Burma Update
News and updates on Burma25 May 2010
News on Burma - 25/5/10
Rangoon authorities quit en masse – Maung Too Democratic Voice of Burma: Mon 24 May 2010 Lower-ranking administration officials in 10 Rangoon division wards have resigned from their posts, reportedly in frustration at their maligned reputation among Burmese citizens.A member of the Ward Peace and Development Council (WPDC) in Thongwa township said that “all chairmen from 10 out of 12 wards in town, except Ward 2 and 9, submitted their resignations”. “We were hated by people for being part of this organisation but in reality we don’t have power or hold any authority in our positions,” he said. He added that officials were forced to adopt “security measures whenever senior government officials or their wives come here”. “We have to take action against suspects when bombs explode; we have to go on duty at teashops and get assigned to the nooks and crannies of temples,” he said, referring to a Burmese expression which means areas where drug users and prostitutes reside. He added that officials were also required to regularly travel to Rangoon to beef up security. But it was the people’s “mistrust” of the authorities that forced them to “bluntly [resign] from our positions”, he said. Another WPDC member said that members of Village Peace and Development Councils in Thongwa were also resigning. “There are 64 villages in Thongwa jurisdiction and officials there are also seeking resignation at the Township Peace and Development Council. But as senior authorities are not accepting this, the TPDC chairman is now in hot water.” Government authorities in Burma are forced to operate under extreme bureaucracy, with power heavily centralised by the paranoid ruling generals in the capital, Naypyidaw. Another WPDC member said that low-level authorities are “hated by the people” and “really don’t have any power” but instead act on the orders of the TPDC He added however that the Thongwa TPDC chairman, Kyaw Thaung, informed them that they could not quit until the end of the upcoming elections this year, but said that they are “still seeking resignation as we don’t want to continue with this job”. Carving out humanitarian space post-Nargis UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): Mon 24 May 2010 Yangon – Two years after the destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis created a rare opening for foreign assistance into Myanmar, aid workers say they still face numerous operating challenges.Under the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), comprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) [http://www.aseansec.org/], the UN and Myanmar government, unimpeded humanitarian access was granted to the areas where Nargis struck on 2 May 2008, killing at least 140,000 and affecting 2.4 million. There were hopes the experience would free up access to other parts of the country needing aid. However, no major changes have taken place, humanitarian workers say. “We have learned a lot and come a long way,” Bishow Parajuli, the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar, told IRIN. “But we have not yet taken full advantage of the trust that has been cultivated. There are positive moves, but we need to do more on that front.” Some progress Aid workers say the Nargis experience did help the government to better understand the international community’s work. “There are issues that we are considering and discussing with the government now which we wouldn’t have thought possible before Nargis,” Chris Kaye, country representative for the World Food Programme (WFP) in Myanmar, told IRIN. “There is an overall trend to a better working environment for NGOs in this country and it’s largely because of what the international community was able to do [after Nargis],” added Andrew Kirkwood, country director for Save the Children in Myanmar. However, that period of easy access to Nargis-affected areas is evaporating, aid workers say. “The issuance of visas is not so streamlined and fast-tracked .The fluidity of operations is quite different now to what it was a year ago. That’s unfortunate,” said Kaye. Myanmar is also gearing up for its first elections in two decades this year, and the operating environment is changing. While the UN says it has not seen more restrictions yet, international NGOs fear further limits, including restricting domestic travel for international aid workers. “In the run-up to the elections in 2010, the government or the ministries are asking more and more INGOs for their numbers of international staff, and they are trying to reduce the number of international staff,” said Birke Herzbruch, liaison officer for a forum of INGOs. Varied access “It’s very difficult for us to say access is not being granted – that’s not true – or access is being granted everywhere, which is also another extreme. The truth lies somewhere in the middle,” said Thierry Delbreuve, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Myanmar. For example, access to Myanmar’s conflict-affected southeast border is difficult for agencies, which only deploy national staff there. “The access and space available differs from agency to agency,” said Ramesh Shrestha, the UN Children Fund’s (UNICEF’s) Myanmar representative. “Some agencies have better access than other agencies. It depends on the scope of work, it depends on the partnering ministries.” Unpredictability over who is allowed to work in the country, and when, also makes planning difficult, INGOs say. Obtaining a requisite government letter of invitation to a foreign aid worker can take months, while there is a constant backlog of visa applications. And for an INGO to operate in Myanmar, it must negotiate a memorandum of understanding with the government, which can take two years. “Nobody seems to be able to grasp or reflect accurately the situation because it is also evolving over time. Today you may not have access, tomorrow you may have it. What is important is to continuously advocate for humanitarian access to all populations in need,” said Delbreuve. Room for work Despite these difficulties, UN agencies and INGOs say Myanmar is being unfairly painted as a country where aid workers cannot operate effectively, or are co-opted by the military government. “You can actually work here. Although it is difficult, although we have all the restrictions . we can all remain and maintain our humanitarian mandate here without being compromised,” Herzbruch said. Aid workers who have been in Myanmar for a number of years say there are now agencies in every state and division in the country, despite variations in access. Kirkwood referred to the mid-1990s, when agencies were only working in limited areas, such as around Yangon. “If you look over a 15-year period, there’s a huge opening-up of places we can access,” he said. A selection of IRIN reports are posted on ReliefWeb. Find more IRIN news and analysis at http://www.irinnews.org * This article does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. Refer to the IRIN copyright page for conditions of use. Forced labor for road construction in Maungdaw Kaladan Press: Mon 24 May 2010 Maungdaw, Arakan State: The Burma’s border security force-(Nasaka) has been using villagers in Maungdaw Township as forced labourers for road construction since the beginning of May, said a local trader.The commander of Nasaka camp No. 12 of Nasaka area No. 5 ordered nearby villagers to construct the Pawet Chaung-Sali Pyin village Road, which is a mile long as of the beginning of this month. As a result, every day, in turn, around 100 villagers have to go to the work site. The authorities are also constructing a bridge across the Mingala Gyi Chaung River of Nasaka area No. 5 with forced labor from villagers. Villagers have to provide wooden logs or pillars cut from the forests to construct the bridge. “I had to go to the work site five times in one month,” a villager said. But, non-Rohingya villagers are excluded from forced labour. Villagers, unable to go to the work site for construction of the road and bridge have to pay the Nasaka Kyat 2,000 per day. Poor villagers are having difficulty in supporting their family, when they go to the work site, said a village elder. However, the military regime has declared that there is no forced labour in the country. Ignoring, international pressure, the junta authorities have been extracting forced labor from people across the country for a long time. UN Chief urges action against child soldiers – Edith Lederer Associated Press: Mon 24 May 2010 United Nations — Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Friday urged the UN Security Council to consider tough measures against countries and insurgent groups that persist in recruiting