Burma Update

News and updates on Burma

23 April 2010

 

News on Burma - 23/4/10

  1. Burma’s hip-hop resistance spreads message of freedom
  2. NLD Youth rolls out human rights aims
  3. Khin Maung Swe may run solo after May 6
  4. Wa hosts allies for security talks
  5. Saboi Jum brothers want KIO to accept BGF
  6. India eyes $5.6bn Burma hydropower deal
  7. Sanctions will force Burmese junta to negotiate
  8. Succession strategy
  9. Final days at NLD Party headquarters
  10. NHPC May Build Power Projects in Myanmar
  11. Junta raking candidate backgrounds
  12. KIO holds militia courses ahead of army deadline
  13. Refugees in Burma, Malaysia and Thailand: Rescue for Rohingya
  14. Burma’s ‘forgotten’ Chin people suffer abuse
  15. Leading parties stay away from election
  16. Ethnic group in Myanmar gears up for war, peace
  17. BGF impasse explained to people by Kachin leaders
  18. Elections without rights
  19. Burmese music: Sound of the underground
  20. The UN singles out big oil in Burma, with good reason
  21. Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis in Bangladesh
  22. Weekly business roundup


Burma’s hip-hop resistance spreads message of freedom – Jack Davies
Guardian (UK): Thu 22 Apr 2010

Thxa Soe’s music gives country’s youth a focus for dissatisfaction with the junta despite strict censorship
Taunggyi, Shan state – Burmese hip-hop artist performs in Yangon. ‘Some people in government like me, some people hate me.’

Burmese hip-hop artist performs in Yangon. ‘Some people in government like me, some people hate me.’ Photograph: New York Times/Redux/eyevine

They know every word. Boys, bare-chested and sweating in the April heat. Girls clutching digital cameras, their faces streaked with paste to protect them from the sun. They answer the call-and-response lines with increasing excitement. By the time Thxa Soe reaches the chorus, the crowd have taken over. With fists pumping the air, they roar his words back at him.

This is a summer music festival, soaked in alcohol and drenched in sweat, the same as anywhere. But this is Burma, and nothing is the same here.

The barricades keeping the audience from the stage are ordinarily used to control rioters. They are ringed with razor wire. At the very front of the crowd, two novice monks, wrapped in the maroon robes that have come to symbolise defiance in Burma, dance and play air guitar. And everywhere, the Tatmadaw – Burmese military officers – armed and helmeted, watch over all.

Everything is watched in Burma, everything is scrutinised, and everything is controlled. Books cannot be published without government approval, song lyrics are vetted by a censorship board for anti-government sentiment before they can be recorded. Anything even vaguely critical of the ruling military junta is swiftly outlawed, any attempt to circumvent the regime brutally repressed.

But an imported art form – hip-hop – is providing a subterranean vehicle for quiet, yet significant, dissent among Burmese youth.

Burma has a history of revolutionary music. Traditional protest songs, known as thangyat, were once used to air grievances, both small, against neighbours, and large, against authority. Following the 1988 student uprising, however, the music was banned outright by the ruling military junta.

But hip-hop’s fluid lyrics wrapped in rhymes and youthful argot make it a perfect modern format for subtly spreading an anti-authoritarian message.

Thxa Soe is one of Burma’s leading hip-hop stars, and one of its most outspoken. He first heard hip-hop as a student at the SAE Institute in London, instantly admiring the quicksilver rhymes and daring lyrics of Dr Dre and Snoop Dogg.

But he also had an interest in the traditional music of his homeland, and began researching the hundreds of documents held in the UK. “In the British Library, I discovered these traditional songs, [with] original Burmese-language lyrics, that nobody had performed for hundreds of years. They were taken from Burma in the 1780s. Many songs that people had never heard.”

He began combining the two art forms, meshing the ancient melodies with computer-generated beats, and near-forgotten Burmese-language words with his own modern lyrics.

“I like, and people like, the freedom of hip-hop. There is not much freedom in rock, but in hip-hop you have freedom to express, express your ideas. And this is our hip-hop, for Burmese.

“I have too many words, not only me, too many teenagers have too much to say. Because our country is a very closed country, and the older people have a closed mind, a concentrated mind.”

The Burmese people have been promised elections this year, the first in two decades. No one at this concert has ever cast a ballot. But even before a date has been set, the poll has been written off by the international community as a sham. The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy, which won 80% of seats in the last election in 1990 but was never allowed to take office, will not contest it.

It opposes new election rules laid down by the junta which forbid the participation of its leader, the Nobel peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, because she is serving a prison term. Aung San Suu Kyi has spent 15 of the past 21 years under house arrest, put there by the same military generals now legislating to keep her from taking part.

There will be no campaign in Burma this year, no discussion of policies, opposition and government, and no international oversight to ensure the polls are “free and fair”.

More than 2,000 political prisoners remain in Burmese jails, and rebel armies in several eastern provinces, including in this state, the Shan, run a fierce resistance against the military’s brutal rule.

“The election will not bring democracy,” the Guardian hears more than once in Taunggyi. But through music, there is opportunity for expression.

Meeting foreign journalists is dangerous, so Thxa Soe speaks to the Guardian several days after the concert at a house 500km south, in Burma’s capital, Rangoon.

The 29-year-old flew under the junta’s radar with his first album, but he is now a victim of its success. Its popularity has meant he is closely watched by the government censors.

Outright criticism of the government is forbidden, but he skates close to the edge of what is acceptable in the junta’s eyes, and his songs are regularly banned.

On a recent album, fully three-quarters of the tracks were forbidden, fearful of reprisals from the junta, fled Burma.

“[I said to him:] ‘Hey man, you can’t be paranoid, but you don’t want to face [this] kind of problems, you need to get out from this country.’ So he decided he want to get out, so I helped him go to America.”

But even the seemingly anodyne can land musicians in trouble in Burma. One of Thxa’s songs recently banned had as its only lyrics: “Hey hey, how are you?”

Famously paranoid, tThe Burmese government is undoubtedly aware its young people are pushing the boundaries of what it will tolerate.

The regime’s mouthpiece, state-run newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar, regularly rails against foreign art forms and entertainment.

Police regularly seize from street vendors bootleg copies of albums and live performances they have banned, but, cheap and quick to reproduce, they are never off the streets long.

Thxa Soe says he has chosen to stay in Burma, despite the risks, because he sees his voice as important in his homeland. “It is very difficult being a musician in Myanmar. You are not free. You are always being watched, for what you say, and you are being told what you can say and what you cannot. [But] I believe music can change a country, not only our country, but the whole world.”

And there are others in Burma finding an outlet for dissent in music. A group known as Generation Wave, its exact membership unknown, secretly records and distributes anti-government albums across the country, dropping them at the tea shops that are the social hubs for Burma’s underground political network.

They write songs such as Wake Up, a call for young people to join the pro-democracy movement, and Khwin Pyu Dot May (Please Excuse Me), the story of a young man asking his mother’s permission to join the struggle.

Most of its members keep their identities a secret, after high-profile member Zayar Thaw was jailed for six years for forming an illegal organisation.

But the threat of prison has not stopped Burma’s young flocking to the group, as fans and as members.

“We welcome young people to participate in our movement against the regime,” a performer known only as YG says. “Our songs honour mothers and revolutionists. We want young people to be active and interested in politics. Every youngster can be an activist.”

As the grinning teenagers leave the Taunggyi concert, steam rising from their sweat-soaked bodies in the now cool midnight mountain air, a young man yells out to the Guardian Thxa Soe’s banned song lyric: “Hey, hey, how are you?”

Innocent enough, but in Burma, everything has meaning.
Censored by the state

Thxa Soe’s record with Burma’s notorious censorship board, run by the ruling military junta, is patchy. On his most recent album, nine of 12 songs were banned.

One song titled Hey, We Have No Money was allowed but another, Water, Electricity, Please Come Back, an obvious comment on Rangoon’s inconsistent power supply, was forbidden.

The titles of Thxa Soe’s albums – Blend Of Music, Mix Or Don’t Mix If You Want To – reflect his musical style, which combines traditional Burmese songs and lyrics with hip hop-style beats and words.

He has been criticised by the censorship board for “ruining” traditional Myanmar music, and the Myanmar Theatre Association has forbidden musicians in traditional orchestras from using their instruments to play contemporary music.



NLD Youth rolls out human rights aims – Khai Suu
Mizzima News: Thu 22 Apr 2010

New Delhi – Human rights issues will be the focus of National League for Democracy (Youth) activities once the party ceases to exist as a legal entity, a party spokesman said yesterday.
Electoral law provisions published last month by the military regime were causing the party to expire, – Rangoon Division Hlaing Tharyar Township National League for Democracy (NLD) Youth information department joint chief Khai Soe said.

“After the NLD took the decision not to stand for election, our party programmes and activities will be more clearly directed on human rights issues and activities … Because we think, under the 2008 constitution, the human rights situation will worsen before and after the election”, Khai Soe told Mizzima.

“I have experience in this issue as I am the former political prisoner. I fully comprehend the dangers that lie ahead … But we cannot be afraid …” he said. “We must face this situation and do what we should. We will work on these activities for the development of rights in Burma and to put our work back on a democratic track.”

The policy will be put to work within the legal framework by starting in Pegu, Irrawaddy and Magwe divisions, he said. Among the activities, the group will expose oppression by local authorities, land-grabbing, extrajudicial killings, forced recruitment of child soldiers and forced voting in the forthcoming elections.

“We will support the families of political prisoners by visiting their homes for counselling. And we will encourage them and discuss with them their right to choose whether or not to vote and that no force should be exerted. We will tell them to inform us when they experience these kinds of oppression and we will convey these violations to the people who deserved to be informed”, Khai Soe said.

He also said that he will start this activity alone but that he has many supporters. He has to fill the vacuum left by rights activist Suu Suu New, who is serving a prison sentence for her work.

Khai Soe was sentenced to a seven-year jail term in 1998 by the Insein Special Tribunal after being charged under sections 5(j) of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act and 17(1) of the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act.

(Section 5(j): to affect the morality or conduct of the public or a group of people in a way that would undermine the security of the Union or the restoration of law and order; Section 17(1): Whoever is member of an unlawful association, or takes part in meetings of any such association, or contributes or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of any such association, or in any way assists the operations of any such association, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term [which shall not be less two years and more than three years and shall also be liable to fine].)

After his release from prison, he has engaged in social work and became an NLD member in 2007. “I gave vocational training to children in abject poverty and school dropouts by finding donors. And also I provided training in hairdressing to young prostitutes who had been pushed into the flesh trade because of economic hardship and poverty. I organised them to get back on track,” he said.


Khin Maung Swe may run solo after May 6
Mizzima News: Thu 22 Apr 2010

New Delhi – Fissures in the National League for Democracy have deepened over the re-registration issue, with party Central Executive Committee member Khin Maung Swe leaning towards going it alone after the May 6 deadline for registration, when the group will cease to exist as a political entity.
Khin Maung Swe has however let it be known he would continue to be loyal to National League for Democracy (NLD) founder Aung San Suu Kyi and the party until the deadline. He is among the few leaders likely to form a party or contest as independents, yet they are averse to being branded disloyal to the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, analysts believe.

