.

But for content affecting national security the ministry has relied largely on the Council for Democratic Reform's announcement No.5, which empowers the ministry to curb any web content deemed to disrupt political reform.

The ministry has also proposed legislation on computer-related offences.

It hopes the law, when enacted, will encourage a greater sense of responsibility by all parties involved, including service providers, since it lays down clear penalties, the minister said.

The CDR announcement will be gone, along with the the interim government, sooner or later, and the law was needed, he said.

Chiranuch Premchaiporn is manager of http://www.prachathai.com, a website providing information on social and political issues which is occasionally asked by the ICT ministry to screen certain content posted on its web board.

She said the surge in political content on the internet reflects the limited space currently provided in other media, amid people's rising need to express their opinions.

Drawing on her own experience, Ms Chiranuch believes internet users are mature enough to distinguish between the information they receive, and to be selective in what they choose to believe.

The best way to deal with the internet is to let the information flow rather freely, and at a certain point it will balance out naturally, she said.

"It's true that certain content should be under control, such as pornography, but in fact we already have existing laws to deal with such content, including the criminal code.

"If we all really want a certain amount of censorship, it should start with an agreement in public, rather than letting someone say we should now have censorship," said Ms Chiranuch.

She said co-responsibility under the new law was a good principle, and it should be paired with the principle of protecting internet users' right to information.

More important, she said, the internet possessed the unique characteristic of instant and interactive communication, and this made it almost impossible to deal with through controls. Officials would have to invest too much time and energy to hunt down inappropriate information.

At Chai's office, the discussion has become intense. Chai and his colleague glare at each other.

"I have a family to take care of, so you guys just do it, right?" Chai says, making a final decision. It's already after 4.30pm, when government staff usually go home.

BangkokPost: 5 June 2007
SUBIN KHEUNKAEW

A network of Shan activists has appealed to the government to protect Shan villagers from forced repatriation by the army. The appeal was made by members of the Shan Democratic Union, the Shan Women's Action Network and others. They alleged that 91 Shan people who fled human rights abuses in Burma were forced to relocate by soldiers from Ranger Unit 956, under the command of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment task force based in Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao district, on May 25.

They told the villagers to move 500 metres down the hillside to another section of the camp.

The refugees, comprising 24 families, were ordered to move within five days despite the fact that the rainy season had already begun and many had only just finished building their houses.

In an open letter to Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, the activists said that as soon as the order was given, the rangers immediately began forcibly dismantling some of the houses.

They used army trucks to transport some of the refugees' possessions to the new location.

They called on the government to provide help to the affected families.

Maj-Gen Wannathip Wongwai, commander of the Phamueng Task Force, said there had been no such incident.

"Repatriation to Burma will be made on a voluntary basis only," he said.

However, a source in an ethic community acknowledged the relocation had occurred. He said it was aimed primarily at security as the villagers' settlement was too close to the rangers' base.

He said the relocated villagers were from the Lisu tribe.