child soldiers. The UN chief’s annual report to the council for the first time includes a list of violators that have been monitored for at least five years, including Somalia’s transitional government, Congo’s armed forces, Burma’s army, and rebel groups in Congo, Burma, the Philippines, Colombia, Sudan and Uganda. The report also names two parties that try to maim or kill children in conflict—Somalia’s government and al-Shabab Islamist militants trying to overthrow it. And for the first time it names seven parties that commit rape and sexual violence against youngsters—six in Congo and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, which is notorious for kidnapping children and using them as fighters and sex slaves. “We still live in a world with those who would use children as spies, soldiers and human shields,” Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN special representative for children in armed conflict, said in a statement. “The shifting nature of conflict has put many children on the front lines. Too often children become collateral damage during military operations.” A resolution adopted by the Security Council in 2005 took the first major step to prevent the victimization of young people in war zones by addressing the exploitation of children as combatants. Last year, the UN reported that there were still some 250,000 child soldiers. The Security Council voted unanimously in August 2009 to name and shame countries and insurgent groups engaged in conflicts that lead to children being killed, maimed and raped. The resolution reaffirmed the council’s intention “to take action”—including possible sanctions—against governments and insurgent groups that continue violating international law protecting children’s rights. The secretary-general recommended in the report that the council “weigh more vigorous measures against persistent violators who have been listed in my annual report for grave violations against children.” The largest number of persistent violators are in Congo, where the report noted that despite positive steps to investigate and prosecute those responsible, “known perpetrators of grave crimes against children” have been appointed to government or senior military positions. In addition to the Congolese armed forces, the list includes units of the rebel National Council for the Defense of the People, formerly led by Laurent Nkunda and Bosco Ntaganda; the Rwandan Hutu militia known as the FDLR; and the rebel Nationalist and Integrationist Front and Mai-Mai groups in North and South Kivu. The report names three separatist groups fighting in the Philippines—Abu Sayyaf, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the New People’s Army—as persistent violators. The Karenni Army and Karen National Liberation Army fighting the government in Burma are also on the list, as are Uganda’s LRA, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the country’s smaller National Liberation Army, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Sudan’s pro-government militias. The secretary-general welcomed the signing of action plans to end recruitment and use of child soldiers by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, though they remain on the list, and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist which has released all minors. Ban removed one rebel group from the list—Burundi’s National Liberation Force or Palipehutu-FNL—following UN verification that all children associated with it have been reunited with their families. But three groups were added to the list for recruiting children, the Afghan National Police, the Central African Republic’s rebel Committee of Patriots for Justice and Peace, and Somalia’s Hizbul Islam. Than Shwe’s election dilemma – Bamargyi Irrawaddy: Mon 24 May 2010 Snr-Gen Than Shwe is a worried man. He has called for an election which will change the course of the nation’s history. He single-handedly created the Constitution to safeguard his future and to protect his interests, formulated the election laws and presumably will schedule an election this year.Even so, there are many things that could go wrong along the way. For the past two decades, Than Shwe has eliminated all challenges to his power, and now, he has near absolute control. However, in spite of his best efforts, it appears things could still unravel beyond his control. He is getting very old. These final days are when he must protect his family and cronies, all of whom have enriched themselves through questionable means. For the upcoming election, he has to ensure that there are 166 members of parliament elected from among the army’s ranks, who will ensure the formation a new military-controlled government after the election. One of the general’s problems is that he is surrounded by corrupt officers and “Yes” men. Can the 166 new military-backed MPs be trusted? When a new government is installed, will it question the way the state has dispensed state-owned property to his family, friends and cronies? Than Shwe is nearing his final act on the national scene, and the people he puts in power will affect his fate. He himself was picked by the late dictator Gen Ne Win for his loyalty, and his seemingly low profile. It turned out to be Ne Win’s biggest mistake in his life. Than Shwe well knows how a low-profile subordinate can overthrow the leader. Apparently, he has picked Lt-Gen Myint Swe, the nephew of his wife Kyaing Kyaing, to be the next army chief, who will also be in charge of the interim government (along with five other young generals including Lt-Gen Myint Hlaing). Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye and Gen Thura Shwe Mann—junta’s No.2 and No.3—are slated for retirement. A high level political position for Lt-Gen Tin Aye is out of the question because of his so-called eccentricity. The problem of picking the right people for the new jobs is difficult because all the men in the top positions lack real creativity or intelligence. The brightest people have not been appointed to high level jobs. Introducing a new government while his family and his cronies are robbing the state treasury is a formidable task. Than Shwe has ordered his current ministers including Thein Sein to take charge of the new military-created political party, the Union Solidarity Development Party. However, without vote rigging these people can not be elected. If they are not elected, Than Shwe grand plan is over. If they are elected, then he has ensured his safe passage into the future at the expense of the country which will continue to deteriorate under military rule. Another headache for Than Shwe is the conversion of cease-fire groups. Some super brain in the cabinet promoted the idea that their armies should be converted into border guards, managed by the junta, which would effectively remove their independence. If they do not agree, the government might be forced to go to war or drop the idea. Today’s army is mainly composed of corrupt officers. A once proud army is a thing of the past. It is poorly equipped. Morale is at its lowest. For what purpose hasit waged war on its own people other than for Than Shwe to hold on to power? There have been instances of field commanders colluding with with others to avoid confrontations on the front lines. Than Shwe knows too well he can not win a war in ethnic regions. Their struggle will go on. If he presses too hard on the ethnic armies it will backfire, and there will be a mutiny among the ranks. Perhaps a solution could be found with Aung San Suu Kyi, who could negotiate with the ethnic armies. Everyone is now asking why no election date has been set? one explanation might be the general is still not sure how to negotiate his way to a safe future. Than Shwe is still not sure what he is going to do. Although unlikely, there is still time for Than Shwe to come to his senses and to pull the country out of its long nightmare through some genuine acts of reconciliation prior to the announcement of the election date. That type of final act may be the most effective way to ensure his passage into a safe future. What can gas transparency do for Burma? – Matthew Smith and Naing Htoo Democratic Voice of Burma: Mon 24 May 2010 International pressure continues to mount on the oil companies Total, Chevron, and PTTEP of Thailand to practice complete revenue transparency in connection to the controversial Yadana natural gas pipeline in Burma’s Tenasserim Division. Non-governmental organizations, scholars, labour unions, investment firms, and even world leaders have urged the companies to publish over 18 years of payments to the Burmese military regime, including taxes, fees, royalties, bonuses, and social benefits since the project’s first contracts were signed