The main opposition party had unanimously chosen against re-registration with the Election Commission after deciding against contesting the polls. It had said its decision was based on its view that the electoral laws were “unjust and unfair”. Khin Maung Swe was among the few who disagreed with the party on the issue.

“I shall do nothing until the last date for registration, which is May 6 in keeping with my loyalty to both NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” he said.

May 6 is the last date for registration with the Election Commission in accordance with this year’s Political Parties Registration Law. Soon after Khin Maung Swe was publicly critical of the NLD over its decision not to run, a rumour spread that he would join the race anyway. He denied the claim, citing his indecision on the matter.

“It’s not true that I will contest the elections. I have not yet decided to contest as an individual. It is just speculation by some people. I have no intention to do anything for the time being for I am in a wait-and-see mode,” the NLD Information Department member and Central Executive Committee (CEC) member told Mizzima.

If political parties, which won in the 1990 general elections like the NLD, do not re-register with the commission, their legal status will automatically be void.

Fellow CEC member Dr. Than Nyein, Rangoon Division Vice-Chairman, who nurses a similar opinion on re-registration, also said he would continue to be loyal to the NLD until the cut-off date.

“We are members of NLD as long as NLD exists until May 6. We have not yet taken any decision on electoral issues,” he said.

But both declined to say what they would do after the May 6 deadline.


Wa hosts allies for security talks – Wai Moe
Irrawaddy: Thu 22 Apr 2010

As the junta’s deadline for the Border Guard Force (BGF) plan passes on Thursday, the largest of Burma’s armed ethnic groups, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has upward of 20,000 troops, met this week with its allies to discuss the potential threats they face in the near future, sources close to the groups told The Irrawaddy.
“The ethnic groups have learned a lesson from the failure of their Kokang allies, and are preparing a united front against any threats to the development and stability of their territories,” said a source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Since Naypyidaw first proposed transforming the various ethnic cease-fire groups into BGFs one year ago, groups such as the UWSA, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the Kokang army (officially called the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army), the Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army and the Shan State Army-North, have formed alliances with each other.

Following the Burmese army’s seizure of the Kokang headquarters in Laogai, near the Chinese border, in August last year, the cease-fire groups have reportedly pledged to stand alongside one another if one group is attacked.

The Burmese army knows that with the UWSA involved, any conflict with the ethnic groups could potentially involve a lengthy and bloody campaign. A couple of days before the deadline, the UWSA sent a letter to the junta saying it rejects the BGF proposal.

According to sources, the Wa leadership reportedly said in the letter that their stance had not changed since their previous letter to Naypyidaw on April 3. It also said that the Burmese regime, or any other party, is welcome in the Wa region if they want to help create development and stability. However, anyone who “seeks to destroy” the region’s peace and development would be considered an enemy, they said.

Contrary to Naypyidaw’s demands, the Wa leaders insisted that any BGF unit stationed in Wa territory must be headed by Wa commanders with Burmese army officers assigned to deputy commander positions. Furthermore, the UWSA proposed that general staff officers could be assigned from the Burmese army, but that all deputy staff officers must come from the UWSA. The Wa said it would allow six lower-ranking Burmese officers in each battalion, whereas the junta demanded 27 rank and file military personnel.

The junta rejected the Wa’s terms on April 9 during a meeting between Wa leaders and a government delegation led by Lt. Col. Than Htut Thein, who is a general staff officer in the Triangle Regional Military Command, according to The Shan Herald Agency for News, which monitors affairs in Shan State.

Saengjuen Sarawin of The Shan Herald Agency for News said that both the Wa and the Burmese army are preparing for conflict. He said the Burmese have reinforced troops and military facilities in northern and southern Shan State, while the UWSA has done similarly in their own territory.

Another major ethnic cease-fire group, the KIO, based in northernmost Burma, was due to hold BGF negotiations with government officials on Thursday in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State. Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein and the chief of the Military Affairs Security, Lt-Gen Ye Myint, who is the chief negotiator with the cease-fire groups, are scheduled to attend the meeting.

The KIO is yet to announce its acceptance or rejection of the BGF proposal. The group proposed that Kachin troops join a “Union Defense Forces,” in the “spirit of Panglong,” referring to a 1947 agreement that granted the Kachin and other ethnic groups full autonomy and internal administration of frontier areas.

Kachin sources said KIO associates in Myitkyina could face retaliatory measures after the deadline passes, noting that a Kachin official was recently arrested in Myitkyina because he traveled to his family home without travel documents.

Analysts have said the BGF issue is posing a dilemma for the Burmese army as the generals’ proposal has failed to bear fruit.

Meanwhile, Chinese premier Wen Jaibao postponed his trip to Burma, Brunei and Indonesia, from April 22 to 25, due to the deathly earthquake in northwestern Qinghai Province, according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site.

As the Chinese are traditionally and geographically close to the Wa, Beijing has repeatedly called for peaceful solutions on ethnic issues in Burma.


Saboi Jum brothers want KIO to accept BGF
Kachin News Group: Thu 22 Apr 2010

In what might lead to fresh fissures in the Kachin community, prominent peace mediators Rev. Dr. Saboi Jum and his younger brother Hkun Myat are seriously suggesting that the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) accepts the Border Guard Force proposed by junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe.
The Saboi Jum brothers have told the KIO, the last remaining Kachin armed group refusing to accept the BGF that “It (BGF) is the key and the door can be opened by only a key”. It means the relation between the junta and the KIO will end if the latter rejects the BGF, said a KIO official in Laiza headquarters.

Saboi Jum and Hkun Myat attended the latest KIO’s public meeting explaining its stance and the “lack of positive result on BGF negotiations with the junta after 15 times”, in Laiza headquarters in east Kachin State on April 16. But the two brothers had to go back home in Myitkyina without getting a chance to talk to KIO leaders, said participants.

Earlier this month, three other Kachin leaders who sided with the junta were— Dr. Tu Ja, former Vice-president No. 2 of KIO, Zahkung Ting Ying leader of New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) transformed to BGF and Col. Lasang Awng Wa leader of KIO split Lasang Awng Wa Peace Group transformed to a militia group. They also suggested that the KIO accept BGF —or else it will have trouble in terms of existence.

Saboi Jum is the former general secretary of Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) and founder and director of Shalom Foundation (also called Nyein Foundation), one of the largest national NGOs in Burma. His brother Hkun Myat is a businessman.

The two brothers, a pastor and a businessman mediated in a big way and successfully helped sign a ceasefire agreement between the junta and the KIO on 24 February, 1994.

The 16 year-old ceasefire has not helped usher in democracy and ethnic Kachin rights, so criticism by Kachin people of the two brothers has only mounted. The criticism revolves around the duo creating personal wealth through business, given their proximity to the ruling junta. They are not for the Kachin people.

Saboi Jum was general secretary of KBC during 1993 to 2000 and Kachin Baptist followers expected him to be a saviour of the Kachin people. However he did not fulfill the Kachin people’s aspirations.

In 2007, Saboi Jum was pressured to join the signature campaign in an appeal letter to junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe to halt the Irrawaddy Myitsone dam project by the Kachin Nationals Consultative Assembly. But he refused to sign.

In December, last year, Saboi Jum visited Washington D.C and suggested to U.S. officials to withdraw the economic sanctions on Burma and support the junta’s general elections in 2010.

KIO delegates led by Chairman Lanyaw Zawng Hra will meet the junta’s Northern Regional Commander Maj-Gen Soe Win today in Myitkyina but the KIO will refrain from providing the junta-demanded answer— on whether it will accept the BGF, said KIO officials.


India eyes $5.6bn Burma hydropower deal – Joseph Allchin
Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 22 Apr 2010

India’s state-owned National Hydro Power Company Limited (NHPC) will increase its investment in Burma to the tune of an extra $US5.6 billion as Burma aggressively expands its energy sector.
The head of the NHPC, S K Garg, told the Wall Street Journal the company was “inching towards Myanmar [Burma]. We have already sent our team to Myanmar for further survey and investigation for two projects.”

Little is known of the location of the projects, but the Wall Street Journal suggests that they could be two new 510-megawatt and 520-megawatt dams.

The NHPC already has a major presence in the country, primarily at the Tamanthi dam on the Chindwin river in Burma’s northern Sagaing division. The project has a capability of providing 1200 megawatts of electricity, 80 percent of which it is believed will go straight to India.

As of 2007, according to research by the Burma Rivers Network (BRN), over 380 families had been displaced by the Tamanthi dam and none had reportedly received compensation. It is estimated that the dam will eventually displace some 30,000 people in 35 different Kuki ethnic villages.

Sai Sai from BRN said that these people have absolutely no input or “right to participate” in the decision-making process for the dam, a fact that is clearly against the first recommendation of the World Commission on Dams: “Development needs and objectives should be clearly formulated through an open and participatory process, before various project options are identified,” it says.

Added to this, the Chindwin river is the only known habitat of the Burmese Roofed Turtle, a species that will be lost forever by the construction of the dam.

The Wall Street Journal further notes that within India “progress on hydroelectric power capacity addition has been slow due to environmental concerns and issues related to resettlement of people displaced because of the construction of dams”.

This would suggest a strong incentive for India investing in Burma’s hydropower sector, given BRN’s concerns about a lack of accountability in the process.

The Tamanthi dam is being constructed by the NHPC in collaboration with Swiss company Colenco Power Engineering Ltd. According to Garg, quoted in the Indian press, the NHPC is also involved in the 642-megawatt Shwezaye dam.

BRN believes that construction of the Tamanthi dam had been suspended after it began in 2007, suggesting that renewed investment of the sort mentioned by Garg may be needed to finish it, although at present details are not available.

It is believed however that consultants had been engaged by NHPC, but their findings had not yet been put to the government in Naypyidaw.

China is without doubt the leading investor in Burma’s hydropower sector, with numerous projects on rivers across the country, many of which have attracted international controversy and condemnation.

The drying of the Mekong river is partly blamed on Chinese dam construction, whilst Kachin organisations and individuals have strongly petitioned against forthcoming dam projects on the Irrawaddy river, including the Myitsone dam.


Sanctions will force Burmese junta to negotiate – Eva Sundari
Sydney Morning Herald: Thu 22 Apr 2010

The past 20 years has seen massive foreign investments in Burma and a policy of unconditional engagement pursued by neighbouring countries, including my own, Indonesia. This practice of unprincipled engagement, which ASEAN has been guilty of, has failed to bring positive change to my Burmese neighbours who show so much courage and hope.
The benefits of foreign investment and trade have not reached the ordinary people of Burma. Instead poverty has increased and health spending has fallen, while the human rights crisis has peaked and so has sexual violence, torture and murder of women by military forces armed with newer weapons. Burma’s humanitarian crisis continues to worsen with tragic consequences. One in 10 children die before their fifth birthday, a figure that doubles in eastern Burma where the military is attacking civilians. Children are still being forcibly recruited into the armed forces despite the regime’s pledges to stop. The cost of unconditional engagement has also implicated Indonesia and ASEAN in the tragedy of the Rohingya boatpeople. There has not been one single political democratic reform, and it is unlikely that Burma’s scheduled 2010 election will bring about any significant change.

