Burma Update
News and updates on Burma17 December 2010
News on Burma - 17/12/10
Prepare for battle, with better weapons, junta tells militias – Jai Wan Mai Mizzima News: Thu 16 Dec 2010 Chiang Mai – Burmese Army officers promised better weapons including heavy arms to around 200 junta-led militia leaders in Tangyan Township in Shan State’s north after calling them to a meeting early this week, a militia source said. People’s militias and Border Forces Directorate chief Major General Maung Maung Ohn, told them to increase their combat readiness, the militia source said. Maung Maung Ohn praised the co-operation and loyalty of the militias and promised to supply more weapons to, he said, maintain stability and peace in the area. Heavy weapons would also be provided he said. He urged participants to closely monitor troop movements of the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a pair of the armed ethnic groups that have rejected the Burmese generals plan that they transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) or state militia under junta command. Around 1,500 militia soldiers have lined up in Tangyan along the frontiers of territories held by SSA-N Brigade 1 and the UWSA. Among the meeting participants, Bo Moon and Ja Htaw, who were believed to head the two strongest militia, were also present, the source said. Bo Moon is an adopted son of notorious Golden Triangle drugs kingpin Khun Sa, who surrendered to Burmese authorities in 1996. The son gained the full support of the Burmese Army after he joined Burmese troops in halting the advance of SSA-S troops towards the north of Shan State between 1999 and 2000. He is allegedly involved in the drug trade, under the protection of a reputed force of 800 armed men. The group is sometimes known as the Wan Pang militia. Meanwhile, Ja Htaw, of Lahu ethnicity, had about 250 men but only 150 were armed, a Shan State source said. One military analyst said: “The Burmese regime has been successful in using the ‘divide and rule’ strategy to [thwart] the opposition groups. The break-up of the Karen struggle by using the DKBA against KNU, the collapse of the Mong Tai Army, the Kachin, Mon and Pa-O were obvious examples. The Burmese Army will not hesitate to use other groups to attack its main rivals.” He was referring to the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army and its rivals since 1994, the Karen National Union. He predicted: “Militia groups would be used on front lines in case a bigger confrontation between the opposing groups and the Burmese Army takes place.” A Lahu man in Chiang Mai said: “The Lahu people were both recruited into the UWSA or the Burmese Army … we don’t want our people to be used as pawns.” He confirmed that some of the Lahu militia leaders had gained business concessions for co-operating with the Burmese Army but that many Lahu people were still poor. A trader in Mae Sai gave his thoughts on why local merchants had moved their allegiance to the junta-led militias. “Many businessmen have changed their business partners from within ceasefire groups to those of militia groups because they have more power than the ceasefire groups,” the trader said. “Some of the businesses are illegal”. He added that the Burmese Army had applied increasing pressure in various forms on the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), aka the Mongla group, and the UWSA, to transform into BGFs. Currently, Burmese officials had also stopped goods entering the NDAA-controlled area through the Taping border checkpoint. Victim of land confiscation facing jail – Naw Noreen Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 16 Dec 2010 A farmer whose land and property was confiscated and destroyed by Rangoon authorities faces a possible jail term after being charged with trespassing.Zaw Weik had initially refused to leave his Tagondai village land when approached in 2008 by two fish farmers, Aung Shein and Khin Myint, who were accompanied by local authorities. He claims they then destroyed his two houses and farmland in two separate incidents, in 2009 and January 2010. He added that his bean crops were razed whilst he was attending a court hearing in March this year. Rangoon division authorities are attempting to sue Zaw Weik on charges of trespassing that stem from his refusal to leave the land. He claims also that the death of his son earlier this year was linked to the case. “My younger son took photos of the people destroying our house and the crops and he was assassinated on 10 June [2010] under the guise of an accident when a motorbike crushed into a shop stall,” Zaw Weik said. “They are hiding the truth of the assassination. Our reports on the two incidents were barely read and absolutely no action was taken.” He added that both sides in the trial have finished presenting arguments and a verdict is due to be heard next week. Land confiscation by authorities in Burma is rife. The majority of cases involve land been taken for infrastructure projects, although numerous cases of farmland being forcibly converted to grow specific crops abound. Only the UN’s International Labour Organisation (ILO) is officially mandated to deal with cases of land confiscation, although groups such as Guiding Star, run by lawyer Aye Myint, handle complaints. Burma’s eight-month international trade value hits $8.8 billion – Wai Moe Irrawaddy: Thu 16 Dec 2010 Driven by a sell-off of natural resources, the value of Burma’s exports hit US $5.5 billion for the past eight months, while the total value of its international trade was $8.8 billion, according to the junta’s Ministry of Commerce. Burmese economic observers predicted, however, that the import-export revenues would not directly benefit most Burmese people. Citing Ministry of Commerce statistics, 7 Day News Journal, a Rangoon weekly journal, reported on Thursday that during the period from April 1 to December 7 of Burma’s 2010-11 fiscal year, Burma exported goods valued at $ 5.5 billion and imported goods valued at $3.3 billion. A ministry official told 7 Day News Journal that most of Burma’s export revenue came from selling natural gas, followed by jade, to Asian countries. These goods were delivered by sea and road. Burma’s export earnings from natural gas during the eight-month period were estimated to be $4 billion and Jade exports delivered by sea during the eight-month period hit US $1.1 billion, excluding jade sold at the Naypyidaw gems fair in November. Burmese beans were the third most significant export, valued at over $520 million, while teak wood exports reached $180 million. Burma’s biggest trading partners for the eight-month period were Thailand, Singapore and China-Hong Kong. Trade with Thailand was valued at over $2 billion, with Singapore $1.1 billion and with China-Hong Kong $ 900 million. The Ministry of Commerce statistics also showed that Burma’s trading value in each of the 2009-10 and 2008-09 fiscal years exceeded $11 billion. Although the Burmese military regime has earned billions of dollars from exporting natural gas to Thailand, economic observers said they are skeptical that the Burmese people’s incomes and quality of life would improve as a result. “It is easy to get money from selling the country’s natural resources,” said a Burmese economist in Rangoon who spoke on condition of anonymity. “But those natural resources will not come back, and so the question is how to use the money for the country’s development such as in the health and education sectors—how to bring resources from underground to development above ground.” He added that for the past 22 years, no independent researcher has had access Burmese government expenditures, which are not publicly disclosed. While junta officials often claim they are “looking beyond 2010” and there will be more economic opportunities following the election held on Nov. 7, Burmese experts said the country’s rate of development is still behind where it stood prior to the 1962 military coup. A Thailand-based Burmese economist, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, said the billions of dollar Burma receives from its import-export trade will not find its way into the hands of the nearly 50 million ordinary Burmese citizens, since there is no transparency and accountability for how and where the money is spent and multiple billions of dollars are likely spent on the junta’s military ambitions. In addition, intelligence sources said that although Burma earns billions US dollars by exporting natural gas, the money received is reportedly transferred directly from foreign oil companies to the junta’s undercover accounts at two Singaporean banks. These accounts are reportedly controlled by ex Lt-Gen Tin Aye, who is junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s most trusted revenue guardian. Intelligence sources said Tin Aye is also in-charge of the junta’s missile programs. According to Burmese experts, the majority of Burmese are still living in poverty and spending more than 70 percent of their income to purchase food. Out of house arrest, into the fire – Steve Finch Foreign Policy: Thu 16 Dec 2010 Aung San Suu Kyi’s release is great news for the dissident and her supporters — but it’s not going to mean anything for democracy in Burma. Speaking after her release from more than seven years of house arrest in Rangoon, Burmese dissident Aung San Suu Kyi said of her freedom, “We want to use this as an opportunity [for democracy].” But she didn’t explain how that opportunity might best be exploited. Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi has been consistently vague about how Burma, the Southeast Asian pariah state that first imprisoned her just before she won a free election in 1990, can plausibly experience genuine political reform in the near future. Worse, the West has seemed equally at a loss, especially since the Burmese leadership engineered a sham election in which it returned to power in a landslide. Aung San Suu Kyi seems intent on remaining hopeful, but unfortunately, the international community seems little inclined to help correct the injustices of Burma’s political system. The main problem remains stubbornly in place: lack of unity in the international community. While the West talks of sanctions and punishment to coerce the generals, China, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continue to prefer a less confrontational approach. The result has been persistent failure both to develop a strategy to secure the release of the regime’s 2,200 political prisoners and to facilitate reconciliation between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi. Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, warns that in the past, when the regime has shown Aung San Suu Kyi a cold shoulder, the international community has usually abandoned her as well. “There is a cycle that happens in Burma, and it is in danger of happening again,” he said, in referring to the ruling junta’s repeated refusal to respond to offers of dialogue and compromise by Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the excitement over Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, so far the cycle seems ready to once again run its course. According to a Burma legal source in Washington, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell, told Burmese groups in November that the United States is taking a “wait-and-see” approach. President Barack Obama’s administration has for the moment decided not to further pursue a U.N. commission of inquiry first recommended in March by Tomás Ojea Quintana, the U.N. special rapporteur for human rights in Burma, that would look into war crimes Burma’s junta might have committed against its own people, an approach shot down by China in particular ahead of the election. The administration otherwise has no other plans to adjust economic sanctions, said the source. When asked directly, the State Department gave few specifics about its plans. “U.S. Burma policy will continue to combine pressure and principled engagement to promote a free and democratic Burma that respects human rights, adheres to the rule of law, and fully complies with its international obligations,” said an official last month following the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. It’s clear that the Obama administration has Burma in mind, even if its official pronouncements are less reassuring. Among the first 200 or so WikiLeaks diplomatic cable releases last week was one message from the secretary of state’s office dated July 31, 2009, classifying Burma as one of eight “key continuing issues” for the United States together with Iraq and the Middle East. Addressed to 36 U.S. missions, including those in the capitals of the other four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — Britain, China, France, and Russia — the cable asked staff to collect intelligence on U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s intentions regarding Burma, how the world body planned to address the recent elections and engage with the regime, and attitudes toward Burma among Security Council members. The memo suggests that Washington sees the United Nations as the most viable arena in which to address Burma’s democracy and human rights problems. The Obama administration seems to have concluded that unilateral actions, whether economic or military, stand little chance of success. But the United Nations’ track record in Burma is not good. All attempts to discipline the junta, such as the recent efforts by Western countries to pursue a U.N. commission of inquiry, have been held up by China and Russia. Their unwillingness to chastise Burma has drained momentum from the issue entirely, at least in the Security Council, which has not held a session on Burma since July 2009 because of Chinese opposition. The September 2006 decision to place the country on the Security Council’s formal agenda has largely been for naught. China’s government has held up progress in Burma outside the United Nations as well. While the West, India, and even Singapore welcomed Aung San Suu Kyi’s Nov. 13 release as a positive step, China’s Foreign Ministry was ducking all questions regarding Beijing’s stance on negotiations to end her detention. Beijing has instead backed the junta line, welcoming last month’s much-criticized elections as a major step toward democratization. Of the many diplomats who met with Aung San Suu Kyi the morning after her release, Chinese Ambassador Ye Dabo was the most notable absentee. Indeed, China’s priorities regarding Burma lie elsewhere. The Chinese government has stated publicly that it sees Burma as a necessary alternative transit route for energy that could bypass the congested Strait of Malacca. China National Petroleum Corp. started building an 800-kilometer oil and gas pipeline from Burma’s western coast up to Yunnan province earlier this year. Meanwhile, Burma’s other major neighbor, India — which also owns gas interests in the country — has shown hardly any more willingness to antagonize the junta. Just a week before last month’s elections, India called the proposed U.N. commission of inquiry on Burma “counterproductive,” which prompted a sharp rebuke from Aung San Suu Kyi herself shortly after her release. When Obama visited New Delhi shortly after Burma’s flawed vote, he accused India of shying away from criticizing regimes like Burma, but that kind of pressure has had little impact on Indian elites. ASEAN, which includes Burma, remains divided on how to tackle the regime. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore have occasionally shown a willingness to fall into line with the West, but Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have generally sided with Beijing on this issue. The sum total of all this is that the West has almost no allies when it comes to Burma. Although Aung San Suu Kyi told journalists the day after her release that “my message is not for the Western nations in particular,” her inability to engage other major players has weakened her efforts. But no matter how tough the situation diplomatically, it still behooves the Obama administration to try to resolve it — and it’s unclear whether Washington is willing to step into the breach. Although Congress mandated for a special representative and policy coordinator on Burma two years ago, this role has never been filled, and there has been no official explanation for the holdup. So where do Aung San Suu Kyi and the West go from here? Possibly, nowhere. “We have to understand that the recent election and Aung San Suu Kyi’s release were not the beginning of the end of repression, or the first, tangible step toward national reconciliation,” says Burma specialist Bertil Lintner. “There is no hope for ‘reconciliation’ or ‘dialogue’ in Burma. Those popular catchphrases are based on wishful thinking.” And, of course, wishful thinking won’t do much to bring real democracy to Burma. Technology lets us peer inside the Burmese cage, but not unlock its door – Timothy Garton Ash The Guardian (UK): Thu 16 Dec 2010 To talk via video link to Aung San Suu Kyi was inspiring. Yet liberation is unlikely for Burma if its neighbours will not act. Guardian Comment Tim Garton Ash/Matt Kenyon 16/12/2010 Of the situation in Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi says: “We have years of practice at talking and getting no response.” Illustration: Matt Kenyon for the Guardian There is nothing to compare with being there. Failing that, get a video-link. And suddenly here’s Aung San Suu Kyi on a screen in front of us, live from 54 University Avenue, Rangoon. She sits upright, composed, elegant in a white blouse, and quietly amused, after more than seven years of isolation, by the unfamiliar new technologies of long-distance communication. “I’m very glad to be able to communicate with you,” she says, “that for me is great progress” – and the satellite link goes down. Later, she is reconnected to the LSE lecture theatre, packed with students and specialists, through a terrible phone connection. Half the time she can’t make out what we are asking, the other half we can’t make out what she is answering as her distorted voice booms from a loudspeaker. After a student has tried several times with a slightly complicated question, Aung San Suu Kyi says: “Just give me one keyword.” “Multinational companies!” we shout. “Investing in Burma!” She laughs, we laugh, at the almost slapstick quality of the long-distance exchanges. “We have years of practice at talking and getting no response,” she comments at one point, after thinking she had been cut off. Talking to the generals who are ruining her country, that is. I don’t think any of those students will forget the day they were able to put a question directly to Aung San Suu Kyi. For all the technical difficulties, both her personality and her message shine through. The message is resolute, but also conciliatory. She reiterates how she hopes to work with, not against, the military authorities. So far as we can acoustically decipher her answer, she gives a cautious welcome to the idea of an international commission of inquiry into conditions inside Burma, but emphasises that it must not be seen as “a trial of the generals”. After seven and a half years under house arrest, getting news of her own country only from intensive listening to international radio broadcasts, she clearly wants to take some time to get her bearings. Can she revive her own emasculated National League for Democracy? Can she rejoin forces with those who have fallen away from it or formed a new party in the (vain) hope of gaining a significant number of seats in the recent election? How about the Buddhist monks, who imparted such disciplined energy to the peaceful protest movement in 2007? Not least: can she forge ties with representatives of the ethnic minorities that comprise about a third of the country’s population? That is what her father, Aung San, did in 1947, in the Panglong conference that helped pave the way for an independent Burma. Now she tells us that she is hoping for a “second Panglong”. Asked to identify her sources of inspiration, she says “in the first place, my parents”. Then she mentions Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Later, when the conversation comes back to the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission, like the one chaired by Tutu in South Africa, she reflects that things are more complicated in Burma. “If only we were all black,” she sometimes thinks to herself, then the ordinary Burmese and the ethnic minorities would recognise that they are all, together, an oppressed majority. As the Burma specialist Maung Zarni points out, in Burma’s version of apartheid it’s the military who are the whites. This is an inspiring conversation, across all the barriers placed in our way. All my instincts are to frame it in a narrative of liberation – gradual, often frustrated, but eventually triumphant. “For Freedom’s battle once begun … though baffled oft is ever won” – these great words of the 19th century English poet Byron were pinned to a wooden cross outside the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, at the birth of Poland’s Solidarity movement 30 years ago. Now freedom’s battle is being fought, and baffled, with the weapons of the internet, the satellite and the mobile phone. Sometimes these are described as “liberation technologies”. Tutu himself has an upbeat reflection on his own “wonderful” phone conversation with Aung San Suu Kyi (“She constantly seemed to be on the verge of bursting into laughter”) earlier this month: “When I think back to the situation in South Africa, I remember that there were many times when it felt like we would never see freedom in our country, when those who oppressed us seemed invincible. As I always say though: this is a moral universe, injustice and oppression will lose out in the end.” A sober analysis, however, shows a constellation of forces in and around Burma less favourable than those in South Africa, or Poland, or the Philippines, or Chile, or the many other stories of eventually triumphant self-liberation over the last three decades. This is not just because of the weakness and divisions of the internal opposition movement, after decades of brutal oppression and the regime’s “divide and rule”. That can change, with time, hard work on the ground and inspired leadership. Above all, it’s because of the external context. Some readers will recall that a month ago I asked on these pages whether the world’s largest democracy, India, could be more true to its own values when it came to its small, suffering eastern neighbour. President Barack Obama, no less, posed a similar question on his official visit to India. I gather that so far the answer has been a resounding silence. India is barely prepared to talk about the issue with the world’s other leading democracies, let alone to act differently. So long as Burma’s Asian neighbours, including Thailand and, of course, China, continue to behave in this way, putting their own commercial and strategic interests before the lives of the long-suffering peoples of Burma – and before their own long-term enlightened self-interest in having a stable and prosperous neighbour – the Burmese generals will be laughing all the way to the bank. Burma is not the only example of such an unfavourable external setting. Welcome to the post-western world. If this continues to be the case, the internet, satellites and mobile phones will enable us to peer inside the cage, but not to unlock its door. We may see the embattled friends of freedom more clearly but will not necessarily be able to help them more effectively. When Liu Xiaobo, this year’s Nobel peace prize winner, is finally released, we may have a chance to talk to him on a video link, though at the moment even his wife’s mobile phone is blocked. We can watch the unjustly imprisoned Russian billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky behind his bars. He remains locked up. What we have here is a political version of the drama of the Chilean miners. We saw them on video camera when still trapped underground, but if their own self-help, and the physical drilling through the rock, had not been successful, then that video link would merely have allowed us to watch them die. This is not a counsel of despair, just of realism. In Burma, as everywhere else, communication technologies do not, of themselves, set anyone free. People set people free. Myanmar junta ignores Suu Kyi signals for dialogue – Daisuke Furuta Ashai Shimbun (Japan): Wed 15 Dec 2010 Bangkok—Despite her many appeals for dialogue, Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi is getting only silent treatment from the country’s ruling generals. Diplomatic sources in Myanmar (Burma) say the junta simply sees no reason to make concessions to Aung San Suu Kyi after it pulled off an overwhelming victory in last month’s general election. Since being released from seven and a half years of house arrest on Nov. 13, Aung San Suu Kyi has repeatedly indicated her willingness to engage in dialogue with the junta. She suggested that she won’t go on a speaking tour of rural areas out of consideration for the junta. Speaking of economic sanctions imposed by the United States and European countries, Aung San Suu Kyi showed flexibility toward the junta by saying those measures should be reviewed if they end up causing suffering to ordinary Burmese. The junta is set to convene the parliament in February based on the results of the vote. In the Nov. 7 election, the first held in 20 years, the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party emerged with about 80 percent of the seats in both houses of parliament. Including seats already allocated to military members, about 85 percent of the full legislature is in the hands of the junta and its political proxies. Western countries have questioned the validity of the polls amid widespread reports that the election was rigged. However, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have acknowledged the election results. Since her release, Aung San Suu Kyi has gone nearly every day to the headquarters of her National League for Democracy party in Yangon (Rangoon) for discussions with party senior officials. She has also met with foreign diplomats and given interviews to media outlets. However, Aung San Suu Kyi’s only public oration since being freed was an address on Nov. 14. She is trying to connect with the public by making weekly appearances on Radio Free Asia, a U.S.-sponsored broadcast service, and answering questions from listeners. The pro-democracy leader does not directly criticize the military leadership, but she has expressed her discontent with the junta’s road map to democracy. Norway accused of funding abuse in Burma – Andrew Buncombe Independent (UK): Wed 15 Dec 2010 The Norwegian government has been accused of complicity in illegal land seizures, forced labour and killings, by investing national funds in international companies that operate inside Burma on projects where widespread abuses are alleged to have taken place. A state-controlled pension fund that is a repository for some of Norway’s own oil wealth has invested up to $4.7bn in 15 oil and gas companies operating inside the South-east Asian country. The companies are accused of participating in projects where various human rights violations have taken place. Activists claim the pension fund is in breach of its own guidelines for responsible investment. The allegations come just days after Norway hosted the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony. Land confiscation, forced labour and other abuses are happening in connection with several gas and oil pipeline projects in Burma, according to Naing Htoo of EarthRights International, which is today publishing a report detailing the alleged abuses being committed by the Burmese government. “There’s every indication abuses connected to these projects will continue, and, in some cases, worsen,” he said. A number of those companies in which the Norwegian fund has investments have previously been accused in relation to controversial projects in Burma which has been controlled by a military junta since 1962. Among them are Total Oil of France, in which the Norwegian fund has an investment of $2.6bn, and the US-based Chevron Corp, in which the fund has $900m invested. EarthRights International insists that widespread violations continue to be committed by the Burmese army in support of many oil and gas projects that earn the regime millions of dollars. The group says that troops providing security for the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines have carried out extra-judicial killings. “The Burmese regime has long demonstrated itself as an unsuitable business partner,” said Steve Gumaer, of the Norway-based aid group Partners Relief and Development. “Business ventures conducted through official channels in Burma directly support the regime’s abuse of the ethnic populations and pro-democracy citizens in Burma today.” He added: “It is said that villages in north-eastern Burma have benefited by this sort of ‘economic engagement’. I have seen the devastating results; instead of schools, health and hygiene programmes, are the ashes of villages that have been burnt down. I have talked to women who were raped, men who were forced to serve as porters.” The Norwegian fund has a total of $3.6bn invested in companies involved in these projects that transport offshore gas from the Andaman Sea. Total, Chevron and other companies have denied claims that their operations inside Burma encourage abuses such as forced labour and land seizure. The report also claims the Norwegian fund has investments in companies that are involved in projects in the Shwe gas fields, which have also been linked to abuses such as forced labour. The Norwegian fund, established in 1990, is the second largest sovereign wealth fund in the world, with assets estimated at $512bn and investments in 8,000 companies. It is forecast to double in size by 2020. Because of previous allegations over unethical investments, the fund, controlled by the Norwegian central bank on behalf of the ministry of finance, is overseen by an ethical advisory council. In 2007, the Norwegian authorities said they were withdrawing the fund’s investments from Vedanta Resources, the British company that was seeking to mine bauxite on a mountain in eastern India many considered sacred . In 2005, the council was asked to consider the fund’s investment in Total and whether it breached guidelines. The council said it believed it likely that Total was aware of human rights violations on projects in Burma between 1995 and 1998, but this “did not provide a basis for exclusion from the fund, as it is only the risk for present or future violations of the guidelines which can prompt exclusion”. When allegations of forced labour were earlier levelled at Total in summer 2009, the company issued a statement saying, “local inhabitants around the Yadana pipeline say they are happy to have us there; they are, above all, grateful that there is no forced labour around our pipeline”. Last night, Norway’s foreign ministry said it had not been made aware of EarthRights International’s report. “The Norwegian government is worried about the situation for human rights in Burma,” a spokesman said. The fund,he added, was “a financial investor with investments in more than 8,000 companies. It is therefore difficult for the Ministry to make comments related to a specific company in the fund’s portfolio.” Indonesia backs Aung San Suu Kyi’s role in Myanmar political solution Deustche Presse Agentur: Wed 15 Dec 2010 Indonesia said on Wednesday that recently freed opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi needs to play a part in the solution of Myanmar’s ongoing political problems. Ms. Suu Kyi was released from seven years of house detention on November 13, a week after military-ruled Myanmar staged its first general election in two decades. Observers slammed the election as a sham designed to cement the army’s rule over the country, which has been under military dictatorships since 1962. The polls, held on November 7, seemed timed to exclude Ms. Suu Kyi from the process and undermine her potential role in the post-election period. But Indonesia, which will assume the chairmanship of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) next year, made it clear that it still sees Ms. Suu Kyi as playing a pivotal part. “Our vision from the start was that it would take the election