in 1992. This raises the question: What will this type of transparency actually do, and not do, for Burma? Despite its virtues, revenue transparency has limitations. Regardless of any new policies of transparency in Burma’s gas sector, billion-dollar gas revenues will continue to line the pockets of the country’s elite for the foreseeable future, especially as new and lucrative projects come online in the absence of a real democratic transition. The management of billion-dollar revenues from the Shwe gas and oil transport pipelines to China is of particular concern, as these payments, estimated at $US29 billion over the 30 year life-span of the gas project, are set to become the largest sources of revenue for the state. Moreover, without a novel scheme for managing and distributing gas revenues equitably, even transparent multi-billion dollar gas profits stand to increase inequality between the very few rich and the very many poor in Burma. This inequality is likely to have a disproportionate effect on the country’s ethnic nationalities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Burma’s own Central Statistical Organization recently found that more than 30 percent of the entire population had insufficient income to provide for basic survival, a figure that increased to more than 50 percent in non-Burman states and regions, where most of the country’s lucrative natural resources are located and have been mined for decades. Additionally, there is a serious risk that the continued influx of large amounts of oil and gas revenues, transparent or not, will have adverse impacts on Burma’s already fledgling economy. Burma is principally an agricultural society, and a continued sharp rise in the value of gas exports could exacerbate the regime’s dangerous disincentive against promoting the agricultural sector, to the detriment of huge parts of the farming population. In the short term, revenue transparency will also do little for the protection of human rights vis-à-vis oil and gas projects. Local land confiscations as a result of gas pipelines will most likely continue, and local people will continue to be forced to work on pipeline-related infrastructure by pipeline security battalions operating on behalf of the oil companies. Transparency will mean next to nothing to the families of two men recently killed in cold blood by Total, Chevron, and PTTEP’s “pipeline security battalion,” as documented by EarthRights International. For these crimes, the companies and the military regime need to be held accountable. Widespread forced labor, forced portering, and other human rights violations committed by pipeline security forces, directly and indirectly related to the project, will continue until the companies take full responsibility and work toward human rights protections. However, despite its shortcomings, revenue transparency is still critically important for development and governance in Burma. For starters, it will shed a critical light on a dark corner of some exceedingly undemocratic concentrations of power in the country. This could have positive, long term political implications. Research indicates that states generating revenues from natural resources are less reliant on citizens, and this “independence” can erode the civic relationship between the government and the people, contributing to authoritarianism. Burma appears to be on the far end of this unfortunate spectrum. Revenue transparency can help push it in the other direction. Second, the people of Burma have an intrinsic right to know what foreign companies have paid to the state for public resources. That is the underlying principle of the revenue transparency norm in the extractive sectors worldwide. Total and Chevron already purport to prioritize transparency and the promotion of human rights. In cooperating with this initiative, they have an opportunity to advance freedom of information and the peoples’ “right to know.” Revenue transparency will also be important for the thorny process of transitional justice in Burma. Detailed data about the amounts, timing, and delivery of payments from these oil companies to the junta from 1992 to the present day could eventually improve the prospects for holding the junta accountable for the past and present mismanagement of the country’s natural resources. A free Burma will want to know how much money evaded the population, and its location. The longer the companies wait to disclose information about their payments to the state, the more troubled their engagement with future governments of Burma could be. But beyond these imperatives, there are economic incentives for the companies to cooperate: Revenue transparency is good for business. For one, transparency will serve Total, Chevron, and PTTEP’s ailing reputational agendas, what some analysts refer to as any oil company’s most important asset. While the companies’ bad reputations for complicity in forced labour, killings, and torture have been well-earned, and in some ways are irreparable, their transparency would demonstrate an overdue regard for freedom of information in Burma, and that would be duly noted by Burmese citizens, shareholders, non-governmental organizations, and others. Reputational repair is something the companies have already spent considerable resources on in Burma, and to dubious effect. Revenue transparency, on the other hand, is objective and free; surely that must have some resonance in the upper corporate echelons. Moreover, shareholders in multinational oil and mining companies increasingly understand the straightforward contributions transparency can make to areas such as corruption control, a much-needed outcome in Burma, which was ranked by Transparency International’s recent corruption perceptions index as the world’s third most corrupt country, behind Afghanistan and Somalia. Revenue transparency also makes sense in terms of open and free markets. It would afford investors and capital providers access to previously unavailable information regarding industry in Burma, including the size and timing of payments made by these oil companies to the authorities. This is information deemed vital for decision-making in the investment community, information oil companies have traditionally withheld. In other words, transparency is in the interests of even those whose primary concern is maximizing profit. What is more, revenue transparency is also in the interests of the home states of oil companies around the world, improving governance and contributing to stability in resource-rich states like Burma. This is noteworthy at a time when palpable political risks stand to threaten innocent civilians in Burma, the material assets of some oil companies in the country, and the long-term energy security of their home states. Specifically, the risk of civil war between the Burmese army and non-state armed groups in areas surrounding the Shwe gas and oil pipelines to China stands to threaten not only citizens of Shan state, but also the interests of Daewoo International, the China National Petroleum Corporation, and the government of China. Stability and energy security through revenue transparency is the rationale behind new bipartisan legislation pending in the US congress, which will require all oil, gas, and mining companies registered with the US securities and exchange commission to publish their payments for oil, gas, and minerals in the countries in which they work, including Burma. If passed, the Energy Security Through Transparency (ESTT) Act would apply to a number of oil companies operating in Burma, including Total and Chevron. However, despite the international application of this proposed legislation, it will not apply retroactively, meaning it will not require companies to publish past payments to host governments. This makes Total, Chevron, and PTTEP’s voluntary cooperation in publishing their last 18 years of payments to the junta critically important. The good news is that the companies are not legally restricted from publishing their payments to the junta. Their contracts with Burma’s state-owned oil and gas enterprise were obtained through the Doe v. Unocal [Chevron’s former name] human rights lawsuit in the US and were recently published on the website of EarthRights International. In no way do they prohibit complete revenue transparency. The time is now for Total, Chevron, and PTTEP to do the right thing and practice complete revenue transparency in Burma. If they want a responsible and level playing field with their Asian competitors, they need to participate in creating it. * Matthew F. Smith is a senior consultant with EarthRights International, and Naing Htoo is a program coordinator with EarthRights International. The organization represented