Income from foreign investment projects enables the military dictatorship to continue abusing human rights. These abuses, including slavery, torture, extrajudicial executions, rape, forced displacement have been well documented across Burma. The International Labour Organisations and International Tribunal into Crimes against Women in Burma have both named Burma’s oil and gas industry as being linked to human rights violations.

Foreign trade and investment channels money to the military, who continue their brutal repression, and to individual generals to shore up their own financial situations and security. This leaves no reason to engage with anyone who advocates for political change; foreign investment in Burma brings no one to the negotiating table.

Last year we saw Aung San Suu Kyi successfully use existing sanctions as leverage to enter into talks with Burma’s junta for the first time in nearly two years and to meet diplomats from the US, UK and Australia for the first time in six years.

Despite what has been reported in the media, Suu Kyi has not indicated any drastic change to her position on sanctions nor has she called for the lifting of existing sanctions. Not unless, of course one would think, if the regime themselves show concessions in the lifting of its arbitrary control over laws, land and citizens.

New targeted trade and investment sanctions, especially if they include Burma’s oil and gas industry, will strengthen Suu Kyi’s and Burma’s democracy movements bargaining position.

In addition to providing Suu Kyi with more leverage, new targeted trade and investment sanctions will play a role in:
  • Protecting national resources, such as oil and gas reserves, from being exploited by the military junta for their sole benefit.
  • Preventing human rights violations from occurring along project sites and by denying the military regime billions in revenues; and
  • Ensuring foreign companies are not complicit in or linked to the violation of human rights abuses in Burma.

A multilateral approach to sanctions against Burma already exists. The US, EU and Canada have adopted trade and investment sanctions and private companies and individuals have voluntarily enacted sanctions. The introduction of targeted trade and investments sanctions by individual countries would strengthen this multilateral approach. This is especially important given the direct channel of oil and gas profits into the military’s pockets, an industry that Australia’s Twinza Oil is beginning to invest in.

ASEAN has had to accept our responsibility for Burma’s crisis, because we continue to contribute to the military junta’s political and economic strength. By not using all available tools to bring about change in Burma, such as imposing targeted trade and investment sanctions, other nations are doing the same, and thus must join ASEAN in assuming blame for the situation in Burma.

Australia has a strong reputation as a defender of democracy and regional security. This reputation may be in jeopardy, should the necessary steps to stop Australian companies funding human rights abuses in Burma not be taken. This year is going to be a defining one for Burma. Let us work together to send a clear message to the military junta, ASEAN governments, the international community and to our brave neighbours, in the form of Burma’s multi-ethnic community who are united in calls for democracy, that Australia is committed to pinpointing pressure in order to bring key players to the negotiating table.

* Eva Sundari is a Member of Parliament in Indonesia and a member of Indonesia Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP). She is ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus regional vice-president and Indonesia’s National Burma Caucus chairwoman.



Succession strategy – Ashley South
The World Today (UK): Thu 22 Apr 2010

The Burmese people are probably about to get their first chance to vote in twenty years. Things did not go well last time; the military prevented the winners taking power. Now, new groups are emerging to try to take advantage of the limited opportunities on offer.
The Burmese military government issued five laws on March 8, providing a framework for elections which are likely to be held later this year. While a number of opposition activists and politicians will boycott the polls, others are preparing to participate in the first opportunity to vote since 1990.

The elections are the brainchild of junta supremo, Senior General Than Shwe, and represent his ‘succession strategy’ – a way of easing himself out of the day-to-day running of the country, while ensuring that no single person can consolidate power, and represent a threat to his continued pre-eminence behind-the-scenes. The polls could still be cancelled, if Than Shwe and his inner grouping feel they are losing control of the process. In this scenario, the most likely pretext would be to fabricate some kind of national emergency, perhaps by provoking a resumption of conflict with armed ethnic groups, most of which have agreed ceasefires with the military government over the past twenty years.

Assuming that they do go ahead, the elections are likely to result in a consolidation and legitimisation of continued military control in Burma/Myanmar. For this reason, many opposition activists are opposed to the process. These include Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy (NLD), won the last elections in 1990, only to be denied the opportunity of forming a government by the military. The NLD has recently announced it will not register to contest the elections.

However, some non-military-controlled actors, including groups which are outright opposed to the government, are nevertheless preparing to participate. These include representatives of Burma’s ethnic nationality – or minority – communities, which make up about a third of the population.

ANY CHANGE WILL HELP

Why are independent candidates interested in contesting the polls? Not because of any great enthusiasmfor the process, which will be tightly controlled by themilitary regime, but rather
because they see little alternative but to go along with the government’s plans, and in some cases, even glimpse a few potential opportunities. The elections are likely to result in the creation of more political space; a relative concept in such a repressive country. Certainly, they will introduce opportunities for a broader range of economic actors to make their interests felt, including many closely associated with the military.

To many activists and observers, any change is better than the status quo; constitutional
rule-of-law, however problematic, being preferable to continued rule by military fiat. Indeed, to the extent that the elections are Than Shwe’s ‘exit strategy’, many proponents of change in Burma argue that the process should be encouraged.

Most observers of the Burmese political scene are familiar with two main branches of the opposition: the urban-based, pro-democracy movement, led by Suu Kyi, who has spent most of the last two decades under house arrest; and a loose alliance of ethnicnationalist insurgents, who once operated across large swathes of the country, but in recent years have been restricted to a few jungle enclaves along the Thai border. The Burma Army continues its brutal counter-insurgency campaigns in these border areas, which have displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians.

THIRD FORCES

There are however, other important sectors of the political scene. These include armed ethnic ceasefire groups which have ended outright hostilities with the central government, and political elites who have not taken up arms, but rather seek to work for change from within military-controlledMyanmar. Among the former, probably the best prepared are Kachin nationalists, including a number of senior officials recently retired from the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) – which agreed a ceasefire in 1994 – who are preparing to compete in the polls through a new vehicle, the Kachin State Progressive Party.

This group is likely to appeal to large numbers of the Kachin population in northern Burma. However, it may yet be denied the chance, if the military government insists on trying to bring the armed wings of the KIO and other ceasefire groups under the direct control of the Burmese army, before the election. Such a development might be designed to provide a resumption of armed conflict – not just in Kachin State, but in other restive border areas.

Another interesting set of alliances is emerging in the Karen ethnic community. Two Karen parties are likely to participate in the elections, one in Karen State, adjoining Thailand, and another in the old capital of Rangoon, and further to the west, in the Irrawaddy Delta, including areas affected by
Cyclone Nargis two years ago. The latter party will attempt to appeal beyond a purely Karen constituency, to members of other ethnic groups, including Burmans, whose villages are often interspersed with those of the Karen. An important set of emergent players is associated with the ‘third force’ in Burmese politics, which is seeking to mobilise support primarily among the Burman majority.

This mostly civilian network is positioning itself as an alternative to military-backed parties, which is nevertheless independent of the NLD and its ‘politics of dissent’. After sixty years of armed ethnic conflict, the elections are a rare opportunity for ethnic nationalist and other elite groupings to outline their political objectives, and compete on the national political stage. Having said this, most ethnic parties are focusing on winning seats in provincial legislatures, rather than the two national-level assemblies. They are hoping to gain enough seats to leverage at least some concessions on the issues which have structured ethnic and state-society conflict for over half a century.

In particular, ethnic nationalist politicians hope to begin using minority languages in schools and local government departments, in areas where their populations live, and to have some say over the proceeds of natural resource extraction, and the use of government funds.

They also hope to promote the creation of greater political ‘space’, within which civil society-based approaches to community development can flourish, and provide a vehicle for long-term, bottom-up democratisation. The main risk of participation in the elections is that this will legitimise the process, and support the consolidation of militarised rule.

Those taking part may also undermine their own standing in disgruntled ethnic communities. Their attempts to promote incremental change in this way are therefore quite principled, and in many cases decidedly brave.

INTERNATIONAL AGEMDAS

Regarding the international aspect of the elections, the China angle is of considerable importance. Burma’s giant neighbour to the north is its main geo-strategic patron.
It offers cover for the generals’ misrule and human rights abuses – for example
in the United Nations Security Council – in exchange for access to the country’s natural
resources. Less influential, but still of some note, are the various Association
of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries which border Burma to the south
and east, and are looking for stability and investment opportunities.

Despite – or perhaps, even because of – the lofty rhetoric of western actors, European and North American countries have very little influence on the political situation. Regardless of whether the British or United States governments – or the European Union – like it or not, the elections
will take place, and if they do not, this will not be because of western pressure. To think otherwise is to misunderstand the nature of Burmese politics, in an era of declining western influence globally.

Those inside the country seeking to participate in the elections, are hoping to make the best of a poor set of options. They are surely better placed than exiled politicians and their sympathisers to judge the opportunities and constraints locally.

* Ashley South is an independent writer and consultant, specializing in politics and humanitarian issues in Burma/Myanmar and Southeast Asia.



Final days at NLD Party headquarters – Kyi Wai
Irrawaddy: Wed 21 Apr 2010

RANGOON—The red and white sign in front of Burma’s main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), headquarters in Rangoon will disappear in the next 15 days.As a political party, the NLD gained the support of many people from different walks of life for more than 20 years. However, the party will be dissolved in May because of its decision on March 29 not to register as a political party and compete in the election this year.

For now, the ground floor of the headquarters is as lively and busy as before. Tables are occupied by members. Some have come to the office regularly for 20 years, working without a salary. Some of the workers have been imprisoned by the regime only to return upon their release.

A skinny young man and woman said they were waiting for Phyu Phyu Thin, an NLD member who works with HIV/AIDs and TB patients, providing medicine and shelter.

An man from Arakan State who has provided money to help support political prisoners is working at one of the tables. He said the wife of a political prisoner recently asked him if the NLD would continue to provide assistance to political prisoners.

“I had to tell her that I still didn’t know, since we haven’t said anything about it yet,” said the man.

The party has contributed 5,000 to 8,000 kyat (about US $5-8) to each political prisoner every month for 10 years. Currently, there are more than 2,100 political prisoners in prisons throughout the country.

Other current party activities include cleaning water wells damaged by Cyclone Nargis in areas where people still have difficulty finding access to drinkable water. Such projects will be harder to undertake in the future, he said.

“But despite the dissolution of our party, we will continue in our struggle for democracy and there will be political activities,” he said.

In the office, members also work on such issues as how to keep office equipment, records and other assets belonging to the party. In the future, said one member, it will be difficult for a group of former members to meet together.

“Even if the NLD existed as a legal political party, we could be arrested. So, if there’s no NLD and we meet somewhere even for social purposes, do you think we can avoid being harassed? How are we going to meet?” said a member from Mandalay Division.

A MP-elect from Pegu Division in the 1990 election said military intelligence officers constantly pressured him and others to resign from the NLD, saying that they would be paid as much as 10 million kyat (about $10,000).

He said that MP-elects in Pegu Division refused the offer, saying “We won’t leave the NLD, you can jail us,” and many ended up in prison or what the regime called “government guesthouses.”

He said many MP-elects were able to focus on politics only because of the support from their family.

“My wife has taken care of my family throughout my time in politics,” he said. “She is not in favor of the NLD’s dissolution.”