and national dialogue, inclusive of Aung San Suu Kyi, for further development in Myanmar post-election,” said Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa. “In short, what we are going to suggest in the most constructive way, is that we need to see Daw (Madam) Aung San Suu Kyi and the authorities in Myanmar as being part of the solution to the situation in Myanmar,” Mr. Marty told a seminar on ASEANpolicy at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. Indonesia will chair two ASEAN summits and the East Asia Summit, which includes ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the U.S. Myanmar’s political problems promise to be a major subject of debate at these forums, as they have been for the past two decades. Western democracies slapped economic sanctions on Myanmar, in 1988 when the army cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators, leaving an estimated 3,000 people dead. ASEAN has traditionally followed a policy of “constructive engagement” with the pariah state, even allowing it to enter its fold in 1997 despite objections from the region’s main allies — the U.S. and European Union. Indonesia, in its coming role as ASEAN chair, is advocating greater cooperation between the two camps in pressuring Myanmar to become more democratic, with the West easing some sanctions when appropriate and the East being more critical of the military’s lack of progress. “We hope that in 2011 many of the external sides of the Myanmar issue will find some closure,” Mr. Marty said. Former US Diplomats seek use of ’smart power’ in Burma – Lalit K Jha Irrawaddy: Wed 15 Dec 2010 Washington — Observing that the policy of sanctions and open criticism has yielded nothing in the last two decades, two former US diplomats who served at its mission in Rangoon urged the Obama Administration on Wednesday to use “smart power” to bring change to Burma. “Perhaps it is time now, as Burma transitions to at least the trappings of civilian rule, to seriously try a different approach where the United States attempts to further its goals in Burma through ’smart power’,” said Franklin Huddle and Donald Jameson. Huddle was US Chargé d’Affaires to Burma from 1990 to 1994, and Jameson was Acting Deputy Chief of Mission to Burma from 1990 to 1993. The two American diplomats expressed their views after US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Joe Yun visited Burma and had meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi and Burmese officials last week. Huddle and Jameson said the use of “smart power” by the US would include engaging in an effort to open up the country to increased outside influence that may enable nascent civil society groups now germinating to take root with the assistance and example of Western governments and NGOs. “One thing many closed-off regimes fear most is hordes of Western assistance providers and tourists bringing in new ideas and values. This approach has been taken in dealing with other authoritarian regimes such as China and might be equally effective in Burma. Unless a serious try is made we will never know,” they argued. State Department spokesman P J Crowley recently said the United States is willing to lift sanctions against the military regime but the ball is in the court of the junta, which needs to create conducive conditions. “We are prepared to have a different relationship with Burma, provided Burma takes significant steps forward. There are very clear requirements for Burma, and it’s not about the United States dictating to Burma. It’s about what is in Burma’s best interest,” Crowley told reporters on Friday. “Obviously, we welcome the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, but that doesn’t solve the broader problem of the 2,000 political prisoners who still remain in custody in Burma. It doesn’t solve the challenge of the fact that the central government is still at war with many ethnic groups within its borders,” he said. “It doesn’t solve the challenge of having a political system that allows broader participation so that you don’t have a faux election here that just, in essence, takes generals and makes them civilians and pretends that’s a different kind of government. It is the same kind of government,” Crowley said. Huddle and Jameson said the US policy toward Burma over the past two decades can only be described as ineffective. “Whatever the steps toward liberalization taken by Burma’s ruling generals in recent years—such as the recent elections and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi—these mincing steps have taken place on their own terms and at their own pace, not as a response to admonitions by the United States and other Western countries,” they wrote. “Meanwhile, the Burmese people have been pawns in a political game that has little relevance to their everyday struggle for survival,” they said. The former US diplomats said the American policy toward Burma has remained largely the same for 20 years, consisting basically of strongly worded demands that the junta make major moves toward democratization and respect for human rights, including the release of more than 2,000 political prisoners now languishing in prison under harsh conditions. “Our vehicles for bringing the generals to heel have consisted mainly of public castigation and an increasingly tight array of economic sanctions designed to isolate the ruling military junta and force their compliance,” Huddle and Jameson said. US double talk on Myanmar nukes – Bertil Lintner Asia Times: Wed 15 Dec 2010 Bangkok – Is Myanmar truly trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and produce ballistic missiles with North Korean assistance, as alleged in a controversial June documentary made by the Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and aired by al-Jazeera, or is it all poppycock, as claimed in a November 12 report by United States-based ProPublica, an award-winning US investigative journalism outfit?The DVB report was based on testimonies from Myanmar army defectors who had been scrutinized by Robert Kelley, a highly regarded former US weapons scientist and former United Nations weapons inspector. ProPublica, on the other hand, quoted an anonymous senior “American official” as saying that the US Central Intelligence Agency had reviewed Kelley’s report “line by line and had rejected its findings”. Classified cables recently released by WikiLeaks from the US Embassy in Yangon, however, reveal a wide discrepancy between what US officials have said in public and the concerns they raise internally about Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions. Judging by these leaked documents, it appears that ProPublica has fallen victim to manipulations by US officials who want to hide the true extent of the intelligence that US agencies have collected in order to enhance the political agenda of those who favor engagement over further isolation of Myanmar’s military regime. The US currently imposes economic and financial sanctions against the rights-abusing regime. Long before the Barack Obama administration launched its new Myanmar policy and began sending emissaries to talk with the generals, other US officials had tested a similar conciliatory tack. By any measure, those diplomatic efforts completely failed. In February 1994, US congressman Bill Richardson, who later served as the US’s ambassador to the United Nations, paid a highly publicized visit to the country. Accompanied by a New York Times correspondent, he met with pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi – then under house arrest – as well as then intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt. At the time, Richardson’s visit was hailed in the press as a major “breakthrough” – although he himself was very cautious in his remarks. After a second visit to Myanmar in May 1995, Richardson stated at a press conference in Bangkok that his trip had been “unsuccessful, frustrating and disappointing”. Similarly, a string of UN special envoys have for over two decades attempted and failed to engage the generals towards political change and national reconciliation. Myanmar’s partners in the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have also long advocated a policy of “constructive engagement” with the military regime, though so far with few tangible results apart from increased trade and investment with the impoverished nation. The WikiLeaks cables and other internal US documentation show that Washington is indeed concerned by reports of North Korea’s shadowy involvement in Myanmar as well as the military regime’s nuclear ambitions. Comparing the content of the recently leaked cables with what US officials and other sources apparently told ProPublica shows that expressing such concerns publicly would make it more difficult to entice Myanmar’s ruling generals to give up their newly established, cozy relationship with North Korea’s weapons-proliferating regime. Myanmar’s close relations with North Korea’s main ally, China, is also a concern, according to US senator James Webb, a staunch advocate of the US’s new and to date ineffectual engagement policy with Myanmar’s military government. At a breakfast meeting with Washington defense reporters in October, Webb called on the Obama administration to be more active in Myanmar and engage the country’s military junta to prevent China from making Myanmar a full-blown client state. Downplaying perennial human-rights concerns and dismissing the well-documented reports of Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions are part and parcel of this new policy departure. From the afore-mentioned breakfast meeting, Foreign Policy magazine reported on its web site on October 27 that Webb “criticized what he sees as a double standard in the administration’s approach toward human rights – and pointed to Beijing”. “When was the last time China had an election? How many political prisoners are there in China? Does anybody know? What’s the consistency here?” Foreign Policy reported. Tellingly, the November 12 ProPublica report quoted Webb as saying that the DVB report on North Korea and Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions “made such an [engagement] approach impossible”. Difficult truths The US Embassy in Yangon stated in a report dated August 27, 2004 – which has recently been made public by WikiLeaks – that one of their sources had said that North Korean workers were assembling surface-to-air missiles at a “military site in Magway Division” where a “concrete-reinforced underground facility” was also being constructed. An unidentified expatriate businessman had told the US Embassy that “he had seen a large barge carrying reinforced steel bar of a diameter that suggested a project larger than a factory”. While stating that these reports could not be “definitive proof of sizable North Korean involvement with the Burmese [Myanmar] regime… many details provided by [a confidential source] match those provided by other, seemingly unrelated sources”. According to those reports, the embassy stated in its report, Myanmar and North Korea “are up to something of a covert military or military-industrial nature”. The report added that, “exactly what, and on what scale, remains to be determined” and that the embassy would continue to “monitor these developments and report as warranted”. Asia Times Online reported as early as July 2006 (see Myanmar and North Korea share a tunnel vision, July 19, ‘06) on North Korea’s involvement in the construction of an extensive underground complex in and around Myanmar’s new capital Naypyidaw. In another internal US document made public by WikiLeaks, a local Myanmar businessman reportedly offered uranium to the US Embassy in Yangon. The offer was not linked to any North Korean activity, but nevertheless added to the mystery and speculation surrounding nuclear issues in Myanmar. The embassy reportedly bought it and wrote in its cable to Washington: “The individual provided a small bottle half-filled with metallic powder and a photocopied certificate of testing from a Chinese university dated 1992 as verification of the radioactive nature of the powder.” The unnamed businessman also said that “if the US was not interested in purchasing the uranium, he and his associates would try to sell it to other countries, beginning with Thailand”. It was unclear where the alleged uranium came from, but Myanmar is known to have several deposits of the radioactive metal used in nuclear reactors and weapons. According to a Myanmar government web site, there are uranium ore deposits at five locations in the country, namely: Magway, Taungdwingyi (south of Bagan), Kyaukphygon and Paongpyin near the ruby mines at Mogok, Kyauksin, and near Myeik (or Mergui) in the country’s southeast. Perhaps even more revealingly, according to an August 2009 report from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the US Embassy in Berlin marked “confidential” (but not included in the documents released by WikiLeaks), ambassador Susan Burk, special representative of the US president for nuclear non-proliferation, discussed “concerns about Myanmar’s nuclear intentions” in a meeting with German officials. The DVB documentary mentioned the involvement of German companies in Myanmar’s alleged weapons of mass destruction programs. But, in ProPublica’s version of events, the only noteworthy event related to Germany was that “officials” had said “they were aware that Burma had bought the equipment shown in the [Myanmar army] defector’s pictures [some of it was exported by German companies], but have concluded that it is not being used to launch an atomic weapons program.” Furthermore, a UN report released in November alleged North Korea is supplying banned nuclear and ballistic missile equipment to Myanmar, among other countries. “China had blocked publication of the report which has been ready for six months,” the French news agency Agence France-Presse reported on November 13. According to the report, drafted by experts who answer to the UN Security Council’s sanctions committee, North Korea is involved with “the surreptitious transfer of nuclear-related and ballistic missile-related equipment, know-how and technology to countries including Iran, Syria and Myanmar”. The UN report went on to state that suspicious nuclear activities in Myanmar were linked to Namchongang Trading, a state-owned North Korean company known to have been involved in nuclear activities in Iran and Syria and the arrests of three people in Japan who tried to export illegally a magnetometer to Myanmar through Malaysia. In reference to the disclosures by the UN experts, the Washington Times reported on November 10: “Magnetometers can be used to produce ring magnets, a key element in centrifuges that are the basis of nuclear arms programs in Iran and Pakistan. That transfer was linked to a North Korean company involved in ‘illicit procurement’ for nuclear and military programs.” In 2009, Namchongang and its director, Yun Ho-jin, were formally sanctioned by the UN for proliferation activities. According to a German Customs Bureau report, the company uses its offices in Beijing and Shenyang in China to place orders for the equipment, which is critical to building the centrifuges required to enrich uranium. The arrival of Namchongang Trading in Myanmar set off alarm bells in many Western capitals and convinced several previous skeptics of Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions to take the recent reports more seriously. At the same time, US officials continue to deny that such concerns exist, as was reflected in ProPublica’s November report that cited a supposed Central Intelligence Agency assessment of the threat. ProPublica did not reply to e-mailed questions from Asia Times Online about its November 12 piece. But, if their source’s intention was to appease the Myanmar regime, it clearly succeeded. On December 5, the state-owned daily newspaper Kyaymon (The Mirror) ran a full translation of the ProPublica report that trashed the DVB documentary and nuclear expert Kelley’s assessment. That response would seem to demonstrate that Myanmar’s secretive military regime is still in denial about its true intentions: it has repeatedly stated that it has no nuclear ambitions and that there are no North Korean technicians situated in the country. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s government has yet to publicly react to the recently leaked internal US documents disseminated by WikiLeaks. However, it is now clear that there is one version of US perceptions about Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions crafted for public consumption and diplomatic effect, and quite another making the rounds among Washington’s security establishment. The recent disclosures of the latter cast the US’s recent engagement efforts towards Myanmar in a new strategic light and raise hard questions about the policy’s wisdom and sustainability. * Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea under the Kim Clan. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services. UK urges Ban to sack Nambiar, appoint full-time Burma envoy – Thomas Maung Shwe Mizzima News: Wed 15 Dec 2010 Chiang Mai – Britain has suggested to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that a full-time envoy be appointed to replace Vijay Nambiar, Ban’s interim Burma envoy, the country’s UN ambassador Mark Lyall Grant told reporters in New York last week. Nambiar, who also serves as Ban’s chief of staff, took on the position of Burma envoy part-time following the departure of Nigerian diplomat Dr. Ibrahim Gambari last December. Grant made the comment following a UN Security Council meeting on Burma in which Nambiar reported back on his recent two-day trip to Rangoon, during which he met pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The British calls for a full-time replacement for Nambiar were echoed by Mexico’s ambassador to the UN, Claude Heller. Ban’s deputy spokesman, Farhan Haq, informed Mizzima that Ban had told the ambassadors “that he is considering the idea”, adding that Ban’s office would make an announcement if there was any change of personnel. Nambiar ignores Burma’s ethnic minorities, critics say Mark Farmaner of the London-based advocacy group Burma Campaign UK, responded to news that the British government had proposed replacing Nambiar, stating that while his organisation had advocated that Ban and his office take a greater role on the Burma file they were unimpressed with the performance of his chief of staff as Burma envoy. He said his organisation was “increasingly concerned by the approach of Nambiar, who seems to be following the failed approach of Gambari, thinking that befriending the generals will somehow buy influence. It seems that the dictatorship has got lucky yet again”. Burma Campaign was extremely disappointed with Nambiar’s handling of Burma’s ethnic question, Farmaner said, adding that: “We are also disappointed that yet again a UN envoy has gone to Burma, met with Aung San Suu Kyi and the generals, and not with key ethnic representatives. The mandate from the General Assembly which Nambiar is acting on is to secure tripartite dialogue, not just dialogue between the generals and Aung San Suu Kyi.” NLD veteran Win Tin, in a phone interview conducted the night before taking part in Suu Kyi’s meeting with Nambiar, told Mizzima that he would use occasion to urge the UN diplomat to meet leaders of Burma’s main ethnic groups so as to better understand their situation. Despite the request, Nambiar failed to do so during his short trip. Nambiar said to have let Chinese strongly influence Burma report The Washington Post reported last month that in August Nambiar had met Chinese UN ambassador Li Baodong days after the US announced its support for the creation of a commission of inquiry to investigate possible war crimes committed by the Burmese regime. The report said that during the “confidential” meeting, Li relayed Beijing’s strong opposition to any such inquiry. The Post’s Colum Lynch wrote that three separate UN sources privy to the details of the meeting said Li had told Nambiar the proposed Burma inquiry was “dangerous and counterproductive, and should not be allowed to proceed”. Nambiar by omission appeared to share Chinese opposition to the commission of inquiry. A report in September this year on the Situation of Human rights in Burma, prepared with the assistance of Nambiar in his position as Burma envoy and officially submitted by Ban to the General Assembly, made no mention of the proposed inquiry. The omission came despite the fact that UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma Tomás Ojea Quintana had issued a report in March to the UN Human Rights Council that called for such an inquiry. The September report, while briefly mentioning Quintana’s report also left out any discussion of his conclusion that in Burma there existed a pattern of “gross and systematic” rights abuses which suggested that the abuses were a state policy that involved authorities at all levels of the executive, military and judiciary. The September report, which is supposed to cover the period from August last year to August this year also left out any mention of the significant Burmese military offences in ethnic areas that occurred during this time, leaving many in the Burma movement deeply concerned. In a previous interview with Mizzima, senior NLD leader Win Tin said that it was totally unacceptable that the September report neglected to mention the continuing attacks against villagers in eastern Burma. He also said he was deeply disturbed that the report ignored the Burmese Army’s military offensive in the Kokang region of Shan State in August-September last year which the UN itself had estimated forced 37,000 refugees to flee into China. In response to questions about the glaring omission of rights abuses in ethnic areas, Ban’s spokesman Haq said at a press conference in New York on November 26: “I have no comment on the SG’s [Secretary General] human rights report, which speaks for itself.” Nambiar allegedly called Suu Kyi out of touch, too hard-line The calls to replace Nambiar came just days after a widely circulated report by Inner City Press reporter Matthew Russell Lee that sources in the UN had said that after returning from Burma “Nambiar’s internal reporting to UN officials was critical of Aung San Suu Kyi, characterising her as out of touch and somehow too hard-line”. Haq told Mizzima that Russell Lee’s report “is not accurate”, and that according to Haq, “Mr Nambiar has considerable respect for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi”. Responding to Haq’s denial, Russell Lee told Mizzima he stood by his story. He said in an e-mail message: “Having spoken with people privy to Mr Nambiar’s report – back within the UN Secretariat – which again was different on the point from what Nambiar said in the Security Council and Group of Friends meeting, Inner City Press stands by its story 100 per cent. Now with the UK, Mexico and others having asked that Nambiar be replaced by another full-time envoy, this double game or doublespeak diplomacy may be less relevant. Mr Haq’s denial gives rise to the question: did Haq even ask to see the internal report before denying it?” Envoy upbeat on Burma’s election While Nambiar certainly had not condemned Suu Kyi or the NLD in public, he had made positive statements about Burma’s recent and much criticised elections. In an interview with the BBC Burmese langue service conducted after the election, Nambiar claimed that in Burma “Government formation is taking place. I think there will be new spaces, new slots in the parliament which will open up for by-elections”. Nambiar also told the BBC that by-elections, held for a single seat or a small number of seats usually held when a politician retires or dies in office would give “small opportunities for increasing the political space for a broader, inclusive involvement”. As Burma’s national election was just held last month it is hardly likely will be any by-elections in the near future. Role in Sri Lanka during height of civil war still controversial and unresolved Nambiar remains surrounded in controversy over questions regarding his actions in May last year during the final days of Sri Lanka’s war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), aka Tamil Tigers, while he was in the country on behalf of Ban as part of an apparent effort by the UN to stop the bloodshed. Ban sent the former Indian diplomat to Sri Lanka despite that his own brother, retired Indian army general Satish Nambiar, had served as an adviser to the Sri Lankan military for several years. Marie Colvin, a reporter with The Times of London, wrote that on Monday, May 18, 2009, at 5:30 a.m. she personally called Nambiar in Colombo to relay a message she had received from members of the LTTE leadership, who were surrounded in a bunker with 300 loyalists including women and children, that they were ready to give themselves up to Sri Lankan government troops. According to Colvin the leaders wanted “Nambiar to be present to guarantee the Tigers’ safety”. Nambiar told Colvin that he had been assured by Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa that those who gave up would be safe if they were to “hoist a white flag high”. When Colvin suggested that Nambiar go personally to witness the surrender he told her it would not “be necessary” and that “the president’s assurances were enough”. Hours later the lifeless bodies of dozens of members of the LTTE leadership including the two men who told Colvin they were ready to give up, were put on display by a triumphant Sri Lankan government. General Sarath Fonseka, head of the Sri Lankan military at the time, told an opposition newspaper last December that Gothabaya Rajapaksa, the Sri Lankan defence minister and brother of the president had been “given orders not to accommodate any LTTE leaders attempting surrender and that ‘they must all be killed’”. Foneska, now jailed and facing charges of sedition for making the allegations, said the president, the defence minister and their brother Basil Rajapaksa, a senior presidential adviser were all guilty of war crimes for ordering the summary executions of rebel forces during the final days of battle. The Times also reported that after arriving in Colombo to survey the situation, Nambiar was briefed by UN staff that they estimated at least 20,000 people had died “mostly by army shelling” during the final stages of the war against the Tigers. The report said Nambiar “knew about but chose not to make public” the UN estimates. When the British Foreign Office revealed the UN estimate, human rights groups demanded an inquiry into the conduct of the Sri Lankan armed forces. Suu Kyi calls on Europe and Germany to be more supportive Deustche Welle (Germany): Wed 15 Dec 2010 In an exclusive interview with DW, Burmese civil rights activist Aung San Suu Kyi talks about the changes in Myanmar (Burma) she has experienced after her release and her future plans.Aung San Suu Kyi was released on November 13 after more than seven years of house arrest. In 1991, the pro-democracy activist received the Nobel Peace Prize. The 65-year old has spent 15 of the last 21 years in detention. Deutsche Welle: What is your daily routine these days? Aung San Suu Kyi: My daily routine is very, very hectic. If I look back at today, I had about two, three appointments this morning and two in the afternoon, and I still haven’t finished my work yet. So, it is extremely hectic. What kind of appointments are these? I am meeting diplomats, I am meeting political parties, I am meeting individuals, we have our National League for Democracy (NLD) office meetings. Then I am speaking to people on the phone. And there are individual journalists and correspondents, who have managed to come to Burma, and I have to meet them as well. What was the biggest change you noticed in your city after your house arrest was lifted? I think the number of hand phones! The moment I was released, I saw all those people with their hand phones which they were using to take photographs. I think what it means is that there is an improvement in communications. And what about the Burmese society? Did you find any other changes? Prices have gone up sky-high, and people are very concerned about it. Everybody talks about the rise in prices. Also, the attitude of the young people has improved considerably. They want to be involved in the political process, and they are much more outgoing and proactive than they were seven years ago. When you were released, it was striking that many young people turned up to greet you. What are your expectations from the youth of Burma? It is for them to understand that it is up to them to bring change to our country, and that they should not depend on me or the NLD or anybody else. We will do our best, but in the end I want them to have this self-confidence to believe that they can do it for themselves. How do you see the future of your party, the National League for Democracy? We are going to stand as a political force because we have the full support of the people. Of course, the authorities are trying to deregister our party, and I am contesting that at court, but that is a legal matter. The real political truth of the situation is that we have the confidence, the trust and the support of the people, and that will keep us going as the most important opposition force in Burma today. Have you tried to get in touch with the government after your release? No, not yet. I have, of course, been sending indirect messages through almost every speech I have made, every interview I have had, that I would like to have dialogue. I think we should discuss our differences and come to an agreement that we should be prepared to compromise on both sides. But why haven’t you taken any concrete step to initiate this kind of a dialogue? We are waiting for the right time, which I hope is not too far off. Burma is a country with many ethnic minorities, whose relationship with the majority has been rather tense over the recent decades. What do you plan to do to reach out to these groups? We have been reaching out to these groups for a number of years, and I can claim that we have had a certain amount of success. Not only do we have very strong allies among the parties which contested the 1990 elections, we also have the support of other ethnic groups, including the ceasefire groups along the frontiers, who have expressed an interest in what we are trying to do – to revive the spirit of true union. Last week, the Nobel Peace Prize for the Chinese democracy activist Liu Xiaobo turned into a major international controversy. What is your reaction, being a Nobel laureate yourself? I have a great respect for the Norwegian Nobel Committee, and I believe they must have sound reasons for choosing to give him the award this year. I personally don’t know much about Liu Xiabo because I have been under house arrest for about seven years, and all I know about him is that what I heard on the radio. But I do believe that the Nobel Committee must have sound reasons for selecting him. In Europe, people are wondering what they can do to support Burma. What is your advice? First of all, it would be very helpful if all the countries of Europe could speak with one voice. Even within the European Union there are different attitudes and different voices, and I think that weakens the [Burmese] opposition. It would help us a great deal if all European countries called for certain steps to be taken in Burma – the release of political prisoners, inclusiveness of the political process, specifically with the NLD, and negotiations. Do you have any specific European countries in mind, which you want to see more active in this? As I am talking to you in Germany – I would like Germany to be more active. You said in previous interviews that you will need time to form an opinion about international sanctions against the Burmese regime. What is your impression so far on this matter? So far, I have not got the impression that economic sanctions have really hurt the public, but of course there are other voices that are perhaps still waiting to be heard, so we have yet to find out. I have been released just for over a month, and I haven’t had time to go into this issue; I am waiting to read the latest report of the IMF, and perhaps the ADB and other economic institutions. How influential is the West in Burma? Compared with that, how do you see India’s and China’s role? I think the