Burmese plaintiffs in the Doe v. Unocal Corp. lawsuit. PM’s party recruits members forcibly in Shan State – Hseng Khio Fah Shan Herald Agency for News: Fri 21 May 2010 The newly floated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) led by Prime Minister Thein Sein is on a recruiting drive in Shan State North and Shan State East using the power of its parent organization the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), border sources said.All village and village tract headmen in Shan State North’s Namkham Township and Kengtung, Shan State East are being pressured by local ruling military junta officials and USDA officials to collect household lists starting early this month. Namkham alone has to provide at least 5,000 members for the party, said a Namkham USDA member. Namkham Township is homeland to ethnic nationalities such as Lisu, Shan, Palaung and Kachin as well as people of different religions especially Christians and Buddhists. The township chairman ordered on 19 May that each quarter must send 50 members for the party, he said and added “They started collecting names yesterday.” Likewise, in Shan State East’s Kengtung Township, every youth above 15 years of age must apply for membership. If not they will be blacklisted for high treason [Naing Ngan Taw Pone Kan Thu], said a member of the USDA in Kengtung. Local USDA officials are now conducting census and collecting family lists in areas all around the town including the outskirts, he said. The Chairman of the Kengtung USDA is Sai Long Hseng Leng. He is also a general secretary of Kengtung Tai Khun Literature Association. “The USDA says we should become PM Thein Sein’s party members because he had developed our town and built pagodas for us,” a woman resident said. “But we don’t see any development in our town.” Prime Thein Sein with 20 other senior officials retired from their military posts in late April and came to lead the USDP. The USDP was directly formed from the state backed organization, the USDA. It applied for party registration to the Union Election Commission on 29 April. It is expected to contest from all constituencies in Burma in the forthcoming election later this year. The Saffron Revolution continues – June Kellum Epoch Times: Fri 21 May 2010 This summer marks three years since the world first saw the smuggled cell phone footage of ferocious attacks by Burmese junta forces on the country’s Buddhist monks. Since 2007, Burma’s monks have faced continuous abuse and tight surveillance by the country’s military rule.“I’m being watched all the time,” one monk said in 2009, in a report by Human Rights Watch. “I am considered an organizer. Between 12 p.m. and 2 p.m. I am allowed to go out of the monastery. But then I’m followed. I had to shake off my tail to come to this meeting today,” the monk said. “I’m not afraid, not for myself. I’m not afraid to tell foreign journalists what happened. And I’m prepared to march again when the opportunity arises.” In 2007, tens of thousands of monks began marching to protest poor living conditions in Burma. The monks were shot, beaten, and arrested in droves. The monks that remained in the country after the violence are still being detained, tortured, and forced to do hard labor and the media’s suppression by junta powers has made it difficult for the world to know the full extent of the atrocities. Other monks have gone into hiding and some have fled Burma. In March, Reuters reported that most of the monks who found asylum in the United States and have given up their robes, find the need to support themselves too great. Some monks however are still active, in the wake of the revolution, a group of senior monks formed the All Burmese Monks Alliance (ABMA), and two other senior monks founded International Burmese Monks Organization (IBMO). Both organizations support monks inside and outside Burma as they continue to struggle for basic rights. The IBMO website reminds readers that Buddha prescribed 10 rules for kings. These rules include: almsgiving, liberality, justice, kindness and endurance. For centuries, Burmese kings followed these rules. Even after all that has happened to them, the monks still hold hope, and strive for the day when Burma’s rulers will again adhere to these principles. Buddhism is Burma’s main religion and out of a population of 54 million, Human Rights Watch quoted estimates that there are between 300,000 and 400,000 monks, and around 50,000 nuns. Burma’s monks have historically played an active role in both spiritual and secular society. Supported by patronage of kings and commoners, the Buddhist Sanghas (order of monks), were responsible for education, yearly festivals, making offerings (merit making), the ordination of young novices. “Any other communal activity in the village—circled around the monastery,” according to the Human Rights Watch report, which said that the goodwill of the Sangha was always sought by kings and more lately by political leaders including former opposition leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Activist dies in jail hospital after neglect – Phanida Mizzima News: Thu 20 May 2010 Rights activist Kyaw Soe, who was arrested during the September 2007 “Saffron Revolution”, on Wednesday morning became the 144th political prisoner to die in a Burmese jail since 1988, after inadequate treatment at a prison hospital in Mandalay Division, a rights group said on Wednesday.Also known as Kyaw Kyaw Soe and Jeffrey, the 39-year-old member of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters (HRDP) in Taunggyi, Shan State, died of respiratory and abdominal diseases in Myingyan Prison, said Bo Kyi, joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners in Burma (AAPPB), based in Mae Sot, Thailand. “Kyaw Soe was denied timely access to medical treatment or suitable doctors for his stomach and respiratory conditions”, he told Mizzima. “He had been charged over connections with Burmese exile political organisations in Thailand but had merely distributed copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the people.” He was arrested at his home in Taunggyi on September 17, 2007 and remanded in custody at Insein prison, Rangoon. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on November 11, 2008 for violations of: section 17(1) of the Unlawful Association Act; section 13(a) of the Immigration (Emergency Provisions) Act and section 505(b) of the Penal Code for “upsetting public tranquility”. Later that month he was transferred to Myingyan Prison, the political prisoners’ rights group said. During interrogation he was tortured, and was the 144th political prisoner to die in prison in Burma since 1988, the AAPPB said. Tate Naing, secretary of the prisoner’s rights group, said that when Kyaw Soe’s family asked prison authorities to buy appropriate medicine for him, the authorities said they had had been taking care of him “adequately and carefully”. “Now, it is obvious that they were not treating him properly,” Tate Naing, said. “The deplorable conditions in Burma’s prisons: the absence and denial of adequate medical treatment, torture and mistreatment, causes and exacerbates the health problems of prisoners, leading to the tragic deaths of far too many of Burma’s human rights defenders and democracy activists.” Since 2007, at least 20 members of the HRDP have been arrested, the prisoner’s rights group said. Among more than 2,100 political prisoners in the 44 prisons and more than 50 labour camps in Burma, 142 were in poor health. Most suffered from malaria, hypertension, heart conditions and diarrhoea, Bo Kyi said. More than 200,000 prisoners in Burmese prisons were denied adequate medical care and treatment, he said. They are not given their basic rights concerning adequate medical treatment or decent doctors,” Bo Kyi said. “They are suffering from severe malnutrition and such conditions lead many political prisoners to die behind bars.” Kyaw Soe leaves behind his wife, May Han Ei, and a seven-year-old daughter. Burma flag ‘erases ethnic armies’ – Francis Wade Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 20 May 2010 The new Burmese flag to be hoisted following elections this year is evidence of the ruling regime’s attempt to wipe out ethnic armies, Burma observers say. An image of the new flag obtained by DVB shows a complete revamp of both colour, design and symbols: in place of a largely red flag with a blue square in the corner hosting a paddy ear, cog wheel and 14 stars comes a flag dominated by one single star in the middle, with three yellow, green and red stripes behind. Analysts believe that the removal of the 14 stars, which signify the 14 divisions and states in Burma, or indeed their assimilation into one larger star, is further