MP-elect Sein Hla Oo said during the NLD meeting on March 29 that if the party was dissolved, he would feel as if half of his heart was taken away.

“I am not happy with the fact that our decision will lead to the end of our organization,” said Tin Oo, the NLD vice chairman. “On the other hand, I am proud of others and myself for making such a dignified decision.”

Quoting Aung San Suu Kyi, who said the NLD would not be destroyed even if it was dissolved, he said it would continue its activities and struggle for democracy.

Veteran NLD leader Win Tin also said that the party has a future.

“Some say the NLD may become an underground organization if it doesn’t re-register,” he said. “We will continue our activities in peaceful and non-violent ways.”

In a letter to the public, the party affirmed that under the leadership of Suu Kyi it would continue its aims and objectives.

It’s clear the party’s social work will go on.

“We have decided to offer food to monks in front of our office until May 4,” said Dr. May Win Myint, a leader of the NLD women’s wing. “We will continue to do so after that, but it may not be here.”

“We also think about the continuation of our prayer every Tuesday for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners,” she said.


NHPC May Build Power Projects in Myanmar – Eric Yep
Wall Street Journal: Wed 21 Apr 2010

Mumbai — India’s state-run NHPC Ltd. is considering building two hydroelectric power projects in Myanmar at an investment of 250 billion rupees ($5.6 billion) as it seeks to expand, its chairman said Wednesday.“We are inching towards Myanmar. We have already sent our team to Myanmar for further survey and investigation for two projects,” S.K. Garg told reporters on the sidelines of an industry conference.

NHPC has been looking at neighboring countries for expansion partly because of slow progress in projects in India. The company, which raised 40 billion rupees ($899 million) through its initial public offering last year, is also planning to set up power projects in Bhutan.

The hydroelectric power producer has an installed generation capacity of 5,175 megawatts, accounting for a little more than 3% of India’s total generation capacity from all fuel sources. India has an estimated hydroelectric potential of 148,701 MW, junior Power Minister Bharatsinh Solanki told Parliament in December.

However, progress on hydroelectric power capacity addition has been slow due to environmental concerns and issues related to resettlement of people displaced because of the construction of dams. Mr. Solanki said in December that 15 hydroelectric projects that could add more than 12,000 megawatt capacity were awaiting environment and forest-related approvals.

Mr. Garg said also that NHPC is looking to build a 510 MW plant and another project with a capacity of 520 MW in Myanmar. NHPC is yet to decide on whether it will tie up with any other company for the projects, he said.

The company aims to produce 18 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in the financial year that started April 1. It produced 17 billion KWh in the previous year, lower than the targeted 17.2 billion KWh, Mr. Garg said.


Junta raking candidate backgrounds – Ahunt Phone Myat
Democratic Voice of Burma: Tue 20 Apr 2010

Burmese authorities are reportedly collecting information on the backgrounds of candidates looking to contest elections this year, the head of a registered party has said.The 19 parties that have so far registered for Burma’s first elections in 20 years, rumoured to be in October, are yet to receive an approval.

But, according to Aye Lwin, chairperson of the Union of Myanmar Federation of National Politics (UMFNP), one of the more prominent parties looking to run this year, the group learnt recently that checks were being carried out on the histories of party members.

“[The authorities] are officially collecting background information on about 27 or 28 [Central Executive Committee candidates],” he said. Fifteen of those belong to the UMFNP, while the rest are members of the closely-allied 88 Generation Students (Union of Myanmar), a party led by his younger brother, Ye Htun.

Aye Lwin, known to have close ties with the ruling junta, was a student activist in the 1988 uprising against military rule before switching sides and campaigning against international sanctions on Burma.

The deadline for parties to register expires in the second week of May. Ohn Lwin, communications officer for the National Political Alliances, speculated that the approvals would be given by the Election Commission (EC) once the deadline is up.

“It is likely that the [EC] is waiting until they get [applications] from everyone,” he said. “We are waiting to be informed and will not yet start our [campaign] activities, such as releasing statements; we are worried that we will be seen as crossing boundaries if we start now.”

Out of the 19 parties registered, 16 have been formed in the past few months. The majority of these are either outwardly pro-junta or part of the so-called ‘third force’ in Burmese politics that are allied to neither incumbent nor opposition.

It is unclear what role these parties will play in a post-election Burma: observers have said that the polls are little more than a show of legitimacy for the ruling junta, which will continue its hold on power under the guise of a civilian government.

One of the registered parties, the Kachin State Progressive Party, is comprised of members of three Kachin ceasefire groups, including the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO).

The KIO is now at loggerheads with the ruling junta following its refusal to transform into a Border Guard Force (BFG), and military analysts have warned that fighting may break out.

The BGF issue is seen as a means for the junta to shore up support and bolster its army size in the run-up to elections, with border units ostensibly coming under the command of Naypyidaw.


KIO holds militia courses ahead of army deadline – Phanida
Mizzima News: Tue 20 Apr 2010

Chiang Mai– Kachin Independence Organisation troops are providing military training to people from the ethnic minority after the group refused to join the Burma Army’s Border Guard Force, local residents and group officers said.This compulsory training will start today and will last 18 days. It will be attended by former Kachin Independence Army (KIA) soldiers from the KIO Third Brigade based in Mai Jayan and nearby villages, along with the persons who had already attended similar military trainings in the past.

A Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) officer said the training includes courses on self-defence, basic military tactics and small arms. “We train them how to shoot a gun, how to take cover and how to avoid being shot”, he said.

A local resident from Mai Jayan said more than 100 people were attending the courses and trainees’ were aged in their 40s to more than 50. “The training started today at the school in Mai Jayan”, he said.

Training will also be held at Inn Bapa village, where the KIA First Battalion under the command of the Third Brigade is based, 32 kilometres east of Mai Jayan. A witness said one person from each household was being collected as a trainee.

Similar short-term courses military training have been conducted in villages in Sadone Village tract, Wai Maw Township, east of Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State.

KIO departmental staff had attended such training in Laiza in August last year.

Junta Military Affairs Security Chief Lieutenant General Ye Myint gave tomorrow as the deadline for the KIO to reply on whether it would bring its troops into line with the Border Guard Force.

According to a KIO Central Committee member, its nine-member delegation led by chairman Zau Hara will leave Laiza this evening to meet the junta’s Northern Command chief Soe Win on Thursday in Myitkyina.

The KIO’s vice-chief of staff, Major General Guan Mau, and General Secretary Dr. Laja held a debriefing on April 16 this month at Manau ground in Laiza, with 2,500 participants comprising Kachin people and staff of grass-roots groups. The group’s leaders explained its stance on the ceasefire period and the border force issue.

They said the group would reject the junta’s offer to join the force and that the group would like to join the Federal Army as Kachin Battalions, another KIO central committee member, who asked not to be named, said.

In a meeting held on April 4 at Northern Command headquarters in Myitkyina, the KIO had presented that position, but Lieutenant General Ye Myint refused the offer.

A day after the debriefing session, a series of bombs exploded at Myitsone hydropower dam project site. KIO has denied involvement.


Refugees in Burma, Malaysia and Thailand: Rescue for Rohingya – Brad Blitz
The World Today (UK): Tue 20 Apr 2010

For months monitors have reported on the crackdown against stateless Rohingya refugees in south eastern Bangladesh and allegations that the Thai Navy is pushing back boatloads of them in the Andaman Sea. As Burma, Bangladesh and Thailand all gear up for elections, these practices seem more common. One fear is that anticipated changes in Burma following polling there will send more unwanted Muslim migrants to seek refuge in neighbouring states.In March, physicians for human rights documented the effects of overcrowding, denial of access to food, health, and work among Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The Thai newspaper Phuketwan reported the disappearance of boats filled with Rohingya following naval activity near Phuket and suggested they had been intercepted and set adrift by the Thai Navy. Then, CNN and other media published claims that 92 Rohingya boatpeople had been chased out of Thai waters, only to wash up in Malaysia where they were detained.

Approximately 725,000 Rohingya are concentrated in North Arakan, also known as Rakhine state, a region of Burma that borders Bangladesh. No country will accept them as citizens, and they have suffered rape, forced labour and killings. Several hundred thousand have fled to Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, and elsewhere in South Asia where they have received only very limited protection from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Hundreds of thousands were expelled in the 1960s by the military-socialist regime of General Ne Win during the Burmese Way to Socialism nationalisation programme. Subsequent expulsions include the murderous ethnic cleansing campaign Operation Dragon King (Naga Min), which drove more than two hundred thousand Rohingya into Bangladesh in 1978, where an estimated ten thousand died from starvation and disease.

The source of the latest tragedy lies in the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya in Burma by a 1982 Citizenship Law which legalised their exclusion. Denied citizenship inside Burma, further discriminatory policies and an increasingly brutal regime, precipitated a series of refugee crises.

In 1991, the Burmese army expelled more than 250,000 Rohingya, destroying villages and buildings on its way, and forcing them into towns in southern Bangladesh, primarily around Teknaf and Cox’s Bazar. Three decades later, the Bangladeshi response has hardened with the government accused of withholding food aid, frustrating NGO access to camps, and with the exception of a small minority of Rohingya, generally refusing to recognise their rights as refugees.

THREAT OF REMOVAL

As documented by Physicians for Human Rights, thousands of Rohingya refugees are now crammed in squalid settlements and only two, Kutupalong and Nayapara in Cox’s Bazar district, have been designated by the government as official UNHCR assisted refugee camps where there is food, healthcare and education for the children. Just 29,000 of the estimated two hundred to four hundred thousand Rohingya in Bangladesh have been given refugee status. And this number of displaced people is growing as new refugee movements continue, fuelled by systematic repression in Burma.

Arriving migrants face a challenging reception in Bangladesh. Denied access to UNHCR supported refugee camps because the authorities describe them as economic migrants, new arrivals are immediately faced with the threat of removal. The government of Bangladesh has stepped up efforts to return large numbers of Rohingya to Burma after new conflicts erupted over the two countries’ 320 kilometres maritime border.

One of these conflicts was exacerbated following an agreement between the government of Burma and South Korea’s Daewoo International Corporation, which was granted oil and gas exploration rights in contested waters. Since then, increasing numbers of Rohingya living in the border area have been expelled by Bangladeshi forces.

Tensions worsened throughout 2008 and in March last year Rohingya labourers in Burma were forced to start construction of a two hundred-kilometre fence to prevent future ‘push backs’ of Rohingya into Burma.

One consequence of the tensions between Burma and Bangladesh has been the increased presence of Bangladeshi troops in the border region. Fearing arrest and abuse, thousands of Rohingya have flooded into makeshift camps, putting a strain on resources and the local community and threatening thousands with starvation.

UNWELCOME VOTERS

In addition, developments in Burma have thrown up a new wildcard: the promise of elections. In a contradictory move, Burmese authorities have permitted Rohingya non-citizens to vote in the planned elections and started issuing temporary identity cards. The prospect of thousands of Rohingya voters in Arakan is not welcome to xenophobic and parochial interests, giving rise to fears of further destablisation. Bangladesh has responded to the anticipated tensions by continuing the forced removals of Rohingya before Burmese authorities complete the fence that is intended to seal off the area.