role of the West in Burma and the role of India and China are quite different. I would not like to think of them as competing for influence, or competing for ascendancy over Burma. It is not as though we were not able to shape our own destiny. But certainly, because India and China are very close neighbors, they have a certain advantage over those countries that are situated very far away. Does this mean that what the West does with regard to Burma is not so important? No, it has its importance, depending on how and what actions the West is taking, which is why I said earlier that it would be good if all the Western nations could coordinate their efforts. Not just the Western nations, it would be good if the whole international community, including the United Nations, coordinated its efforts. That would help us very greatly indeed, and if it called for the same basic steps, that would mean progress. What are your expectations from India and China? We would like them to engage with us. To begin with, we’d very much like India and China to give us the opportunity to explain our point of view to them. We have very little contact with China and India. We have more contact with the Indian government than with the Chinese government, in fact I don’t think we have any contact with the Chinese government at all. We would like to have contact with them, we would like them to listen to our side of the story, and make them understand that we look upon them as neighbors, and that we would like to be friends with them. We are not hostile to them even if we are working for democracy in Burma. What are your plans for the coming weeks? The man that I fear most in the world is the man who keeps my appointment book. I haven’t gone through next week’s appointments with him… *Interviewer: Thomas Baerthlein *Editor: Shamil Shams Ethnic armed groups discuss collaboration – Sai Zom Hseng Irrawaddy: Tue 14 Dec 2010 Four ethnic armed groups have discussed the possibility of deepening cooperation and mutual support at a meeting in Mongla, the Burmese-Chinese border town in Eastern Shan State, which lies in the area controlled by the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). The meeting, during last week’s Shan New Year, was attended by representatives from the NDAA, the Shan State Army-North, Shan State Army-South and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Saengjuen Sarawin, deputy editor of the Shan Herald Agency for News (SHAN), who also attended the meeting, told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday: “The representatives analyzed the country’s current situation, reviewed what they have done in the last 20 years and discussed their future plans.” An officer based at the UWSA headquarters in Panghsang told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday the meeting had been “just a normal discussion with the other ethnic armed groups. We haven’t made any decision yet but we do intend to support each other because we all are ethnics. We have been oppressed by the same government.” The UWSA, the NDAA, and the Shan State Army-North are among the armed ethnic groups which are resisting regime pressure on them to join its Border Guard Force (BGF) . Sarawin said the BGF issue had caused the armed ethnic groups to “wake up” and understand that they had to depend on each other. As part of its campaign of pressure on the NDAA and another armed group, the Kachin Independence Army, the regime interrupted cross-border trade at Mongla by closing the checkpoints located on the Mongla-Keng Tung highway in Shan State. This highway is the main trading route in Shan State and is an important thoroughfare for goods between Burma, China and Thailand. A local source said that the NDAA could still derive income from casinos, rubber production, border pass fees, a magnesium mine and vehicle taxes. The Mongla meeting also discussed last year’s attack by Burmese government troops on NNDAA forces in the Kokang region of the Sino-Burmese. NDDA leader Peng Jia Xiang said about 200 civilians had been killed in the two-day battle, three of them Chinese civilians who died in artillery fire from government troops. The clashes sent 30,000 refugees into China, where Chinese authorities spent 10 million yuan (about US $1.4 million) in providing humanitarian assistance to them. Vietnam-Burma trade forecast to rise 60pc Mizzima News: Tue 14 Dec 2010 Rangoon – The value of bilateral trade between Burma and Vietnam has increased almost 60 per cent year on year and will reach nearly US$160 million, according to Vietnamese deputy industry and trade minister Nguyen Thanh Bien, in Rangoon yesterday. His claims came today at a conference for businessmen from the two countries on Monday at the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry building held to promote bilateral trade. Nguyen said bilateral trade values last year and 2008 were US$99 million and US$108 million respectively. “Trade promotion activities between the two countries are also very busy,” he said. About 200 businessmen attended the conference and visitors exhibited products and services in the agricultural, fisheries, household goods and tourism sectors. In April, Vietnam’s largest trade fair in Burma was held in Rangoon at which 70 Vietnamese enterprises participated. Direct Hanoi-Rangoon and Ho Chi Minh City-Rangoon flights were also launched. Vietnam’s total trade value would reach around US$139.1 billion this year, the minister said, of which US$64.4 billion would account for exports and US$74.7 billion, imports. Independent UN rights expert calls for release of political prisoners in Myanmar UN News Centre: Tue 14 Dec 2010 An independent United Nations human rights expert today urged the Government of Myanmar to release at least 2,202 prisoners of conscience still detained one month after the freeing of Aung San Suu Kyi, saying many of the prisoners are seriously ill as a result of harsh jail conditions. “As Myanmar attempts to move forward in its democratic transition and the new Government seeks to establish a new era of peace and prosperity for the people, it is critical that prisoners of conscience be released immediately and unconditionally,” said Tomás Ojea Quintana, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. “These are individuals who were imprisoned for exercising their basic human rights, the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly,” he said. He voiced sadness at the death on 8 December of 50-year-old U Naymeinda, who was also known as Myo Min or Nay Win. He was a Buddhist monk and the 145th prisoner of conscience to die in prison in Myanmar since 1988. Mr. Naymeinda had been arrested for distributing leaflets supporting a pro-democracy demonstration on 9 September 1999 and was charged under the Unlawful Associations Act and the Emergency Provisions Act and sentenced to 20 years in prison. His health deteriorated when he was transferred to Moulmein Prison in Mon state far from his family, making it difficult for them to visit and provide essential food and medicine, a practice that is used frequently to further punish not only the prisoners but also their families, Mr. Quintana said. The Special Rapporteur also voiced deep concern about reports he received on several prisoners in Cell block 4 in Insein prison, who appear to be suffering from malnutrition-related diseases as well as tuberculosis. Releasing the prisoners of conscience, said Mr. Quintana, would be a strong signal that the new Government intends to uphold fundamental freedoms and would be welcomed by people inside and outside the country. He recalled that before the legislative elections on 7 November, the Government had indicated that it might release some prisoners, but that has not happened. According to Myanmar’s Government, the revision of national laws – particularly those used to convict many of the prisoners of conscience – is on its agenda and will be one of the matters taken up by the parliament. “All prisoners of conscience should be released in advance of those deliberations,” Mr. Quintana said. UN independent experts, including Mr. Quintana, report to the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council. They work in an independent and unpaid capacity. Myanmar’s military sights ethnic victory – Marwaan Macan-Markar Asia Times: Tue 14 Dec 2010 BANGKOK – An ongoing clash along the Thailand-Myanmar border, pitting government troops against ethnic insurgents, is raising the specter of more violence in areas that the military sees as the final frontier to putting the country under the grip of one army for the first time in over six decades. The fighting that erupted in early November, when a brigade from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) attacked and occupied the Myanmar border town of Myawaddy, has already seen some 35,000 civilians from the Karen minority flee across the Thai border for safety. Reports of the death toll remain unclear in the wake of the regime troops retaliating and taking back areas from the DKBA. Some Myanmar activists monitoring the fighting from the Thai border town of Mae Sot say as many as four people were killed in the intensive fighting. “The situation is serious and the [Myanmar] regime seems to be very angry,” says Win Min, a national security expert currently living in exile. “It is a show of force that they can fight all [ethnic insurgent] groups at the same time and pressure other armed groups not to make coordinated attacks against the regime.” This latest trigger to simmering tensions in an area where a civil war has raged for decades is a plan Myanmar’s military regime unveiled in April 2009 to bring the patchwork of ethnic insurgent troops along its borders under the command of the Tatmadaw, as the military is called. But not all the armed ethnic groups have agreed to join the ranks of the planned Border Guard Force (BGF), which will come under Tatmadaw’s direct command. Among those resisting the Myanmar monopoly of military power is the DKBA. “The regime is going to fight smaller or weaker groups that have resisted the border guard transformation, and the DKBA fits the regime’s target,” Win Min explained during an Inter Press Service (IPS) interview. “The regime has tried to control all of Burma [Myanmar] by occupying the ethnic areas bit by bit every year.” Signs of possible clashes in areas that are home to the Kachin and Shan ethnic communities are being reported in the Myanmar exile media. The rebel groups from these minorities were among the 17 ethnic armed groups that signed ceasefire agreements between 1989 and 1995 with the junta. An area near the Chinese border is currently in the grip of an uneasy peace, states Human Rights Watch (HRW), the New York-based global rights lobby. “The tension with the ceasefire groups is set to continue in 2011, as fighting has also flared in parts of Shan State [due] to the BGF scheme.” The military, which has held political power since a 1962 coup, is dominated by the Southeast Asian nation’s Burman majority. Arrayed against them are 135 registered ethnic groups, which account for nearly 40% of the country’s 56 million population. Yet ever since Myanmar got independence from the British colonialists in 1948, it has been divided along ethnic fault lines that have prevented Burman domination over the entire country. In the early years of post-independence,over half the country was beyond the reach of the central government in Yangon. The balance has shifted dramatically since then, with the Tatmadaw now 400,000-strong and controlling substantial parts of the country, and some 45,000 ethnic rebel troops standing in the way of the army’s total domination. Such a feat over past two decades has left the Myanmar military with the thinking that soldiers are the only force to unify the country. “When the men in uniform looked to the past, they saw a country that tended to fall apart into little pieces and that had always needed to be melded together by force,” writes Thant Myint-U, a respected Myanmar historian, in The River of Lost Footsteps. “They saw themselves in a long line of national unifiers and saw their task as unfinished,” added Thant in his book, which charts the story of the country during and after British colonization. “In their imagination, there remained the challenge of nation building, of creating and promoting a new Myanmar identity.” Myanmar’s 2008 constitution, which was approved in a referendum plagued with irregularities, personifies this military vision for the country more than the two previous charters, 1947 and 1974. Following the general election on November 7, the country’s first poll in 20 years won by a pro-junta party under questionable circumstances, the military regime is marching to reach new heights through the enforcement of the 2008 charter in early 2011. This constitution is unequivocal about the military’s place in power, stating that the country can have only one army – the Tatmadaw. “The junta has already given an ultimatum to the ethnic rebel groups to join the BGF under the command of the army, otherwise these groups will be declared illegal,” says Kheunsai Jaiyen, editor of the Shan Herald Agency for News, a media outlet covering Myanmar from northern Thailand. The military regime will use its twin weapons – a parliamentary majority and the constitution – to place the issue of the BGF on the agenda of the new government, he told IPS. “They will submit a motion to make all groups come under the Tatmadaw.” New dam in China disrupts river trade at major Burma border crossing Shan Women’s Action Network and Shan Sapawa Environmental Organisation: Tue 14 Dec 2010 A recently built hydropower dam on the Longjiang River in China’s Yunnan Province is causing severe disruption to thousands of villagers relying on cross-border trade in Burma’s northern Shan State, according to a new report by local Shan researchers. The report “High and Dry” by the Shan Sapawa Environmental Organisation and the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), exposes how local trade and transport across the Shweli River (the Burmese name for the Longjiang) near Muse and Namkham has been crippled by unpredictable daily fluctuations in the water level since the completion of the 110-meter tall Longjiang Dam about 30 kilometers upstream in mid-2010. An estimated 16,000 villagers relying on ferrying of goods near Muse, the main China-Burma border trade crossing, have seen their income cut drastically by the continual drops and surges in the water level, which have caused both grounding and flooding of the ferry boats. “The people of our village live, eat and work with the river. People cannot work when the water suddenly rises and falls like this,” said an impacted villager. The villagers are calling urgently for the Chinese authorities to investigate and mitigate the disruptive impacts of the dam, while the authors of the report are requesting that trans-boundary impact assessments are carried out for any future dams built in China. “Impact assessments for dams should be carried out for the entire length of the river, regardless of national boundaries. Whether for the Longjiang, Mekong or Salween, China should consider the health of our shared rivers and all the communities that rely on them,” said Sapawa spokesperson Sai Sai. There has been increasing international debate about the downstream impacts of China’s dams on the Mekong River. There are also 13 dams planned on the Salween River in China. * The full report can be viewed on www.shanwomen.org Panglong II can work only if military joins: NLD – Myo Thant Mizzima News: Mon 13 Dec 2010 Chiang Mai – Burmese opposition leaders on Friday informed US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs Joseph Yun that a second Panglong conference could only be fruitful if the Burmese military supported the proceedings, National League for Democracy spokesman Ohn Kyaing told Mizzima. “The second Panglong conference is intended to give people a strong sense of unity. It does not intend to oppose any person or any organisation. Practically, it will be fruitful only if the military participates in it. So, we want the military to participate in it. It’s an affair we need to do in unison,” Ohn Kyaing said. The comment came on the final day of Yun’s