proof that citizens of a post-election Burma will live under the dominant control of the military government. “It’s a sign of the original agenda [the junta] had after the British left; the Burmanisation of the country,” said Saw Taw Wa from the Karen National Union (KNU) Peace Council. He added that it was a “step-by-step process” which has already taken root in the formation of ethnic Border Guard Forces aimed at “causing division within the ethnic states”. The Burmese government has been attempting, sometimes aggressively, to transform the country’s 18 ceasefire groups into border militias, which will bring them under direct control of the ruling generals. Saw Taw Wa said that the junta has been supporting pro-government ethnic groups, such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), with money and arms “to eliminate ethnic armies”. Many have however resisted and decades-old ceasefires are now on tenterhooks, leading to fears in Burma’s ethnic border regions that fighting will erupt. Khin Ohmar, chairperson of the Network for Democracy and Development (NDD), said that the new flag was a sign that the junta was “solidifying their power into one star – the unity of the union; that every ethnic group is together as one”. Further evidence is found in Article 338 of the 2008 constitution which will come into force following the elections this year. It states that “all the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defense Services”. Khin Ohmar said that it proves the junta is “consolidating…everything by force and by assimilation”. “When I look at this attempted assimilation – all ethnic groups have to follow the traditional Burmese dances, for example – it’s unbelievable; really disgusting to me. That is a very clear sign that the one big star really is their power.” The official name of Burma is also due to change, from the current Union of Myanmar to the Union Republic of Myanmar. “With the name, they are being very clear that Burma is no longer a federal state, but will be a republic – they are totally denying indigenous rights,” said Saw Taw Wa. Ethnic conflict in Burma has gradually eaten away at the roots of society, with millions now displaced and areas of the country littered with landmines. The 60-year long conflict between the Karen National Union and the ruling junta is thought to be one of the world’s longest running. Burma’s banks set for a shakeup – Joseph Allchin Democratic Voice of Burma: Thu 20 May 2010 The Burmese junta is preparing to allow major business cronies free reign to open banks, with the new entrants into the sector all industry leaders in other fields.The move would appear to open the potential for huge power among new bank owners, and comes as part of the government’s mass privatisation of the Burmese economy. Among the companies listed is Htoo Trading Company, owned by the sanctions-listed Tay Za, who is known to be close to the ruling junta. Another company, IGE, is owned by Nay Aung, the son of a government minister, while Ayedin Company is owned by Chit Khine, a renegade of the former opposition National League for Democracy party. Max Myanmar, also tabled to enter the banking sector, is owned by business tycoon Zaw Zaw, who is also president of the Myanmar Football Federation. Htoo Trading, along with Asia World Company, is regarded as one of Burma’s leading conglomerates, with interests in construction and gems. It owns an airline and, according to its website, a “customs authorised clearing agency” service. IGE meanwhile is in construction and has been involved in building gas terminals, whilst Max Myanmar follows in a similar mould with interests in mining construction and hotels. Analysts suggest that the groups would have been given “special privileges” by the regime. The move to open new banks has been questioned by Burmese economic analyst Aung Thu Nyein, who told DVB that most Burmese banks are currently not profitable because “of high inflation and negative interest rates, so I don’t know why they opened new banks at this moment”. The government has had difficulty controlling the economy and has enacted strict controls since the 2003 financial crisis in the country, including limiting bank withdrawals and other anti-inflation measures. These are aimed at further limiting liquidity, which is essential for the emergence of new enterprise and economic growth. More recently, however, the surge in gold price, although partly in line with global commodity trends, is indicative of mistrust in the banking sector. This sector is considered archaic in the country, despite a liberalisation with the Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law 1990 that allowed the emergence of some private banks with certain “backward” elements, such as interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans considerably below Burma’s inflation rate. Aung Thu Nyein corroborated this long-held sentiment by saying that the banking sector “urgently needs reform”. Transparency and a respect of property rights and other legal provisions are high on a list of urgent needs in Burma, with banks being viewed as money laundering hot spots due to a lack of viable anti-laundering enforcement or scrutiny. The lack of such a provision is often viewed as necessary for the country’s vast narcotic profits. Whether these private companies who are intimately linked to the military regime will affect any change remains to be seen, but the creep towards megaliths within the Burmese economy continues with worrying implications for the further polarisation of the economy. Concerns abound that certain entities or companies will have vast vertical control of the economic supply chains, thus limiting competition and stimulating the possibility for economic bubbles and greater fraud. The absence of minimum conditions for elections Human Rights Council from Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada and the Asian Legal Resource Centre: Thu 20 May 2010 1. The Government of Myanmar has this year issued a raft of laws and rules for the holding of national and regional elections for new parliaments under the army-prepared 2008 Constitution. The elections are expected late in 2010 but no firm announcement has been made and they could be postponed until any time in the future, as have so many other undertakings by the military regime in Myanmar: the preparations for drafting the new constitution alone took over a decade to complete. Anyhow, it is widely acknowledged that the minimum conditions for free and fair elections are absent from Myanmar and whatever takes place this year or thereafter will not constitute an electoral process as understood in most other countries. 2. Although many groups and scholars have pointed to specific problems associated with the electoral process, the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) and Lawyers Rights Watch Canada (LRWC) are concerned to anchor these in the larger and deeper obstacles to social and political change in Myanmar. In this statement, we have chosen to drawn the Council’s attention to the absence from Myanmar of three basic minimum features of free and fair elections: namely, the absence of a judiciary; the absence of a normative framework for civil rights; and, the absence of opportunities for free speech. 3. The absence of a judiciary
4. The absence of a normative framework for civil rights
5. The absence of opportunities for free speech
6. In light of the above, Myanmar’s planned elections can be nothing but an elaborate farce, following on from the referendum on the new constitution that coincided with the biggest natural disaster to hit the country in living memory. If indeed the Government of Myanmar were sincere about the elections it would start by, at an absolute minimum:
7. Some problems associated with the electoral process indicated above, notably those of the judiciary and the 2008 Constitution, will take much longer to address than the interim between now and the planned elections allows. But if obvious, feasible, immediate steps like the three indicated here cannot be taken then there can be no reason to expect that far more intractable aspects of the anti-human rights regime in Myanmar will be addressed any time soon. Under these circumstances, we also need to question the limits of international pressure on Myanmar for change, and strategies and approaches that the Human Rights Council ought to take. This question is the subject of a separate written submission from the Asian Legal Resource Centre to the Council’s 14th session. Junta runs underground mine in Shan State North – Hseng Khio Fah Shan Herald Agency for News: Wed 19 May 2010 An unknown mining project by the ruling military is being secretly operating in Shan State North’s Kyaukme Township, local sources said. The project site was located in Nawngping village tract, south of the Lashio-Mandalay highway. Security has been very tight around the site. Outsiders are banned from visiting the site including its own officers, a local villager who lives near the project site said. The number of workers in the site is over 500 and more will be coming soon, he said. “Because of this news, many villagers from other villages have come to open shops and restaurants in the vicinity.” The Burmese military has ordered workers not to release any information about the project, said another source. “They [junta] informed people that it is only for hydro power project.” “Everything dug out is put in boxes and carried to Naypyitaw directly,” she said, “Workers also don’t know what they are.” An informed source said Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), was reported to have visited the site in the second week of April. According to some local residents, it is expected to be coal mining as some of coal and metal company had reported been there for inspection two years ago. But others are skeptical, “Why should they be so secretive, if it’s only coal?” asked one rhetorically. US media law ‘won’t affect’ Burma – Ahunt Phone Myat Democratic Voice of Burma: Wed 19 May 2010 A new US law signed this week that will single out governments that restrict press freedom will have little impact on Burma, media workers inside the country have said. President Obama on Monday ratified a bill that requires the state department to compile a public list of governments which violate journalistic freedoms. It was passed in honour of US journalist Daniel Pearl, who was killed in Pakistan in 2002 whilst on assignment with The Wall Street Journal. But journalists in Burma, a country that consistently ranks at the tail-end of press freedom indexes, say that outside pressure on the country’s military rulers to lift draconian media restrictions rarely has an impact. “[Press freedom] only depends on the politics that dominates the country; if [the junta’s] politics is likely to be affected in a big way, they will continue to hold onto the status quo… there is not much hope for that,” said an editor from a Burmese news journal, speaking to DVB on condition of anonymity. The vice-chairman of the Thailand-based Burma Media Association (BMA), Zin Lin, added that the intransigence of the Burmese junta, which has ruled the country in various forms since 1962 and introduced some of the world’s harshest media laws, made the US bill merely symbolic. “The international community can warn and denounce them [the generals], and can give journalists inside Burma awards as a way of encouraging them, but as long as you can’t change the military machinery [or] remove the press scrutiny board, the prospect of press freedom in Burma remains distant.” Around 15 journalists are currently behind bars in Burma, including DVB reporters Hla Hla Win, Win Zaw and Ngwe Soe Lin. Hla Hla Win was handed a 35-year sentence last year after recording interviews with monks, while Ngwe Soe Lin had filmed footage for the award-winning Channel 4 documentary ‘Orphan’s of Burma’s Cyclone’, and was given 13 years. Burma last year ranked 171 out of 175 countries in the Reporters Without Borders’ annual Press Freedom Index, above Turkmenistan, Eritrea, North Korea and Iran. Obama told AFP that the new law “sends a strong message from the US government and the state department that we’re paying attention on how foreign governments are operating when it comes to the press.” But recent attempts by the US to nudge the ruling junta towards democratic transition appear to have been ignored by the generals, who are gearing up for elections this year that look set to entrench military rule. Another newspaper editor told DVB that the lack of success by the US, including a recent visit by senior envoy Kurt Campbell, showed that “nothing has changed” in the country. “What is happening now is that reporters can’t do anything here. When they go into the field where something serious has happened, they get arrested,” he said. “Nothing has changed. You will see that the situation only gets worse.” Ethnic armed groups, locals to enforce relocation of Myitsone villagers Kachin News Group: Tue 18 May 2010 Adopting an aggressive posture on relocation, the junta has ordered the militia and local people to force villagers to shift from near the Irrawaddy Myitsone dam project site as of May 1. The Kachin State Peace and Development Council (KSPDC) based in Myitkyina the capital of Kachin State, released an order on May 1 telling all 58 quarters in the city to help out. Ten people from each quarter will work on the relocation of the villagers. The order stated that People’s Militia group also known as Lawyang and Gwi Htu Militia groups transformed from former Lasang Awng Wa peace group, and the Border Guard Force, which is transformed from the New Democratic Army Kachin (NDA-K) led by Zahkung Ting Ying and the northern commander of the military junta will be responsible for the security of these workers. The workers are tasked with forcing the resident to relocate and if they refuse they will pull down houses and churches. More than 15,000 people are to be relocated for the dam project, said environmentalists. The leaders of two Kachin ethnic armed groups, which transformed to the People’s Militia and BGF, Lasang Awng Wa and Zahkung Ting Ying have been granted several business permits after they accepted the junta’s proposal to toe its line on the transformation. They are now permitted by the junta to plunder all natural resources, including gold and timber from Myitsone to Shang Ngaw as of February this year. The two leaders signed agreements on February 8. The junta has made new plans to relocate villagers after fresh Chinese dam construction workers arrived after the serial blasts. Over 600 houses for the Kachin villagers near Myitsone dam site to be relocated were already constructed in Chyinghkrang Village, 14 miles north of Myitkyina by Asia World Company. Photo: Kachin News Group. At a meeting on May 16 in Tang Hpre village near Myitsone, 27 miles north of Myitkyina it was decided to forcibly relocate residents, who refuse to budge from their villages. The meeting was attended by the administrators of Myitkyina and Waingmaw townships, villagers said. Four Kachin villages close to the dam site — Tang Hpre, N-gan, Dawng Pan and Gwi Htau are to be forcibly relocated but the regime is yet to announce the deadline, said residents. At least 27 bombs exploded in Myitsone Irrawaddy dam construction site on April 17 killing four and injuring more than 12 Chinese workers. The workers fled to mainland China in the wake of the blasts. There was severe damage to the main office of the Asia World Company. The junta arrested and interrogated hundreds of people including almost all villagers from Tang Hpre village after the blasts. On May 1 the regime in Kachin State released Red Posters announcing rewards to anyone providing information about the perpetrators of the blasts. It offered 5 million kyats (US$5,102), a CDMA phone and plot of land. A sketch of the bomb blast suspect was released by No. 1 Police Station in Myitkyina on April 20 and at least 48 people with similarities to the sketch were detained. The Myitsone hydropower project officially got off the ground on December 21, last year and is being jointly implemented by Burma’s Asia World Company, Ministry of Electric Power 1 of the junta and China owned China Power Investment Corporation (CPI). It will produce an estimated 6,000 MW of electricity to be sold to China. Essar wins prestigious infrastructure project in Myanmar TendersInfo: Tue 18 May 2010 Essar Projects Ltd. today signed a contract with the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India to execute Port and Inland Water Transport components of the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project to be executed in Myanmar. The contract involves the construction of two jetties at Sittwe and Paletwa in Myanmar, dredging and construction of cargo barges etc. to facilitate cargo movement along the river Kaladan. The construction of a port at Sittwe is a major component of the contract. This project is being executed by the Government of India under a Framework Agreement between the two countries to ease the movement of goods from mainland India to the North-Eastern states of India. The route will offer an alternate access to the North East and therefore is strategically also important. It will also, in turn, help Myanmar develop its infrastructure and port facilities for accelerated development of the country. The multimodal transit transport project has a component