The Thai authorities have been equally inhospitable to the arrivals of refugees from Burma and Bangladesh. In 2008, the then Prime Minster Samak Sundaravej was reported as saying that Thailand would relocate Rohingya refugees to a deserted island.

Phuketwan journalists and the Arakan Project, a Bangkok based monitoring organisation, later raised the alarm about Thai security forces’ alleged practice of detaining Rohingya refugees on the remote Ko Sai Deang, before towing them out to shark-infested waters and abandoning them. Though challenged by the Thai government, recent press reports suggest that some of these practices have continued.

While Burma remains isolated, western and donor governments should call on the governments of Bangladesh and Thailand to stop the push backs on land and at sea. All receiving states in the region should ask the UNHCR to help determine the status of migrants from Burma and ensure that their human rights are respected, including access to aid and assistance. It is time for a regional plan for the Rohingya which addresses both the geo-political and domestic sources of their persecution.

* Brad Blitz, Professor of Political Geography at Kingston University London, Director of the International Observatory on Statelessness. www.nationalityforall.org


Burma’s ‘forgotten’ Chin people suffer abuse – Sam Bagnall
BBC News: Mon 19 Apr 2010

With elections being held in Burma later this year the country’s “forgotten people” are appealing to the rest of the world for help.The Chin people, who number roughly 1.5m and live mainly in the hilly west of the country near the Indian border, are one of the most persecuted minority groups in Burma.

Yet their plight is little known in the rest of the world.

Filming for the series Tropic of Cancer, presenter Simon Reeve and a two-man BBC crew managed to visit the area.

Risking capture and arrest at the hands of the Burmese army, who have around 50 bases in Chin State, they trekked through the jungle to a remote village.

“It was an extraordinary journey,” said Reeve. “The villagers I met gave me horrifying accounts of the abuses they suffer at the hands of Burmese troops.”

These stories appear to confirm recent research by US organisation Human Rights Watch.

After interviewing Chin refugees in neighbouring India their report concluded that the Chin are subjected to forced labour, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and extra-judicial killings as part of a Burmese government policy to suppress the Chin people and their ethnic identity.

The BBC team was taken into Burma by Chin human rights activist Cheery Zahau.

Despite being on a Burmese army wanted list, Ms Zahau was prepared to run the risk of working with the BBC, which, like other western media organisations, is banned from entering Burma.

“If we don’t speak up, if we don’t tell the stories of the people under this repressive military regime, then no-one will know what’s happening, and if they don’t know they will not do anything,” she said.

Christian persecution

The Chin are mainly Christians, having converted to the faith when the British ruled the area before independence after World War II.

The persecution of the Chin dates back to the military takeover of Burma in the 1960s.

According to the US State Department, Burmese troops and officials have tried to forcibly convert the Chin from Christianity to Buddhism.

They have also destroyed churches, and arrested and even killed Christian Chin clergy, who now often work undercover.

The Chin also suffer from acute food shortages.

The United Nation’s World Food Programme believes that food consumption in Chin State is the lowest in Burma. In recent years food shortages have been further exacerbated by a plague of rats, which have devastated Chin crops.

There is little in the way of medical facilities in Chin State. The villagers said that they had not seen a doctor for 10 years.

The Christian NGO Free Burma Rangers is one of the few sources of medical aid.

They give training to local volunteers who take basic drugs and medical equipment to the remote villages. The danger of running into a Burmese army patrol is ever present.

“If they catch us they will kill us,” one volunteer inside Burma said.

In the neighbouring Indian state of Mizoram, Chin refugees receive little help from the Indian authorities or aid agencies.

Instead they face discrimination and hostility, and are often forcibly repatriated to Burma.

“The Chin are unsafe in Burma and unprotected in India, but just because these abuses happen far from Delhi and Rangoon does not mean the Chin should remain ‘forgotten people’,” said Human Rights Watch in its report.

Burmese refugees from other persecuted ethnic groups who can flee from the south and east of the country into neighbouring Thailand receive international help and assistance.

Human Rights Watch has called for better treatment for the Chin and for Chin refugees who arrive in India.
Map

Burma’s military rulers intend to hold an election later this year, but most opposition leaders are banned from taking part.

The most famous is Aun Sang Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in the elections of 1990.

Burma’s military leaders refused to accept the results and she has spent most of the last two decades in detention. The NLD says it will boycott these elections.

Amnesty International has warned that ethnic groups, like the Chin, face increased repression at the hands of the Burmese military.

The Burmese regime has previously denied repressing ethnic groups.


Leading parties stay away from election – Ko Htwe
Irrawaddy: Mon 19 Apr 2010

Nineteen political parties to date have submitted applications to the Union Election Commission to take part in the Burmese general election later this year. However, most of the leading parties from the previous election, in 1990, have said they will not compete.Of the 19 political parties that have registered, 16 are new parties, while only three are existing parties—the Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organization (MKNSO); the National Unity Party (NUP); and the Union Karen League (UKL).
Members of the National League for Democracy wave in the direction of the home of Aung San Suu Kyi on the banks of Inya Lake in Rangoon on April 17. According to tradition, on the first day of Burmese New Year, activists of NLD release fish into the lake and pray for the freedom of Suu Kyi who has been in detention without trial for more than 15 of the past 21 years. (Photo: Reuters)

The seven other existing parties—including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD)— have either not registered to date or have announced that they will not compete in the election due to the recent election law and the 2008 Constitution, both of which are regarded by observers as serving only to entrench military rule in Burma.

The notable exception is the NUP, formerly known as the Burma Socialist Programme Party, led by late dictator Gen Ne Win. In the 1990 election, the NUP came fourth with 10 seats and to date is the only major party to register.

In 1990, the MKNSO won one seat; the UKL won none.

The leading parties ahead of the NUP in 1990 were the NLD with a landslide 392 seats, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) with 23 seats, and the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), which won 11 seats. None are expected to register before the deadline on May 6.

Speaking to The Irrawaddy on Monday, Aye Thar Aung, the secretary of the ALD, said, “Most of the existing parties have not registered because they cannot accept the 2008 Constitution. The election will go ahead, I’m sure, but I don’t think it will be free, fair and inclusive.”

Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political commentator living in exile, said that the existing political parties did not register with the Election Commission because most are allied with the NLD. Some parties, such as the SNLD, have had their leader arrested and so will not compete. Others believe the election will not be free and fair, he said.

“The parties that have registered to date are not allied with the NLD,” he added.

Of the 16 newly formed parties that have applied for registration, seven are ethnic minority-based parties: the Kachin State Progressive Party, led by Dr. Tu Ja; the Kayin People’s Party, which is headed by well-known Rangoon physician Dr. Simon Tha; the Shan Nationals Democratic Party, led by Sai Ai Pao Eik Paung; the Pa-O National Organization, led by Aung Kham Hti, a former monk and a politician who had a close relationship with former premier Gen Khin Nyunt; the Chin National Party; the Wa Democratic Party; and the Taaung (Palaung) National Party.

Rangoon-based parties to register include: the Union of Myanmar Federation of National Politics, headed by Aye Lwin, a former university student leader who took part in the 1988 uprising; and the 88 Generation Students Union of Myanmar (GSUM)?, led by Ye Htun, the brother of Aye Lwin.

The GSUM is distinct from the original 88 Students Generation group, led by prominent former students—including Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi—who are now in prison.

Aye Lwin, a 46-year-old former political prisoner, started his own political group in 2005. His close contacts with regime officials (he had a meeting with Rangoon’s mayor, Maj-Gen Aung Thein Lin, five months ago) have made him unpopular with young activists, who accuse him of accepting substantial financial support from them.

The remaining registered parties include the Democratic Party, which is led by Thu Wai, a former political prisoner. After the 1990 election, the Democratic Party was abolished.

Also registered are: the Union Democratic Party, headed by Shan leader Shwe Ohn; the Difference and Peace Party, led by Nyo Min Lwin; the New Era People Party, which is led by Tun Aung Kyaw; the National Political Alliance Party, led by Ohn Lwin; the Wunthanu NLD (the Union of Myanmar) party; and the Myanmar New Society Democratic Party.


Ethnic group in Myanmar gears up for war, peace – Tini Tran
Associated Press: Mon 19 Apr 2010

Laiza, Myanmar – Crawling on their bellies, the recruits inch through a field, dragging wooden rifles. A whistle blows, and they scramble to their knees, pulling the pins from imaginary grenades before lobbing them. Dropping flat, they yell “Boom!”At a camp alongside a river, the next generation of soldiers in the Kachin Independence Army, one of Myanmar’s largest armed ethnic groups, is training with a new urgency. A cease-fire is in peril, and the Kachin do not want to patrol the border for the ruling junta.

“I don’t want to kill anyone but being a soldier is the best way to change the conditions in Burma,” said 23-year-old cadet La Ran, who joined four months ago. “I am ready to fight if I have to.”

The possibility of armed conflict in Myanmar, also known as Burma, is rising because a series of cease-fire agreements between the military government and more than a dozen armed ethnic groups are dissolving as the regime seeks to press those groups into becoming a border militia under government control.

The government has set a deadline of April 28 for the armed groups to merge or disarm as the junta tightens its grip on the country ahead of this year’s nationwide elections the first in two decades. Their demands have largely been met with resistance during negotiations over the past year with the country’s largest armed ethnic groups, including the 8,000-member Kachin army.

Myanmar’s government, run by ethnic Burmese who make up the majority, is well known for repressing its own people. Considered among the world’s most brutal, the regime brooks no dissent and has been accused of large-scale violations of human rights, including the yearslong detention of Nobel Peace laureate and democracy icon, Aung San Suu Kyi.

In the country’s hinterlands home to a variety of ethnic minority groups the junta has also faced bitter opposition from the Wa, the Shan, the Karen and the Kachin, who are united in their resentment against historical domination by the Burmese. The Karen and the Shan, who have refused to sign truces, are engaged in intense fighting with government troops.

These groups control large territories along the northern and eastern borders along with the valuable trade in logging, jade, gems, gold, and, in some cases, illegal drugs, that have helped finance their insurgencies.

The Kachin, predominantly Christian hill tribes in the northernmost part of Myanmar, have been engaged in a decades-long struggle against the government for autonomy.

Since a cease-fire was signed in 1994, they have enjoyed de-facto self-rule: In the rebel-controlled area, the Kachin army powers the electric grid and runs hospitals while soldiers in green uniforms adorned with the Kachin flag monitor both the border with China and the frontier with government-controlled Myanmar.

But Kachin leaders are still hoping for a permanent solution. In the interim, they have rebuilt their army and their strength.

Over the weekend, the Kachin army and its political arm, the Kachin Independence Organization, adamantly rejected the government’s border guard proposal at a mass public meeting held in the small town of Laiza, a rebel stronghold near the Chinese border.

“From the very beginning, the public didn’t want the KIA to join the (border guard force),” said Gen. S. Gun Maw, vice chief of staff for the rebels, citing letters from thousands of people opposing the idea. “If they (the government) take the military way, it will be a big mistake for them.”

Pulling up in trucks, motorbikes, buses and cars, more than 1,000 Kachin many dressed in traditional headscarves and sarong-like longyi packed into a large assembly hall. An overflow crowd watched intently on television monitors set up in a second room.