four-day visit to Burma, as the US diplomat met NLD and Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP) representatives at NLD general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi’s home for more than an hour. CRPP general secretary Aye Tha Aung added that he felt national reconciliation could be achieved through a second Panglong conference. “Firstly, we need to reach a basic agreement. Then, the military needs to make some changes and give the political parties basic rights. After an all-inclusive dialogue we will achieve national reconciliation. National reconciliation is the most important thing. The second Panglong conference can achieve it,” Aye Tha Aung elaborated. After the meeting with Yun, NLD central executive committee members and CRPP members held further deliberations. Ohn Kyaing said they discussed national reconciliation, the NLD’s right to survive as a legal party and means to obtain the freedom of political prisoners. CRPP member Htaung Ko Thang, who attended the meetings, said Burman and ethnic people were also concerned for Suu Kyi’s personal security, seeking international community assistance in providing her security, according to the NLD spokesman. Yun visited Burma’s administrative capital of Naypyidaw on Thursday, speaking with Burmese authorities including Foreign Minister Nyan Win, Science and Technology Minister U Thaung and Police Chief Khin Yi. A statement issued by the US embassy in Rangoon said Washington was seeking direct talks with the junta on the subjects of human rights, political prisoners and other important issues. Although Naypyidaw’s response to Washington’s overture was unknown, the country’s state-run newspaper, New Light of Myanmar, acknowledged that the government met the US diplomats to promote bilateral relations and co-operation. The Panglong Agreement was reached between the Burmese government under Aung San, Suu Kyi’s father, and the Shan, Kachin and Chin peoples on February 12, 1947. Signatories accepted in principle “Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas” and envisioned the creation of a Kachin State by the Constituent Assembly (the first post-independence parliament). The deal came a year after the first Panglong Conference was held in the town of the same name in the south of Shan State. U Nu, who took over the reins of Aung San’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League party following the latter’s assassination in July 1947, did little to implement the Panglong compact after Burma received independence in January 1948. His failure to live up to the promise of Panglong left ethnic minorities in Burma feeling betrayed. Since 1948, ethnic minorities have had their rights and self-determination in traditional areas of control denied, leading many of the groups to armed struggle against the ruling Burmese military junta. The junta has responded, the United Nations and human rights groups have detailed, with killings, rape, torture, forced labour and burning of villages in ethnic areas as the regime tries to deny the rebels support from the civilian population. Thailand already shelters 250,000 ethnic minority refugees after brutal campaigns by the Burmese Army. China loans Myanmar 2.4 billion dollars for gas pipeline project Deustche Presse Agentur: Mon 13 Dec 2010 Yangon – China has signed a 2.4-billion-dollar loan agreement with Myanmar to finance the construction of a natural gas pipeline between the countries, media reports said Sunday. The loan was inked between the China Develoment Bank Cooperation and Myanmar Foreign Investment Bank on November 30 in Napyitaw, the new capital, the Myanmar Times reported. The pipeline is to run from Rakhine State on the Myanmar coast, site of the Kyauk Phyu national gas project, to Yunnan province in southern China. ‘The loan will be mainly for the natural gas project in Kyauk Phyu, which involves Myanmar, China, Korea and India, where Myanmar has 7.3 per cent of the shares,’ said Jin Honggen, economic and commercial counselor of the Chinese embassy in Yangon. He said the loan would help bring speed up construction of the project. Under the Myanmar-China gas scheme, India is to help build a new port in Sithwe, Rakhine, to handle gas from offshore reserves and China will construct a 1,000-kilometre pipeline to deliver the gas overland to Yunnan. ‘The natural gas from Myanmar will be used for Yunnan province’s industrial requirements and for residential use,’ Jin told the Myanmar Times. Military-run Myanmar currently exports more than 1 billion cubic feet of gas (28 million cubic metres) a day of natural gas from its two offshore projects in the Gulf of Marthaban to neighbouring Thailand via an underwater and overland pipeline network. Thailand pays a estimated 2 billion dollars a year for the gas imports. Orders for Myanmar garments up Deustche Presse Agentur: Mon 13 Dec 2010 Yangon – Orders for Myanmar-made garments from Germany, Japan and South Korea have surged this year due to the country’s low labour costs, media reports said Sunday. Competing demand for Myanmar-made garments this year has prompted German buyers to increase their paying price, Latwar Company managing director Khin Maung Aye told the Myanmar Times. ‘Germany is increasing payment for its order, otherwise all the factories will switch over to South Korean orders only,’ he said. ‘Half my factory’s orders come from South Korea, and half from Germany,’ Khin Maung Aye told the English-language weekly. Germany has been a leading importer of Myanmar-made clothes for years. ‘South Korea used to order garments from North Korea, but the tension between the two countries has created a big opportunity for Myanmar,’ Khin Maung Aye said. Ba Myaing, another factory owner, said his business had gone up by 70 per cent this year thanks to increased orders from South Korea. One of Myanmar’s advantages over its neighbours is the abundant availability of cheap labour. Minimum wage in Yangon garment factories is less than 100 dollars a month, one of the lowest in the region. But a major challenge to industry is the country’s poor and erratic electricity supply, sources said. A pariah nation with lots of friends The Associated Press: Mon 13 Dec 2010 Yangon, Myanmar — Aung San Suu Kyi has long proclaimed her love for India. Myanmar’s pro-democracy icon went to college in New Delhi, her mother was the ambassador there and she spent some of her happiest times with her late husband and two sons in the Himalayan foothills of northern India. But India’s government, she says, has been a disappointment. “It saddens me,” she said of New Delhi’s ties to the army generals who run her country, also known as Burma. “It saddens my heart that the peoples of India and Burma, who went through the battles of independence as comrades to fight and get out from under the British empire, that the old ties have given way to the new ties of commercialism.” Things have changed since Suu Kyi rose to prominence in the late 1980s, and India joined the clamorous international outcry against the military crackdown on the democracy movement. Today, security and commerce are New Delhi’s foremost concerns in Myanmar – echoing how realpolitik governs Yangon’s relations with a string of powerful regional allies. Myanmar’s repressive government is cut off from much of the international community by travel restrictions on the elite and trade sanctions from many western countries. But the nation wedged between India, China and Thailand also has enormous energy reserves, thousands of miles of coastline and long borders that make it strategically important. As a result: in its own neighborhood, the pariah is pretty popular. “Thailand, China, Singapore, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia,” said Maung Zarni, an exiled dissident and research fellow at the London School of Economics, listing Yangon’s regional allies. “All treat Burma as nothing more than a resource brothel and a strategic location for their national interests.” It is India, though, that Suu Kyi has singled out – in her own quiet way – for criticism. “I would like to have thought India would be standing behind us,” she told the Indian Express newspaper in late November. New Delhi is neither the largest investor in Myanmar, nor has the deepest ties to the junta – China is widely thought to hold both positions. But India’s political system – it is the world’s largest democracy – and its one-time support for the pro-democracy movement has sparked a backlash. “India has not only abandoned its supposed democratic values but also discarded any pretensions to ethics,” Zarni said. For years, New Delhi had been a champion of Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement. Dozens of dissidents fled to India, and a number of anti-junta media organizations set up offices there. But the policy began to change in the early 1990s, as a bloody insurgency took hold in Indian-controlled Kashmir. The outbreak of violence forced India to shift soldiers from its troubled northeast, where it had long fought a series of small ethnic militant groups. Many of those groups had bases across the little-guarded 1,000-mile (1,600-kilometer) border with Myanmar. At the same time India’s long-dormant economy began to blossom, leaving the energy-hungry nation searching for new supplies. Finally, there was the rise of China – which India increasingly sees as its major economic and political rival – which had allied itself closely to the junta. For India, all that made reaching out to Myanmar impossible to resist. Deals were made for trade, for natural gas, for Myanmar to expel the Indian militants. “It’s the way of the world,” Suu Kyi said in a November interview with The Associated Press, days after she was released from house arrest. For India, the decision did not come lightly. Shyam Saran was India’s ambassador in Yangon in 1999 when Suu Kyi’s husband, the British scholar Michael Aris, died of cancer in England. The couple had been unable to see one another in the months before his death. She feared that if she left Myanmar, she would not be allowed to return. Saran, who later became India’s foreign secretary, paid a condolence call on her in Yangon after Aris died. She greeted him graciously, then became overcome by grief as she described how Aris and their two sons had been unable to get visas to see her in Yangon. “Here was an individual of extraordinary fortitude and strength of character,” Saran wrote in the Indian Express after Suu Kyi’s November release, admitting that he felt some guilt after that meeting because of his government’s policy shift. Still, he knew India had made the right decision: “Our overriding national interest necessitated working together with the military government.” What’s next for Burma’s democrats? – Aung Din Foreign Policy: Mon 13 Dec 2010 Aung San Suu Kyi is no longer under house arrest, but the Burmese junta’s insidious co-option of “democracy” highlights that real change is still a long way off. Burma’s rigged elections on Nov. 7 did little more than affirm the ruling military junta’s willingness to subvert the popular will in order to maintain its grip on power. However, one positive development did come from the tightly controlled election: Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s most prominent democracy advocate, was released from house arrest on Nov. 13, after seven-and-a-half-years. Since her release, she has been busy: meeting with her party members, supporters, diplomats, ethnic leaders, civil society actors, and families of political prisoners; speaking with foreign dignitaries and leaders; and answering questions from international media. She has consistently said that she will continue to work for national reconciliation in Burma through a meaningful political dialogue, though she’s well aware that her newfound freedom might not last long. The fraudulent election results were not a surprise for Aung San Suu Kyi or her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which boycotted the campaign. From its onset, many loyalists to the party and the movement, including myself, advised the NLD to disassociate itself from this fake election. There were some individuals who were more optimistic, arguing that the election marked the beginning of a transition to civilian democratic rule. But no longer is this the case — the military junta’s brazen theft of the election should have dispelled any remaining doubts about its intentions. The only question is: What’s the next step for Burma’s pro-democracy movement? The phony democratic institutions established by the junta offer some hints about the pace of political developments in Burma. According to the 2008 Constitution, the junta must convene the lower house of parliament within 90 days after the election. Parliament’s upper house will assemble a week later, followed by the Union Hluttaw — a joint session of the lower and upper houses — summoned 15 days later to elect the president. This will likely be completed by early March 2011. Needless to say, both retired and active military generals will control the new parliament, together with their business cronies and drug lords who hold significant positions and powers within the military junta’s political wing, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). There is little to no chance for the opposition members of parliament (who hold, at the whim of the junta, 15 percent of seats in the lower house and 17 percent of seats in the upper house) to address their concerns effectively. Than Shwe, the paramount leader in this criminal ring, is expected to become the president and chairman of the National Defense and Security Council, the most powerful institution in Burma — equivalent to China’s Central Military Commission. The structure of the Burmese government will change, but the political game will continue to be monopolized by the same old figures and played with the same destructive attitude. Than Shwe will still maintain his supreme authority over the government and the military at least for the next five years, the duration of one term in office. And the military’s regular offensives against ethnic minorities will continue, if not escalate, in an attempt to place all armed groups under the direct command of the Burmese Army, a policy known as “Tatmadaw” in Burmese. The ruling clique will also continue to enrich itself at the expense of the Burmese people. A group of business cronies and family members of military generals monopolize the country’s economy and control all access to the country’s natural reserves and resources. The well-known tycoons Khin Shwe (of the firm Zay Gabar) and U Htay Myint (of Yuzana), both of whom are currently targeted by U.S. financial and banking sanctions, are now elected members of parliament with USDP tickets. Another junta crony under U.S. sanctions, Zaw Zaw, was recently granted a major contract to build the Dawei deep-sea port project, an $8.6 billion project mainly financed by Thailand, with the blessing of Than Shwe. Another of Than Shwe’s favorites, Tay Za, (also under U.S. sanctions) operates several jade and ruby mines in Kachin state. Despite these obvious obstacles, there is still hope that tangible positive change will come to Burma. The recent release of Aung San Suu Kyi has effectively re-energized the democracy movement inside and outside the country. People from all walks of life — including NLD members, independent democracy activists, Buddhist monks, students, ethnic minorities, citizen journalists, farmers, laborers, and even the military and ethnic armed resistance groups — have joined her network to press for a democratic and peaceful transfer of civilian power in Burma. In the following months and years, Burma will witness the growth of a new civil society movement that exists in parallel with the ruling government and aggressively challenges it for popular support and legitimacy. There is no doubt that the new regime will launch propaganda attacks and restrictions against this newfound movement to undermine its efforts to expand its capabilities. This civil society movement has believed that political dialogue is the only desirable and plausible way to achieve its aim of national reconciliation and democratization. However, the military junta’s attitude for the past 22 years has demonstrated complete apathy — if not outright antagonism — toward Burma’s pro-democracy movement and its demands. Unless this movement gathers more strength to exert further pressure on the regime, there is no doubt that the junta will continue to ignore our repeated calls for dialogue and national reconciliation. The international community, and especially the United States and Western democratic countries, must do everything in its power to bring about these reforms. It is imperative to keep existing sanctions on Burma in place, while expanding targeted financial and banking sanctions against the military regime’s cronies in the business world. The escalation of the civil war between the Burmese Army and ethnic minority forces also looms on the horizon. The cease-fire between the junta and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, an ethnic rebel group, broke apart on election day, and conflict on the Thailand-Burma border will likely escalate. Another ethnic group, the Karen Peace Council, recently found the bodies of six of its members who had been arrested on Nov. 30 by the military. Meanwhile, the junta has been increasing troop numbers and deploying heavy artillery in the ethnically dominated Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan, and Kachin states. Ethnic resistance groups, including the Kachin Independence Army, Shan State Army, New Mon State Party, United Wa State Army, and Karen National Union are preparing for renewed conflict. This development will no doubt worsen the horrific human rights violations and crimes against humanity in ethnic-minority areas. In addressing this situation, the international community must recognize that an ounce of prevention is superior to a pound of cure. The United States and its allies should press for the creation of a U.N.