of a 120-km road, also to be constructed in Myanmar from the river terminal to the Indo-Myanmar border. The construction of the road will be taken up under a separate contract. The present contract for Port & Water Transport is worth Rs. 342 crores and the same is to be executed within 36 months. A formal contract was signed by Mr. T.S. Tirumurti, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs on behalf of the Government of India and Mr. Vishwesha K Bhat, Vice President, Ports and Jetties, Essar Projects India Ltd. China, Myanmar sign cooperation accords on building road, Wharf – Zhang Jin Xinhua: Tue 18 May 2010 China and Myanmar reached a memorandum of understanding in Nay Pyi Taw Tuesday on cooperation in development of Ruili-Kyaukphyu China-Myanmar platform road project. The MoU was signed by visiting Chinese Transport Minister Li Seng Lin and Myanmar Construction Minister U Khin Maung Myint. Another contract was also signed on Hteedan Wharf construction project in Yangon, the report said. Before the signing, First Secretary of the State Peace and Development Council General Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo met with the Chinese transport minister. Burma-North Korea Ties Worry the World – Andrew Selth Jakarta Globe: Tue 18 May 2010 For the past 10 years, Burma has been accused of trying to acquire a nuclear weapon. A number of developments during this period — notably Burma’s growing relationship with North Korea — have raised international concerns. Yet, to date, no hard evidence of such a plan has been produced. Claims of a secret nuclear weapons program date back to 2000, when Burma’s military government announced that it was going to purchase a small research reactor from Russia. These accusations were repeated in 2003, when it was suggested by a respected news magazine that North Korea had taken over from Russia as the source of Burma’s nuclear technology. In the years that followed, the issue resurfaced periodically on activist Web sites, but in August 2009 it attracted global attention when a story appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald citing Australia National University professor Des Ball and the Thai-based journalist Phil Thornton. The SMH claimed that there were in fact two nuclear projects running in Burma. The first was the Russian research center, which was to be operated under international safeguards. (Contrary to the SMH story, construction of this reactor has not yet begun). The second was said to be a secret project to build a reactor and associated nuclear fuel processing plants with North Korean help. According to the SMH, if all went according to plan Burma would have a nuclear weapon by 2014 and “a handful” of such devices by 2020. The main sources for these claims were two Burmese “defectors” and commercial satellite imagery of suspect facilities in Burma. Needless to say, such claims have been the subject of close scrutiny by the United States and other governments. There have also been comprehensive studies of the issue by think tanks like the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. The US government has expressed its concern about the defense ties that appear to have developed between Burma and North Korea over the past decade. These links reportedly include the sale of conventional arms to Burma, North Korean help with the development of Burma’s defense infrastructure (including the construction of various underground facilities), assistance to Burma’s arms industries and training in fields like air defense. In 2004, the US blocked the sale of North Korean short-range ballistic missiles to Burma. The Obama administration has also stated its wish to discuss a number of proliferation issues with Burma, including the possible transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea. Significantly, however, at no time has the US government stated that Burma is attempting to develop a nuclear weapon, with or without North Korean help. Indeed, despite considerable pressure from members of Congress, activists and journalists, Washington has refused to be drawn on the subject. Its position seems to reflect either a belief that Burma does not have a secret nuclear weapons program, or a lack of hard evidence to support such a claim. This approach has been shared by other countries, including Britain and Australia, both of which have referred only to “unconfirmed” reports of a secret nuclear program. For their part, the IISS and ISIS have both stated that there is insufficient evidence to support the claims. The IISS, for example, said in late 2009 that Burma “has no known capabilities that would lend themselves to a nuclear weapons program.” Even so, both governments and think tanks remain suspicious of Burma’s intentions, and point to a number of factors which they believe warrant continuing close attention. Of all Southeast Asian countries, Burma has the strongest strategic rationale for a nuclear weapons program. Since the abortive pro-democracy uprising in 1988, the military government has feared armed intervention by the United States and its allies. The regime has also suffered from economic sanctions and other punitive measures. Burma’s generals envy North Korea’s ability to resist such pressures and still win concessions from the international community. They reportedly believe that this influence derives from Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons. In addition, Burma has for some years been working closely with two North Korean trading entities that have a record of proliferating sensitive nuclear and missile technologies. Also, Burma has imported a number of sophisticated machines and items of dual-use equipment from Europe and Japan that could conceivably be used in a nuclear program. The number of Burmese sent to Russia for nuclear-related training seems to be more than that required for a peaceful research program. Furthermore, some of the claims made by the “defectors” are plausible. None of these factors in themselves prove that Burma has embarked on a nuclear weapons program. After the mistakes of the Iraq war, no government wants to rush to judgment based on incomplete or unverified intelligence. Having been caught napping a few years ago, however, when it was discovered that Syria was building a reactor with North Korean help, the international community is now looking carefully for hard evidence of a secret Burmese nuclear program. * Andrew Selth is a research fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute in Queensland. Ban Ki Moon must stand tall – Bo Kyi Democratic Voice of Burma: Tue 18 May 2010 At a recent press conference, the spokesperson for UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon asserted that “the United Nations has strongly encouraged the Myanmar [Burmese] authorities to invite regional and international monitors because we believe that that will inspire confidence in the elections”. It is hard to imagine anything inspiring confidence in the elections. To speak of election monitors in Burma misses the point entirely. An election is more than just what happens on the day: to be effective, election observation must look at the entire electoral process over a long period of time, rather than at election-day proceedings only. For this to occur, there needs to be genuine support from the state, as occurred in Cambodia in 1993, where over 50,000 Cambodians were trained as election officials by the UN Transitional. Elections are a process and it is the process itself that is fundamental to democracy. The legitimacy of the election in Burma will not rest on the whether international observers are allowed to monitor the election – the legitimacy of the election rests on the regime’s response to dissent. In Burma, some 2,200 people remain in prison, where they live in dire conditions and endure appalling abuses at the hands of the military junta for their simple desire for a more peaceful and democratic Burma. If it is democracy that this election is meant to serve, then why does the junta keep locking up the very people who seek this aim? A normal part of a democratic electoral process is debate; criticism of the incumbent government. Where the ruling party has not lived up to expectations, the election campaign is an opportunity for those contesting the election to show voters where the incumbent fell short and why they, as candidates, are a better option. In countries like the US, this is taken to the extreme, with candidates and parties publicly ridiculing each other; nothing is sacred in their efforts to expose the competition. But in Burma, this is not the case. The Burmese junta has made clear its thoughts on “the process of fostering democracy,” when they said that “improper and