From the start, the rebel leaders were careful to say their stand reflects the views of the majority of Kachin people, estimated at 1 million in Myanmar. Many in the audience nodded in agreement as their leaders outlined the political stalemate after more than a dozen talks with government leaders over the past 12 months.

“We’ve had the cease-fire for more than 10 years now. It’s a friendly peaceful society now, and I want to keep this. But (the government) violates our rights and takes our land,” said Zing Hang Khawn Hpang, 45, a local trader who attended the weekend meeting.

The gathering was also intended to make a rare appeal for international attention and a small group of foreign journalists, including The Associated Press, were invited to attend. The remote and mountainous Kachin region has largely been off-limits to foreigners for years.

“Not many outsiders know very well what’s happening in Burma and our region … We hope that if they know, if they understand the situation in our region, they may be able to find a way to help us,” Gun Maw said.

In Laiza, a border town of 10,000 nestled in a valley between green hills, the standard of living is better than in other impoverished areas of Myanmar.

Control over two small hydroelectric dams, built with Chinese help, provide the area with 24-hour electricity by comparison, residents in the largest Burmese city, Yangon, only get a few hours of power every third day. Chinese telecommunications towers just over the border ensure steady cell phone service, while brisk commercial trade means a steady supply of Chinese goods, clothing and motorbikes displayed in storefronts on the main boulevard.

On the streets, people talk openly about politics another marked difference from the tightly controlled regions of government-run Myanmar.

The stability has allowed Christianity, brought by missionaries in the 1800s, to flourish a rare display in an otherwise heavily Buddhist nation.

Standing outside the doors of the white-tiled Laiza Kachin Baptist Church, resident Dau Lum, 36, expressed faith that a political compromise can be reached before fighting erupts.

“I try not to worry too much because the world is watching Burma so the Burmese government doesn’t want to start the fight. Even if conflict happens, it will not be like those in the past. I believe that God will guide us to a good future,” he said.

Though Kachin leaders are still pushing for a political solution that includes protection of ethnic rights and government-recognized self-rule, their commanders are preparing for the worst. From the Kachin army’s headquarters, perched high up on the mountainside overlooking the town, they have launched a new push for training and recruitment.

More ominously, the Burmese side has also stepped up its military activities. Kachin residents report army convoys rumbling through the northern countryside in recent weeks near the regional capital of Myitkyina, which is under government control.

But any fighting in northern Myanmar would surely provoke China, the junta’s biggest political ally, which has warned the Burmese government to guard against instability on its borders. Last summer, heavy fighting between troops and the Kokang ethnic group sent some 30,000 refugees across the border into China, prompting a rare reprimand from Beijing.

The Chinese leadership is in a bind, caught between its dislike of border instability and its access to the oil, natural gas, and timber that the junta provides. That makes it hard to divine how deeply Beijing will involve itself.

“We know the Chinese government has influence over the (Burmese government). We want them to use this to make change in Burma, but we’re not sure whether the Chinese government will,” said the Kachin army’s Gun Maw.

Lamai Tang Gun, 59, a Baptist pastor from Myitkyina, notes the Kachin have lived with an uneasy peace for decades: “They (the junta) are always threatening us. We can’t tell if there’s a possibility of fighting. We can only pray to God.”


BGF impasse explained to people by Kachin leaders
Kachin News Group: Fri 16 Apr 2010

Ethnic Kachin leaders in northern Burma today took pains to explain to the people the impasse on the Border Guard Force (BGF) issue with the country’s ruling junta. The public meeting comes before the crucial junta-set deadline of April 22 for transforming the Kachin armed forces.
The public meeting was organized in Laiza, the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in east Kachin State, near the China border. Over 2400 KIO members and members of the public from two states—Kachin and Shan were the audience. Two senior KIO officers took on the onerous task of explaining to the people, said participants.

Dr. Lahkyen La Ja, KIO general secretary detailed all the discussions with the junta on transforming the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the armed-wing of the KIO to the junta-proposed BGF.

According to Dr. La Ja, the two sides met 15 times on the contentious BGF issue in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State since April 28, last year. The issue could not be negotiated because the junta kept pressing the KIA to transform to BGF.

He quoted Burmese military officials as saying that the BGF proposal was the brainchild of junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe and is a goodwill gesture by the military leader.

Brig-Gen Sumlut Gun Maw, Vice Chief of Staff of KIA said that the KIO was told to come up with a clear response on the BGF regarding acceptance by Lt-Gen Ye Myint, Chief of the junta’s Military Affairs Security (MAS) when the KIO delegates met him in Myitkyina on April 4.

In the last meeting, Lt-Gen Ye Myint made it abundantly clear that the KIO has to provide a clear answer on the BGF issue on April 22. Following, which the armed-wing must be transformed within two weeks from April 28, said Brig-Gen Gun Maw.

Lt-Gen Ye Myint also cautioned about the cancellation of the ceasefire agreement saying “If the KIO does not abide by the latest instructions, the relations will revert to the period before the 1994 ceasefire agreement,” the KIA’s Vice Chief of Staff added.

Meanwhile, the latest KIO proposal was sent to Snr-Gen Than Shwe yesterday.

The proposal states that the KIO would like to resolve the BGF issue by peaceful alternative means, not militarily. It wants to convert the KIA to the Union Defence Force under the Burmese Army, maintaining its current status, said Dr. La Ja.

The KIO reiterated to the junta that it would like to convert the KIA after the political imbroglio is resolved through dialogue.

The KIO delegates will meet Burmese military officials again on April 22 and it is expected to explain its latest proposal instead of coming up with a clear response on the BGF issue as sought by the junta, said KIO officials in Laiza.

Till now, there is no sign of impending civil war between the KIO and the ruling junta, said local military observers.


Elections without rights
Asian Human Rights Commission: Thu 15 Apr 2010

The government of Burma has set down conditions for the forming of political parties that would have people associate in order to participate in anticipated elections, but nowhere is the right to associate guaranteed. While parties are required to have at least a thousand members to enlist for the national election–500 for regional assemblies–a host of extant security laws circumscribe how, when and in what numbers persons can associate. The allowance of association without the right to associate is manifest in the Political Parties Registration Law 2010, which contains references to some preexisting laws that prohibit free association. According to section 12, as translated by the Asian Human Rights Commission,

“A party that infringes any of the following will cease to have authorization to be a political party: … (3) Direct or indirect communication with, or support for, armed insurgent organisations and individuals opposing the state; or organisations and individuals that the state has designated as having committed terrorist acts; or associations that have been declared unlawful; or these organisations’ members.”

As in present-day Burma–or Myanmar as it is now officially known–anybody can be found guilty of having supported insurgents, of having been involved in terrorist acts, and above all, of having contacted unlawful associations, the law effectively allows the authorities to de-register any political party at any time.

The case of U Myint Aye is indicative. For founding a local group of human rights defenders and speaking on overseas radio broadcasts about what he saw after Cyclone Nargis, Myint Aye was arrested and accused of a fabricated bombing plot. The military tried and convicted him and two other accused in a press conference during September 2008; in November a court followed suit, handing down a sentence of life imprisonment (AHRC-UAU-018-2009).

More recently, the AHRC has issued appeals on evidence-free cases in which people have been tried and convicted to long terms of imprisonment for having allegedly had contact with unlawful groups outside the country. These include the case of Dr. Wint Thu and eight others in Mandalay (AHRC-UAC-011-2010), and the case of Myint Myint San and two others in Rangoon who were convicted for allegedly receiving money from abroad that was for the welfare of families with imprisoned relatives (AHRC-UAC-137-2009).

The new party registration law is hostile to democratic government because it envisages the arbitrary use of draconian provisions to prevent people from associating freely. It is a law to ensure that only persons and parties palatable to the military regime will be able to run for and obtain office.

But it also points to a far deeper problem. The very concept of a right, in terms of international standards, is neither recognized nor understood by the government of Burma. That the right to associate does not exist is not merely a consequence of a law designed to deny it. It is a consequence of a political and legal regime that does not contain rights within its conceptual framework at all.

This was not always the case. In 1950s Burma, rights were a central part of how national leaders sought to shape government and society. The courts also strongly supported citizens’ rights against the state through a robust constitutional framework. But after the military took full power in a second coup, during 1962, rights became “socialist”.

According to this notion of rights, the interests of the people and the state were aligned against the capitalists. Under “socialist rights” the very idea that a citizen might have a right to claim against the state was absurd. Individual agents of the state could violate citizens’ rights, but the state itself could never do wrong. The right to associate in this time was therefore always a “right” to associate with and through the organs of the state, not apart from them.

After 1988 the socialist concept of rights also ceased to exist, but it was not replaced with anything else. The new state in Burma was right-less, constitution-less, and also law-less in the sense that all laws in the last two decades have been issued as executive decrees rather than through any legislative process. Anything described as a right in this time has in the official view been no more than an entitlement bestowed upon all or part of the population, even if it may be described otherwise.

The 2008 Constitution has confirmed the absence of rights from the normative frame of the new state. At every point it negates and qualifies so-called statements of rights, including the right to associate. Under section 354, citizens have a “right” to form associations that do not contravene statutory law on national security and public morality: which as shown above can be construed to mean literally anything.

The military regime in Burma evidently expects the new constitution and new elections together to be taken as indicators of social and political change. But the passing of a constitution does not signify that rights exist, and nor does the holding of elections signify democratic renewal.

After 52 years of almost unbroken army rule, Burma is today not only without a judiciary, but also without the conceptual frame of rights that are requisite for a fair electoral process. Lacking these, what remains can only be characterized as the politics of despair.


Burmese music: Sound of the underground
The Independent (UK): Wed 14 Apr 2010

When the junta banned traditional protest songs, its leading exponents chose a life of exile rather than fall silent. Andrew Buncombe meets them in Delhi.First comes the sound of hand drums, followed by a voice that is steady and persistent. As Ngwe Toe leans back and angles his words towards the microphone, his lines are met by a chanting group which takes up his theme and sings back at him, as a call and response.

“The religion in our country,” sings Toe, as the group answers for him, “is Theravada Buddhism”. The activist continues: “The colour saffron is growing everywhere.”

The group responds: “The monks are very graceful, but now their power has been drained. They are hiding in the remote areas.”

As the drums continue in a dreamy loop, Toe implores: “Tell me why.” The chanters tell him: “The military devil is rising up.”

This is a traditional Burmese protest song with a modern twist. For generations, the people of Burma marked their new year by performing Thangyat – songs and skits that gave voice to local grievances.

In 1988, the year in which the military authorities violently crushed a series of democracy demonstrations with the death of at least 3,000 people, the junta decided it had endured enough protest and banned the tradition, threatening jail for anyone who dared to disobey.

But the generals could not stop Thangyat, merely drive it overseas. Now, communities of exiled Burmese around the world put together their own collections of protest songs, which are sold on CDs and even broadcast back into Burma where residents listen secretly on their radios.

One of the most famous and popular groups, of which Ngwe Toe is a member, is based in the west of Delhi. Ahead of the traditional four-day new year celebrations, or water festival, which begins today, the activists recorded and released a new collection of songs, music and poetry entitled Gaining Victory for Us and Defeat for Them.