-led commission to investigate crimes against humanity in Burma. Toothless resolutions and statements just won’t do. A credible international inquiry of this kind could prevent future human rights violations and also pressure the regime to engage in a dialogue with its critics. The United States should continue to engage with the regime, but it should not be a unilateral effort. Washington should work together with Asian governments, including those of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan, which have expressed interest and seriousness in restoring stability and democracy to Burma. This multilateral approach will bolster the U.S. message to Burma’s leaders, while also serving to balance against China’s growing influence. U.S. President Barack Obama can begin these initiatives by appointing a U.S. special policy coordinator for Burma, as mandated by Congress, to coordinate sanctions and diplomacy within the U.S. government and with other countries, without further delay. Aung San Suu Kyi cannot work alone; she needs help from the international community. And the Burmese people are expecting the international community to listen to their voices and concerns. They need both moral and practical support to strengthen the democracy movement. It would be irrational and irresponsible for the international community to consider lifting the current sanctions and allowing foreign investments return to Burma; doing so will only enrich the top tiers of the military regime and their business associates while enslaving millions of people under their oppression. Instead, the United States should direct its energies to solidifying this grassroots civil society movement, which is Burma’s best hope for lasting and effective political change in a country that for too long has been oppressed at the point of a gun. Post-election politics in Burma—glimmers of hope? – Ashley South Irrawaddy: Mon 13 Dec 2010 On Nov. 7, Burma went to the polls for the first time since May 1990. The previous elections were won by a landslide by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). However, the military regime, which has ruled the country in one form or another since 1962, refused to hand over power. The generals chose instead to initiate a drawn-out constitution-drafting process, which culminated in a charter consolidating the military’s leading role in politics, and guaranteeing the army 25 percent of seats in parliament. Unsurprisingly, many independent parties refused to contest the polls—a boycott which was led by the NLD and overseas-based activists. Nevertheless, 37 political parties did compete, including a handful of independent candidates and some two dozen non-government-aligned parties. These opposition parties were not so naive as to believe the polls would be free and fair, but they did hope that the military regime would be confident enough in controlling the overall outcome to allow some independent voices to be elected. Non-government parties contesting the elections have a long-term strategy of slowly expanding the amount of space available to civilian political networks in order to incrementally change the balance of power in Burma. Many regarded the 2010 election as a ‘dry run’, in order to build capacities, and prepare for the next polls, due to be held sometime in 2015. In the absence of the NLD, two main urban-based, national-level opposition parties sought to gain support among citizens opposed to continued military rule. In addition, some two dozen parties ran on behalf of the country’s diverse ethnic minority communities, who make up about 30 percent of the population. Some of these parties sought to position themselves as members of a “third force,” between the government and existing opposition groups, such as the NLD. They received a great deal of criticism for participating in the elections. The turnout on Nov. 7 seems to have been somewhere between half and two-thirds of registered voters. It seemed by late that evening that many non-government parties had done remarkably well. However, in numerous instances, vote counting was interrupted once it became apparent that pro-government candidates were losing. When the official results were announced over the following days, it became apparent that many non-government candidates had been beaten to the finish line by their pro-government opponents, largely due to a massive influx of “advanced votes” which were introduced late in the day. In some cases, the number of recorded votes exceeded the total population of registered voters, indicating that election officials panicked when they realized that pro-military candidates were not about to win, and stuffed the ballot boxes. In the week after the elections, many non-government candidates and their supporters were deeply frustrated. However, the post-election scenario is not entirely gloomy. The pro-government Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) won 874 of the 1,140 seats declared by the end of November, giving them firm control of the two national-level assemblies. However, even after taking into account the 25 percent of seats reserved for the military, pro-government parties will not have a stranglehold on all of the ethnic State assemblies. In fact, a number of ethnic nationality parties did rather well in the elections. The party with the third-largest number of seats (57) is the Shan Nationalities Democracy Party, with Rakhine, Mon, Chin, Pa-O and Karen parties also doing well. In many cases, these small parties gained clusters of seats in their ethnic homelands, providing them with regional power bases. It is yet to be seen how the dynamics of electoral power will be played out. Under the 2008 constitution, the two national and 14 State/ Regional assemblies elected in November will be convened in February, to choose a president under an electoral college system. Between now and then, those few independent candidates elected will have to choose their positions. Differences may yet emerge between semi-civilian USDP candidates, and the military blocs in each of the assemblies. In particular, there is likely to be jockeying for power among a number of recently retired senior military officers, not all of whom are comfortable with relinquishing their uniforms for the uncertainties of electoral politics. The government has recently announced measures restricting certain freedoms of speech in parliament. Nevertheless, ethnic nationality parties in several of the State assemblies should be able to scrutinize, and sometimes even block, some legislation. Furthermore, in the ethnic States, many USDP candidates come from minority communities, and enjoy long-standing relationships with members of ethnic nationality parties. Therefore, some interesting cross-party alliances may emerge. Furthermore, the creation of greater political “space,” at least at the local level, is likely to facilitate the further development of civil society networks within and between ethnic nationality communities, the emergence of which over the past decade-plus has been one of the few positive stories in an otherwise bleak political scene in Burma. An important indicator will be whether, and to what degree, ethnic nationality candidates will be pressured or co-opted into following the USDP/ military line, or whether in some cases they will use the space created by their election to give voice for their communities and to gain access to improved services for their electorates. Of course, such opportunities are not without their potential pitfalls: successful candidates are likely to be tempted by the fruits of office. With the military continuing to dominate national-level politics, observers should therefore look to the ethnic nationality parties as agents of progressive—albeit, modest—change in Burma. Whether they can succeed in this incremental approach will depend in large part on whether junta supremo Than Shwe feels confident enough in his control of the political process to allow some concessions. The military’s position will depend in large part on its success in dealing with Aung San Suu Kyi who was released from her most recent bout of house arrest just a few days after the elections. Although the NLD is a shadow of its former self, “The Lady” still enjoys enormous support and respect throughout Burma and beyond. It is yet to be seen whether she will make common cause with non-government candidates elected on Nov. 7. Also unsure is the degree of cooperation, if any, that can be expected between Suu Kyi and the military authorities. Relationships between Suu Kyi and the government could become quite confrontational, quite quickly. In this case, the military is unlikely to allow even semi-independent voices in the elected assemblies to have much autonomy. Members of some ethnic nationality parties have already indicated their willingness to work with Suu Kyi. If such alliances coalesce, this could lead to a new phase of zero-sum political conflict in Burma. Another key factor is how relationships will play out between the government and Burma’s several dozen armed ethnic groups. The Karen and other armed ethnic groups still have the capacity to undermie stability in the border areas. Their continued insurgency is testimony to widespread frustration regarding the lack of political progress in Burma, among (but not limited to) ethnic minority communities. Border-based insurgency has been in decline for some years, with most armed ethnic groups being marginalized in relation to major developments in Burma over the past decade. Nevertheless, insurgency may be prolonged a while longer if some of those armed ethnic groups which agreed cease-fires with the government in the 1990s join forces with the remaining non-cease-fire groups. A recently announced military alliance between several of the main cease-fire and non-cease-fire groups sent an aggressive signal to the government. The situation is very tense, and the current tense stand-off could escalate into all-out conflict at any time. Nevertheless, few of the cease-fire groups want to return to war, if they can avoid it—and the government is only likely to launch a direct attack on these militias if Snr-Gen Than Shwe feels he is losing control of the political process. The multi-faceted political situation in Burma is at a particularly interesting and important juncture. However, that makes it awfully difficult to call the shots. * Ashley South is an independent writer and consultant specializing in humanitarian and political issues in Burma and Southeast Asia. US envoy discusses sanctions with Myanmar’s Suu Kyi – Hla Hla Htay Agence France Presse: Fri 10 Dec 2010 YANGON — A senior US diplomat discussed economic sanctions with Myanmar democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi Friday during the first high-level visit by a Washington envoy since her release last month. Joseph Yun, the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, described his more than two hours of talks with the Nobel Peace Prize winner at her Yangon home as “very productive”. “We had a very useful exchange. I learned a lot,” he told reporters, noting that it was his first visit to the military-ruled country. Suu Kyi, who was freed by Myanmar’s military rulers from her most recent seven-year stretch of detention on November 13, confirmed the talks had included the issue of sanctions, among others, but declined to elaborate. “We talked openly and I believe that the relationship between the US and ourselves will be warm,” she said. The United States bans trade with companies tied to the junta in Myanmar, also known as Burma. It also freezes such firms’ assets and blocks international loans for the state. US President Barack Obama’s administration launched a dialogue with Myanmar’s military rulers last year after concluding that Western attempts to isolate the regime had yielded little success. But it has said it will only lift sanctions in return for progress on democracy and other concerns. After years of espousing punitive steps against the ruling generals Suu Kyi has shown signs of softening her stance on the measures, although she has said little about the issue since her release. In September of last year she wrote to junta chief Than Shwe offering suggestions about how to get Western sanctions against the country lifted. The democracy icon was sidelined during a rare election last month that was widely criticised by democracy activists and Western governments as anything but free and fair. Obama said Myanmar’s “bankrupt regime” had stolen the vote, which handed an overwhelming majority to the military’s political proxy and was marred by allegations of intimidation and vote rigging. Suu Kyi, who spent 15 of the last 21 years locked up, has welcomed the renewed US engagement with Myanmar but warned against “rose-coloured glasses”, saying greater human rights and economic progress were still needed. Her party won a 1990 election but was never allowed to take power. It boycotted the November 7 vote — the first in two decades — because of rules that appeared to exclude Suu Kyi from participating. The party was subsequently disbanded by the junta. Yun arrived in the military-ruled country on Tuesday and also met with representatives of 10 political parties that won seats in last month’s election, as well as government officials including Foreign Minister Nyan Win. During his meetings with the Myanmar authorities, Yun said Washington “remains open to direct dialogue to make meaningful progress on our core concerns including improving human rights and release of political prisoners,” according to a statement released by the US embassy in Yangon. In his talks with the opposition, he “underscored our overarching goal of a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma and discussed ideas on promoting reconciliation and dialogue,” it added. He was the highest-ranking US official to visit since May, when Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell met with Suu Kyi and said Washington was “profoundly disappointed” by the vote preparations. Yun’s visit coincided with the release of leaked diplomatic cables showing that Washington has been concerned for years about a suspected secret nuclear programme in Myanmar with the possible involvement of North Korea. One cable from the US embassy in Yangon, dated August 2004 and released Thursday by the anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks, quoted an unidentified witness who reported seeing 300 North Koreans working at a secret construction site. Multi-ethnic Burma and the junta will collide – Maung Zarni Democratic Voice of Burma: Fri 10 Dec 2010 No matter how carefully they tread on the issue of reviving the Union spirit among different ethnic communities, Aung San Suu Kyi and non-violent ethnic minority leaders – not to mention the armed ethnic resistance organisations – are heading for an inevitable collision course with Burma’s military junta. Here is why. Their respective politics, as well as concerns and interests, are irreconcilable. For Suu Kyi and the multi-ethnic opposition, politics is a means towards peace, reconciliation, representative government and improved public well-being; for the ruling generals, however, it is an expression of entitlement to rule and a means of control, domination, and self-aggrandizement. The fact that Senior General Than Shwe even thought of buying out Manchester United football club while several million cyclone Nargis victims struggled for clean drinking water and dry shelter speaks volumes about the deeply callous nature of the generals that rule the country. While the world knows plenty about Aung San Suu Kyi and what she represents, it knows almost nothing about the generals beyond their international pariah status. As far as the generals are concerned, there is no need for reconciliation along ethnic or political lines with any person, organization or community. In short, they have done nothing wrong, for they perceive themselves as the country’s sole national guardian, untainted by partisan politics. They are committed to the abstract idea of a multi-ethnic nation and an absolutist notion of sovereignty. They love the country, but they can’t stand the people, especially the kind who refuse to go along with their design for the rest of the country. The generals’ politics is all about resuming and completing the process of reconsolidation of the power of the ethnic Burmese majority, most specifically the soldiering class, over the rest of the ethnic minorities – a process only interrupted by the old kingdom’s 19th century defeat by Great Britain. Sixty years after independence the military has built its own version of local colonial rule wherein it serves as the constitutionally-mandated ruling class and the rest of the civilian society, both ethnic majority and minorities, as second class citizens. In this new colonial rule, anything and anyone that doesn’t bend to the generals’ will is to be controlled, subjugated or crushed. Aung San Suu Kyi and 2,200-plus jailed multi-ethnic dissidents or politically defiant ethnic minority groups that are subject to rape, pillage, summary executions and other atrocities attest to this. And this time round the regime is likely to get really nasty, with disturbing signals of the brewing troubles ahead already emerging. The world just witnessed 20,000 Burmese refugees fleeing the renewed, post-election fighting between the regime and a faction of Karen ethnic minority ceasefire groups into Thailand. Furthermore, the Burmese military has recently deployed massive numbers of combat-ready troops along vast stretches of the porous Thai-Burmese border and purchased and assembled 50 Russian-made Mi-24 gunship helicopters in preparation for “counterinsurgency” operations to subjugate the country’s minorities. Burma has been engulfed in conflict, violent and non-violent, since 90 days after independence from Britain. Everyone is tired of war and conflict – that is, everyone except the top generals and those who profit from the continuation of war and conflict. The military’s rose-tinted perception of itself as the ‘guardian of the nation’ is one thing, but the vested class and personal interests that have resulted from 50 years of successive military dictatorships are another. War may not be peace as Orwellian double-speak suggests, but it is highly profitable for the strong and the victorious. Perpetuating domestic conflicts enables the regime to expand its military control over resource-rich and strategic minority regions which border Asia’s rising economies such as India, China and Thailand. The economically vibrant neighbours have signed multi-billion dollar commercial deals, including trans-border gas pipelines, two deep seaports, ‘development corridors’ and ‘special economic zones’, natural gas production, hydropower projects and mining, all over different minority lands along Burma’s national borders. The regime’s opponents are incomparably weaker, outnumbered and outgunned. The regime discards such modern normative inconveniences as governmental accountability, citizens’ voice, and ecological and livelihood concerns, as it grabs natural resources and land from both ethnic majority and minority communities, while their Asian business partners look the other way. The troops are allowed to scavenge among local populations, confiscating anything of value with impunity from the top leadership. In fact, it is the senior and junior generals in Naypyidaw who push their regional, battalion and local commanders towards local economic self-sufficiency – at any cost to local communities and economies. Ideologically, the war against minorities reinforces the Burmese military’s self-justificatory perception that its primacy and monopoly control over minority regions are necessary, lest these autonomy-seeking ethnic people break up the Union. However these days the Burmese public, weary of the governmental brutality and with greater exposure to global free media, is no longer susceptible to the regime’s ethno-nationalist propaganda. The glue that used to bind the Burmese majority with the militarist generals has come off. Precisely because this ethno-nationalist bond has been irreparably broken down, Aung San Suu Kyi and minority leaders’ recent moves towards dialogue and reconciliation poses the greatest threat to the ruling junta. Only 20 years ago the regime, challenged by the majority Burmese public in Burma’s ‘people power’ uprising, opted for disparate ceasefire deals with nearly 20 armed minority organizations, not out of genuine desire for peace and reconciliation, but as a strategy to pre-empt the inter-ethnic solidarity between the Aung San Suu Kyi-led majority and rebellious minorities. Now that some of the most crucial ceasefires are likely to unravel, the highest strategic priority of the regime has become preventing inter-ethnic unity. There is little wonder then that the generals’ greatest threat is Aung San Suu Kyi’s enduring popularity across ethnic lines and her politics of reconciliation. Her politics by no means induces the country’s balkanization as the generals and their supporters have implied. If anything, the military’s zero-sum politics will pave the way for national disintegration. If one listens carefully to Burma’s disparate ethnic resistance groups, everyone is prepared to live within a single union. They are simply asking that fair political representation and ethnic equality be made central organizing principles of the Union – something the majority Burmese as represented by Aung San Suu Kyi and her opposition movement have endorsed. Foreign governments and advocates generally view the military as the only cohesive national organization capable of keeping territorial Burma together, but they conveniently ignore the realities on the ground: Burma’s military has categorically failed at nation-building – its record of 50 years in power speaks for itself. What the generals want and pursue is power and profit while their multi-ethnic opponents can only offer peace and reconciliation. Their respective missions are bound to collide, and it’s just a matter of time before the world witnesses a new round of confrontation, conflicts and crack down. For the foreign governments and international organisations which fear Burma’s ethnic balkanization or political instability, the best way to prevent this eventuality is to start recognizing that the generals, this generation and the next, are not going to be the ones who will bring about lasting peace, reconciliation and stability. Instead of placing misguided confidence in gradual military-led transition, these external players should invest in long-term initiatives designed to help empower multi-ethnic dissidents and their organizations, as well as ordinary citizens and their communities in order that the people may succeed in their attempts at what Aung San Suu Kyi calls a ‘peaceful revolution’, a process of change that brings about meaningful, positive and radical changes in policy, leadership and institutions. * Maung Zarni is research fellow on Burma at the London School of Economics and Political Science. On Myanmar, U.S. and China worked closely, cables show – Thomas Fuller New York Times: Fri 10 Dec 2010 Bangkok — As the United States searches for new ways to nudge Myanmar toward democratic change, it may find an unexpected ally in China, according to secret diplomatic cables. Internal State Department correspondence shows a much less adversarial relationship between the United States and China over Myanmar than the language of official statements or years of posturing at the United Nations might suggest. Chinese officials acknowledge their differences with the United States but appear to share American frustrations at the junta’s handling of the country’s economy and at times show impatience at the slow pace of political change. “The Chinese clearly are fed up with the footdragging [sic] by the Than Shwe regime,” Shari Villarosa, the head of the United States mission in Myanmar, said in a confidential cable in January 2008 that referred to the country’s aging dictator, Sen. Gen. Than Shwe. “The Chinese share our desire to get them to the negotiating table,” Ms. Villarosa said in a note to Washington after hosting the Chinese ambassador, Guan Mu, for lunch. China and the United States both want the same thing in Myanmar, said an official from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yang Jian, according to a separate January 2008 cable: “stability, democracy and development.” “Therefore, China and the United States should show unity, particularly in the U.N., in addressing the situation in Burma,” she is quoted as saying. Over the past two decades politics in Myanmar have unfolded with a good-and-evil storyline fit for Hollywood: a brutal military government has persecuted a democratic opposition movement led by a pretty and charming freedom fighter, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the winner of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize who until last month was under house arrest. When a landslide victory by Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi in 1990 was ignored by the generals, Western nations lined up behind her. China and other neighboring countries, by contrast, lined up to invest in natural gas ventures and buy timber and gems. But what comes across in nearly 400 cables relating to Myanmar and sent by American diplomats over the past three years is a more nuanced picture. The diplomats report the tyrannical tendencies of the junta but also point out many problems with the “sclerotic” leadership of a democratic opposition and its undemocratic ways. Some American diplomats are privately convinced by the argument put forward by many Asian countries that sanctions do more harm than good, a view that runs contrary to official American policy. One cable from 2008 describes the party of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi as very poorly managed — “not the last great hope for democracy and Burma,” the cable says — and domninated by its “Uncles,” the party elders. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi remains “popular and beloved,” the cable says, but her party is “strictly hierarchical, new ideas are not solicited or encouraged from younger members and the Uncles regularly expel members they believe are ‘too active,’” said the cable’s author, Leslie Hayden, who was the head of the political and economic section in 2008. The same cable, which was described as a “candid” assessment on American policy after two years in the country, described sanctions as doing little good. “While our economic sanctions give us the moral high-ground, they are largely ineffective because they are not comprehensive. Burma’s biggest client states refuse to participate in them,” Ms. Hayden wrote. The cables show Washington’s determined support for pro-democracy groups and dissidents opposing the military government. Ms. Villarosa reported that the embassy made a point of inviting dissidents and democracy activists to its diplomatic functions as a way of demonstrating its “commitment to promoting freedom and democracy.” But diplomats also reported a deep skepticism toward some elements of the Burmese pro-democracy movement. A detailed cable from the embassy in Thailand in May 2008 sharply criticized some Burmese exile groups that were described as out of touch with reality in Myanmar and that had “lost credibility.” Thailand is home to a large number of Burmese pro-democracy activists. “At present, it is unclear whether the principal leaders of the exile community in Thailand can act as credible agents for change in Burma,” said Eric G. John, whose tour as the ambassador to Thailand ends this month. The attitudes in the cables toward the Burmese government are predictably skeptical. But the tone of the cables appears to change according to the personality of the diplomats. Ms. Villarosa is energetic and opinionated in her cables. “Than Shwe is mad with power,” she thundered in one note to Washington. “The senior generals are terrified of losing control over Burma and determined to crush any sign of dissent.” Larry Dinger, the current head of mission, who replaced her, sends more measured missives. “These are career military men, most with combat experience in Burma’s past internal conflicts, who value the unity and stability of the state as a top priority,” he said in a secret memo last year describing the leadership. “The senior generals assert, and seem genuinely to believe, that the military is the only guarantor of that unity and stability.” He also called the generals “xenophobic” and “craving respect.” It emerges clearly in the cables that the United States and China do not agree on all issues related to Myanmar. They disagreed on the usefulness of visits by a United Nations envoy, and the Chinese repeatedly tell the Americans that the economic sanctions are counter-productive. A cable in February of this year, accuses Chinese diplomats in Myanmar of being “reclusive.” “The Chinese Embassy regularly rebuffs requests for meetings and information from the Rangoon-based diplomatic community,” says the cable. The same cable described China’s economic dominance in Myanmar: “China’s economic presence in Burma has increased dramatically over the last 10 years.” The cables yielded a number of other items: The United States sought to remove the United Nations special envoy for Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, in October 2008, calling him “unrealistically upbeat” and increasingly unable to obtain access to the country’s top leaders. The Myanmar government appears to have initiated the re-engagement with the United States pursued by the Obama administration. In a February 2009 cable Mr. Dinger wrote of “repeated recent signals” by the government to restart a dialogue with the United States. But Mr. Dinger writes that the offer for closer ties appears “symbolic rather than substantive.” Another cable recounts the ultimately unsuccessful but determined efforts of Mr. Gambari to meet Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi during a visit in August 2008. Mr. Gambari sends two assistants to the gates of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s villa. She snubs him, as does most of the senior Burmese leadership during that particular visit, according to the cable. Several cables in 2004 report possible but unconfirmed signs of the junta developing a nuclear program with help from North Korea. But in a cable classified secret from November 2009 Mr. Dinger describes the possibility of a nuclear program as a “very open question.” |
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