“During the festival, it is a tradition that if there is something the people do not like, it will be criticised – be it politics, social affairs or food,” said Zin Naing, who escaped to India from Burma after the 1988 uprising and who helped produce the recording.

“Now, inside Burma, Thangyat is not allowed, so ours has become one of the only ones that people can get. We produce it on CD as well as cassettes, which are smuggled into Burma.”

There are an estimated 6,000 Burmese exiles in Delhi, most of them from Chin state, on India’s north-eastern border. Many of them took part in the 1988 uprisings and came to India, which at the time was critical of the military authorities and welcomed the refugees. Most have never dared to even visit their home country since.

Ngwe Toe, the 40-year-old lead singer, fled when he was just 19, leaving behind all his relatives. His father died in 2003, but he dreams of returning to the country with his wife and young son, and of being able to show his child to his mother.

In the meantime, he takes some measure of comfort from imagining his family furtively listening to the songs of protest that he and his friends have recorded. “It’s like a rap,” he said. “I say the first line and then the others respond with the second. It’s a call and response, and when I am singing, I am shouting these slogans with emotion. I am very focused on the song. I would be happy if my mother hears it, and would then be able to give the message that her son is involved in the politics.”

The lyrics for the song performed by Ngwe Toe were written by a Buddhist monk, forced to escape to India after taking part in the so-called Saffron Revolution of September 2007, when tens of thousands of monks and citizens took to the streets of Rangoon and other major cities, demanding democratic reforms.

The monk, U Dhamma, a smiling, round-faced 23-year-old, fled after he and several other monks from his monastery joined the demonstrations in the northern city of Mandalay. “I took part in the marches. I thought there would be a revolution. I believed in democratic rule for Burma,” said the monk, who crossed into north-eastern India in January 2008 and now lives in the same dusty Delhi neighbourhood as many other exiles. “After the marches, I stayed at the monastery for some months, but then a minister came to give food. We were very angry and refused to accept this. The minister put pressure on the abbot to expel us, and the next day our names were put in the newspaper, saying that we were to be expelled. We had no chance to stay in Burma.”

Those who wrote the collection of protest songs have had no shortage of material to inspire them over the past 12 months. Last year, the junta extended the house arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi for 18 months, after she was convicted of breaching the terms of her detention when an uninvited US tourist swam to her lakeside home.

Then, last month, the regime announced new rules governing the controversial election due to be held later this year. The rules effectively bar Ms Suu Kyi from standing and say that her party, the National League for Democracy, (NLD), would have to oust her if it wished to field candidates. The NLD has announced it is boycotting the election.

It is not just the junta that comes in for criticism in the Thangyat. While the songs indeed condemn the regime’s alleged nuclear ambitions, the election and the country’s poverty, the NLD and even politicians in exile are also subjects of satire.

Such humour has long been a tradition of subtle dissent in Burma. One of the country’s best-known comics, Zarganar, spent many years making barbed puns about the regime. Eventually, in 2008, the junta ran out of patience with him and seized on an interview he had given to the BBC criticising the authorities’ response of the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. He was jailed for 59 years, a sentence reduced to 35 on appeal.

Likewise, in Mandalay, members of a famous comic troupe known as the Moustache Brothers have been in and out of jail as a result of their performances making fun of the junta.

The Burmese exiles who put together the protest album remain confident that change can come. The song performed by Ngwe Toe says the monks will lead the transformation.

Its last lines, sung as call-and-response, conclude: “If the monks unite – the military becomes afraid. If the monks unite – the religion will be glowing. If the monks take to the front lines – we will escape from poverty. If the monks speak the truth – they will speak to the whole world.”


The UN singles out big oil in Burma, with good reason – Matthew Smith
Huffington Post (US): Tue 13 Apr 2010

In a surprising report last month to the UN Human Rights Council, UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on human rights Tomás Quintana recommended an official “commission of inquiry” into possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in military-ruled Burma (Myanmar).Although the call for such a commission was widely covered in media and policy circles, a critical section of the report went completely overlooked and unreported: Quintana actually became the first UNSR to take specific aim at the ruling State Peace and Development Council’s corporate partners, singling out problematic foreign oil companies operating in the country.

Coming after a 5-day mission to Burma, the report pulls no punches. It notes “rampant forced labor” connected to the country’s four main natural gas projects, including the transnational Yadana gas pipeline to Thailand and the Shwe gas pipeline to China.

Confirming what’s long been documented, the report notes the Yadana and Shwe companies “rely on the Myanmar military to provide security for their projects.”

Mentioning by name only South Korea’s Daewoo International and Thailand’s PTTEP, Quintana in effect implicated a who’s who of Big Oil: The Yadana project, meaning “treasure,” is operated by Total (France), Chevron (US), and PTTEP; and Shwe, meaning “gold,” is operated by Daewoo International, state-owned companies from India and South Korea, and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).

While this is the UNSR’s first mention of the human rights impacts of foreign-led energy projects in Burma, at EarthRights International (ERI), we’ve documented for years how overland gas pipelines and other billion-dollar installations in the country are physically secured by the Tatmadaw — the Burmese Army — resulting in forced labor, killings in cold blood, rape, torture, and other abuses against local residents.

The Tatmadaw is a decentralized, complicated organization of hundreds of thousands of poor, uneducated, predominantly ethnic Burman soldiers. It’s the most powerful political actor in the ethnically diverse country, and the most brutal. It also happens to include thousands of impressionable children, forced from their families, trained to be soldiers, and taught in the way of indiscriminate violence.

In 2009, one former child soldier explained to ERI how he was taken by the Tatmadaw from his family at age 15, and how his craven superiors ruthlessly burned the feet of children who tried to escape their clutches. This particular soldier “graduated” to provide security for Total and Chevron’s pipeline, where he in turn conscripted local villagers for forced labor.

For years, Total and Chevron’s pipeline has resulted in abuses like this: forced labor, killings, rape, torture. In recent weeks we documented two extrajudicial killings and numerous instances of forced labor committed by battalion #282, known locally as “Total’s battalion,” a notorious regiment that’s been securing the project since the 1990s.

This is a grave problem. The burgeoning and controversial corporate social responsibility agenda hasn’t effectively addressed it, regardless of what some companies and analysts claim, and victims of corporate human rights abuses still lack access to justice, despite lawsuits brought by Burmese villagers against Total and Unocal (now Chevron) in the companies’ home states.

What’s more, there’s another batch of problems with Burma’s gas sector. These involve cold hard cash, and were also noted by Quintana: For years, lucrative gas exports have lined the camouflaged pockets of the ruling military regime while the ailing country has sunk deeper into poverty. That’s inherently problematic. In 2009, ERI calculated how Total and Chevron’s pipeline generated over US$7.5 billion dollars from 2000-2008, the lion’s share going to the ruling junta.

This cash influx has only complicated the already deep military-politico complex in the country, not least of all by contributing to high-level corruption. Last September, we exposed how gas revenues from Total and Chevron’s pipeline were being siphoned by the Burmese elite into offshore bank accounts in Singapore, rather than to the national economy or development.

Now, the same junta managing this cash is orchestrating the country’s first elections in 20 years, controversially excluding over 2,100 political prisoners (by virtue of keeping them behind bars), including Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy party just recently decided to boycott the elections.

In this context, the decision was made by the junta and its partners to simultaneously move forward with the construction of yet another pipeline: the Shwe gas pipeline to China, operated by Daewoo and CNPC. Costing nearly US$2 billion to construct, it’ll be almost 20 times longer than Yadana, moving gas valued at a whopping US$30 billion, according to the Shwe Gas Movement.

The pipeline comes amidst a palpable threat of civil war between the Tatmadaw and non-state ethnic armies near the northern end of the project, in Shan State, where there’s a danger of thousands of refugee out-flows to China.

Villagers in some areas of the project aren’t thinking about elections as much as the risk they’ll lose their land and have to do forced labor. Where construction has already begun, so too have land confiscations and persecutions against the pipeline’s dissenters.

In a politically unstable “election year,” when the world’s attention will focus on Burma, one would think that risky transnational mega-development projects would be approached with caution, by both the junta and its corporate partners.

Apparently, that’s not the case.

Rather than move full speed ahead, Daewoo International, its partners, and CNPC should instead listen to the Shwe Gas Movement and EarthRights International: the companies should postpone the Shwe pipeline and any work on offshore installations until there’s no risk the project will contribute to human rights violations — that would be good business. In the meantime, the companies should promote public participation in development decisions; conduct transparent, inclusive third-party environmental and human rights impact assessments according to international standards; and practice complete revenue transparency, including publishing taxes, fees, royalties, bonuses, and social benefits paid to the Burmese authorities.

For companies who’ve ignored the risks and already made the mistake of being involved in a fully operational oil and gas project in Burma — like Total, Chevron, and PTTEP — they ought to take immediate steps to mitigate their harmful impacts. At a bare minimum, they should:
  1. Practice complete revenue transparency.
  2. Facilitate complaints of forced labor to the International Labour Organization.
  3. Acknowledge an accurate sphere-of-responsibility, determined by actual social and political impacts, and take steps to mitigate the local harms caused by Tatmadaw forces securing the project.
  4. Commission ongoing human rights and environmental impact assessments according to international standards, including the safe participation of local communities.

 



Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis in Bangladesh – Dr. Habib Siddiqui and Dr. Nora Rowley
Kaladan Press: Tue 13 Apr 2010

When a widely circulated newspaper like the New York Times picks up the matter of ill-treatment of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, it is no small matter. It is a matter of grievous concern and shame to tens of thousands of Bangladeshi-Americans who live in and around the Big Apple state. In its February 20 publication the headline read, “Burmese Refugees Persecuted in Bangladesh.” It said, “Stateless refugees from Myanmar are suffering beatings and deportation in Bangladesh, according to aid workers and rights groups who say thousands are crowding into a squalid camp where they face starvation and disease.” It described the situation as a humanitarian crisis.The NY Times report should come as no surprise to many of us who have been following the inhuman condition of the Rohingyas around the world for a number of years. In its Special Report, dated February 18, “Bangladesh: Violent Crackdown Fuels Humanitarian Crisis for Unrecognized Rohingya Refugees,” the Doctors Without Borders (MSF) criticized the Bangladesh government for violent crackdown against the stateless Rohingyas in Bangladesh. It was a chastising report in which the MSF called for an immediate end to the violence, along with urgent measures by the Government of Bangladesh and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to increase protection to Rohingya refugees seeking asylum in the country.

Last month the Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) issued an emergency report, “Stateless and Starving: Persecuted Rohingya Flee Burma and Starve in Bangladesh”. This report reveals a PHR emergency assessment of 18.3% acute malnutrition in children. This level of child malnutrition is “considered “critical” by the World Health Organization (WHO), which recommends in such crises that adequate food aid be delivered to the entire population to avoid high numbers of preventable deaths.” The extreme food insecurity causing this critical level of malnutrition is the direct consequence of Bangladesh government authorities’ restricting movement and, therefore, income generation of the Rohingya, and actively obstructing the amount of international humanitarian aid to this population.

Last week, the American Muslim Taskforce (AMT), an umbrella organization that includes the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), amongst other Muslim organizations in the USA, hosted a press conference in the National Press Club, Washington D.C. to discuss human rights abuses in Bangladesh. In his inaugural statement, Mr. Wright Mahdi Bray of the AMT brought up the squalid living conditions of the Rohingya refugees inside Bangladesh. In the last few years we have raised the Rohingya issue a few times with Bangladesh government, but have failed to improve the deplorable condition.

Denied citizenship rights and subjected to repeated abuse and forced slave labor in their ancestral homes in the Arakan/Rakhine state of Burma by a xenophobic Buddhist government, where they cannot travel, marry or practice their religion freely, and betrayed and battered by their Magh Rakhine co-residents, many Rohingya Muslims have hardly any option left for them to survive with dignity other than seeking refuge outside. The neighboring Bangladesh to the north-west with her huge Muslim population and historical ties with Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar, dating back centuries earlier during the Arakanese rule of those districts (1538-1666), provides a natural setting for seeking shelter. Thus, when the Burmese genocidal campaigns – Naga Min ( King Dragon) Operation (1978-79) and Pyi Thaya Operation (1991-92) – forced eviction of some 300,000 and 268,000 Rohingya refugees, respectively, to seek shelter outside it was Bangladesh where they ended up.

With the assistance of the UNHCR, Bangladesh repatriated most of those refugees back to Arakan. Still, however, tens of thousands of Rohingyas never returned, especially from the second batch of major exodus in 1991-92. The on-going Nasaka operation and targeted violence by the Rakhine Maghs inside the Rakhine state have also forced many Rohingyas to leave their ancestral land and return again to Bangladesh. Many of those refugees have often used Bangladesh as a transit point to seek better shelters elsewhere. Many of the Rohingyas have ended up in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and also in Pakistan.

As noted recently by Syed Neaz Ahmad in a New Age article, the late King Faisal’s kind gesture to offer the fleeing Rohingyas a permanent abode in Saudi Arabia is no longer respected by the new rulers who have restricted their employment and movement within the Kingdom. According to him some three thousand Rohingya families are in Makkah and Jeddah prisons awaiting their deportation. It is good to hear that the Pakistan government has agreed to take these unwanted refugees. (Islamabad can also do a noble job, albeit a delayed one for the past four decades, in taking some 300,000 stranded Pakistanis – living a miserable life in camps in Bangladesh.)

There are some 13,600 Rohingyas registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Malaysia, an estimated 3,000 in Thailand, and unknown numbers in India. Small number of Rohingya refugees also lives in Japan, Australia and the USA. The total number of Rohingya refugees living inside Bangladesh today is not known. The UNHCR stopped documenting the Rohingyas after 1991 as they shifted their focus to Africa and Eastern Europe. From my contacts within the Rohingya leadership, the estimate is around 400,000. Of these refugees, only 28,000 are recognized as prima facie refugees by the Government of Bangladesh and live in official camps under the supervision of the UNHCR. The official camp has everything: primary schools, a computer learning centre funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, health care centers, adult literacy centers, supplementary food centers for children and pregnant women.

Except a handful of wealthy Rohingyas who have been able to settle comfortably within the big cities, the rest of the refugees struggle to survive unrecognized and largely unassisted and unprotected, living in dire humanitarian condition with food insecurity, poor water and appalling sanitation. They live mostly in and around Cox’s Bazar and the Hilly districts of Chittagong. Some of the unfortunate refugees have also ended up living in slums of big cities like Dhaka and Chittagong. As reported by the MSF and the Amnesty International, these Rohingya refugees are treated as unwanted folks and have faced repeated beatings and harassment, including forcible repatriation to Myanmar. Many refugees, who had been repatriated to their country in the past, had entered Bangladesh again as they did not find any development and change in the attitude of the Myanmar authorities.

Some Rohingya refugees live at a makeshift camp in Kutupalong, south of Cox’s Bazar. Last June and July the local authorities destroyed 259 homes in that makeshift camp to clear space around the perimeter of the official UNHCR camp at Kutupalong. There was a crackdown in October in Bandarban District, east of Cox’s Bazar, forcing many Rohigyas to take shelter in the makeshift camp in Kutupalong. In January 2010, another crackdown followed the refugees living in Cox’s Bazar District. To add to the brutality of the authorities, the Rohingyas also suffer at the hands of the local population, whose anti-Rohingya sentiment is fuelled by local leaders and the media.

This was not the first time that this kind of problem emerged for the fleeing Rohingyas. In 2002 during the police action “Operation Clean Heart” many Rohingyas were violently forced from their homes, which led to the establishment of the original Tal makeshift camp on a swamp-like patch of ground. This camp relocated, and in the spring of 2006 MSF started a medical program at the new site, where at the time around 5,700 unregistered Rohingya lived in awful, unsanitary conditions on a small strip of flood land in Teknaf in the Cox’s Bazar District. After two years of providing humanitarian assistance, and following strong advocacy by MSF, which ultimately gained the support of UNHCR and the international community, the Government of Bangladesh allocated new land in Leda Bazar for around 10,000 people in mid-2008. Less than one year later, nearly 13,000 people were living in Leda Bazar Camp, their fundamental living conditions having changed little. According to the MSF, these people continue to struggle to survive without recognition and opportunities to provide for themselves inside an increasingly hostile environment.

With a total population of over 28,400, the unregistered Rohingya at Kutupalong makeshift camp now outnumber the total registered refugee population supported by the UNHCR in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government has repeatedly stopped registration of those unfortunate refugees living outside the official camps. Without official recognition these people are forced to live in overcrowded squalor, unprotected and largely unassisted. Prevented from supporting themselves, they also do not qualify for the UNHCR-supported food relief. And sadly, the UNHCR, which is mandated to protect refugees worldwide, makes little or no visible protest at the injustice of this situation.

According to the MSF, the UNHCR is guilty of not taking the return of the Rohingyas as a priority issue. The Office of the UNHCR must take greater steps to protect the unregistered Rohingya seeking asylum in Bangladesh. The UNHCR must not allow the terms of its agreement with the government to undermine its role as international protector of the Rohingyas who have lost the protection of their own state – Myanmar, and have no state to turn to. Any failure to protect the Rohingyas inside and outside Myanmar is simply not acceptable.

We are told that as a poor country, Bangladesh faces a dilemma about the Rohingya refugees. If she shows too much flexibility a huge influx may occur, while being harsh creates concern among international community. Nevertheless, Bangladesh government’s forced repatriation of the refugees against their wishes is simply inhuman and violates international humanitarian laws. It must be immediately stopped, failing which its international image may suffer terribly. It must also stop all harassment against the Rohingyas. Temporary residency permits should be provided to the refugees so that they can earn their livelihood like any other Bangladeshi. There is nothing worse than a forced poverty which leads to crime and other serious problems. Should the refugees choose to leave Bangladesh for a third country the government should not hinder that process either. It must also make all diplomatic efforts to find shelters for these stranded refugees in sparsely populated and prosperous countries of Europe and North America, and the Gulf states.

The Rohingya refugees remain trapped in a desperate situation with no future in Bangladesh. These unfortunate people are caught between a crocodile and a snake: neither the xenophobic SPDC regime wants them back in Myanmar, nor does the Bangladesh government want them to stay because they are largely perceived as a burden on already scant resources. Outside China, none of the neighboring countries of Burma has ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. This must change by ratifying those conventions.

As the Thai boat crisis of 2009 made clear, regional comprehensive solutions are needed to the situation of the stateless Rohingya. The international community must support the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR to adopt measures to guarantee the unregistered Rohingya’s lasting dignity and well-being in Bangladesh.

[About the authors: Dr. Siddiqui is a human rights activist who has written and co-edited three books on the Rohingyas of Burma. Dr. Rowley is a medical doctor who as part of MSF worked with the Rohingya people inside Arakan. She is currently affiliated with the US Campaign for Burma.]


Weekly business roundup – William Boot
Irrawaddy: Mon 12 Apr 2010

Belarus Bids to Bypass Arms Boycott with Burma Sales

The East European country of Belarus is bidding to develop military weapons sales to Burma following a week-long visit by a high-ranking delegation.

A team from the Belarusian state military and technical committee met Burmese army representatives to discuss military and technical cooperation, a European report said this week.

It was the second meeting between the two countries. A Burmese delegation went to Belarus last June.

Although foreign currency revenues from contracts with this state [Burma] remain insignificant, there are certain prospects for the development of cooperation in the military and technical sphere, delegation official Uladzimir Lawranyuk told the Belarus news agency Belapan on April 7.

Belarus is on a United States™ government restricted list because of its arms sales to unstable countries, such as North Korea and Sudan.

The US report lists Belarus as the 11th largest arms exporter in the world, with sales of at least US $1 billion between 1999 and 2006.

Western countries have called for a total weapons embargo on Burma, which buys military equipment from a number of countries, including China, India, Russia, Ukraine and Serbia.

Vietnam: Much Remains To Be Done on Asean Economic Union

Asean is a harmonious organization which has made enormous progress in becoming a œclosely-integrated political and economic entity, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung claimed on April 8.

His welcoming speech to the 16th summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) made no mention of conflicts in Burma, the military confrontations in a border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, or the severe political crisis within Thailand which has forced the Thai prime minister to cancel his participation in the summit.

The Hanoi meeting, in the rotating chairmanship of Asean held by Vietnam, is aimed at solidifying ambitions for the 10-country association to become a European Union-like organization by 2015—seen by most observers as an impossible target.

In a sign that Asean leaders might now be recognizing this, Nguyen Tan Dung warned that œmuch remains to be done to actually imitate the European Union.

It is now imperative to make stronger efforts to really bring the Asean Charter into life, accelerate Asean economic integration and work out a suitable model for sustainable economic development, he said.

Thais Fund Road to South Burma for Bangkok Link

Thailand is spending US $11 million to expand trade and port links into southern Burma.

The Thai government, via the commerce ministry, will use the funding to build a road linking the Thai town of Kanchanaburi with the Burma port of Tavoy, and to create a new permanent border crossing for trade further south near Prachuap Khiri Khan.

The Thai ministry said the developments were agreed at trade talks in the Thai resort town of Hua Hin, on the sidelines of the Mekong Rivers Commission conference.

The aim of the two links is to cut the cost and time of transporting farm and sea produce from Burma into Thailand.

Bangkok is about 300 kilometers from Tavoy in a direct line via Kanchanaburi.

The developments are forecast to be completed some time in 2013, said the Thai commerce ministry.

Australian Trade with Burma Grows Despite Sanctions

Trade between Australia and Burma has grown 160 percent over the last year despite sanctions imposed by the Australian government since 2007, a human rights campaign group has alleged.

The increased trade is mainly in textiles such as women’s clothes, communications and technical equipment, and fish, but does not include investment in Burma’s state-controlled oil and gas industry, said the Burma Campaign Australia (BCA) this week.

Trade between Australia and Burma has grown significantly over the past five years. In the last year alone, it increased 160 per cent, said BCA spokeswoman Zetty Brake.

No detailed breakdown of the increase has been disclosed.

Blanket sanctions are not imposed by Australia against Burma, but the government has been enforcing so-called targeted sanctions on Burmese financial institutions and regime leaders since October 2007.

The BCA said it seeks an extension of government-imposed targeted sanctions and government support for a total trade ban until there is regime change.



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