inappropriate campaigns” would not be allowed. It is not hard to imagine what is meant by “improper and inappropriate,” and it is evident what the consequences for those found engaging in such campaigning would be. History shows us that desperate despots stop at nothing to perpetuate their rule. The past twenty years in Burma have shown us this much, too. Most recently, the regime, threatened by the power of the people, enforced legislation to ensure the opposition is divided and weakened, which forced the National League for Democracy (NLD) party to disband. But this only indicates where the weakness of this regime lies. A military regime will never capture the hearts and minds of its people, not in the way that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi can, not in the way Min Ko Naing inspires generations of activists the world over. That is the power of democracy; it lies in the power of the people. As if harassment, intimidation and imprisonment of the opposition were not enough, the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has gone one step further to seal the fate of the election outcome: they have violated their own election laws. Burmese prime minister Thein Sein and his cronies have formed their own political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). In doing so, they violate Chapter 2, Article 4(d) of the Political Parties Registration Law, which prohibits civil servants from forming a political party. With the 2008 constitution already ensuring the military 25 percent of the seats in parliament, the fact that the military-led USDP is now going to contest the election should dispel any doubts as to the SPDC’s true intention for any power sharing arrangement. Regardless of whether international observers monitor the election, the elections will not be credible if they are held without the release of all political prisoners and without the criminal records of current political prisoners being wiped, therefore guaranteeing their right to participation, once released. For the secretary general of the UN to suggest otherwise is naïve, if not neglectful. What can we learn from other dictators and their sham electoral processes? During the 2008 election in Zimbabwe, opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the contest because of violence against his supporters. In the run up to the election, Mugabe set paramilitary thugs on his opponents, intimidating many potential voters. At one point, Mugabe’s men even attempted to throw Tsvangirai out of an eight-story building. The state-run media spewed out propaganda; intense and abusive vitriol against the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party and Tsvangirai. The independent press was attacked, and its editors and writers frequently brought in for police “questioning.” Following the 2008 election of Mugabe, some African leaders refused to recognize Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe. Given a similar pattern of willful perversion of the electoral process in Burma, will the Southeast Asian leaders do the same? What can we expect from Burma’s neighbours? China’s ambassador recently told reporters: “A general election being held in any country is a matter of a sovereign state, so that should be respected.” But as the British ambassador, Mark Lyall Grant, aptly noted, “The instability that could be caused by a flawed electoral process is a threat to international peace and security.” The UN Secretary General does not provide much inspiration for those looking for a bold approach to Burma. “It’s frustrating and … disappointing that we have not seen much progress” toward democracy, said Ban Ki-moon. “Much progress” – in April alone, at least 12 political activists were arrested, bringing the number of political activists in prison to 2199. Leaping from 1185 in 2006, now, as the election looms ever closer, the figure is set to increase. Elections are important for the democratization of Burma, but, with almost 2,200 political prisoners excluded, the election will not be democratic, or free, or fair. Democracy and human rights are interdependent. You cannot have one without the other. Political prisoners embody the denial of the most basic freedoms essential to humankind: freedom of thought, association and assembly. The treatment of these prisoners also violates fundamental rights: the right to be free from torture, the right to health and the right to an adequate standard of living. The judicial system, in Burma, far from affording individuals basic standards of justice, is employed by the regime as an instrument of repression to silence dissent. And, at every level, impunity reigns. In 2009 Ban Ki-moon stated: “It is high time to turn the promise of the responsibility to protect into practice”. It is high time he gave meaning to these words; it is high time he stood up for the people of Burma. Without the support of the UN and the countries which make up its mandate, then all you are left with is bravery of the Burmese people to fight alone; with their words and with their hearts. It is time Ban Ki-moon stood on the side of the Burmese people. He has the freedom to speak out and those who have the freedom to speak out should do so for those who cannot. The risk for him is far less than the risk my courageous brothers and sisters take, for they will continue to risk torture and even death before renouncing their non-violent struggle. * Bo Kyi is joint secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP) Post-election threats to ethnic areas – Katrina Winters Irrawaddy: Tue 18 May 2010 The recent bombings at the Myitsone dam project in Burma are an example of the root cause of ethnic armed conflict in Burma. While no one has claimed responsibility for the bombings, a farmer who was arrested is viewed by many as a scapegoat, who most likely lacked the resources and skills to plant such a series of bombs. One hypothesis is that it was the work of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which took action as a part of their refusal to become a regime-led border guard force. Another hypothesis is that it could have been an act of the Burmese government to set up the KIA. Either way, it is evident that the root cause of conflict in ethnic areas in Burma is a conflict over land and resources. Such conflicts are likely to accelerate and spread in ethnic areas, especially in cease-fire areas where ethnic groups have refused to transform their armies into a border guard force. As each deadline passes, it is clear that the junta’s efforts to transform ethnic armies into border guard forces have largely failed. The junta’s motivation to form border guard forces is not only for political and security reasons but also for economic gain: to increase access to natural resources in ethnic areas that are currently not under their control. In the cease-fire agreements of the early 1990s, the military regime commonly offered co-operative arrangements to ethnic leaders to exploit natural resources, if they agreed to a cease-fire. In a post-election context, as the Burmese government pursues its plan for economic development through exploiting natural resources in ethnic areas, tensions between ethnic armies both in cease-fire and non-ceasefire areas and the Burmese military are bound to increase. If cease-fire groups turn their back on the government, civil wars are likely to resume, resulting in more land rights abuses, displacement and refugees. Ethnic armies that either re-engage in a civil war or continue in their armed struggle against the Burmese army also have to finance their efforts. As in the past, they will finance themselves through the exploitation of natural resources and through trade with resource-hungry neighboring countries. The situation is further compounded by the opening up of the economy. The 2008 Constitution stipulates that the post –election Burmese economy will be market-based. In the article “A State-owned market economy” (Nov 16, 2009), Sean Turnell—a long-time observer of Burma’s economy from Macquarie University, Australia—noted that the 2008 Constitution says that the economy will have “a capitalist heart.” Article (35) states that, “The economic system of the Union is a market economy system.” Recently, there has been a continuing increase in state militarization, large-scale resource extraction and infrastructure development. These factors are causing widespread displacement in ethnic areas, particularly in eastern Burma where there are plans to build a series of dams on the Salween River. The dams are part of a systematic plan by the military government to gain control over natural resource-rich ethnic areas to create wealth and to consolidate its political power base. This is not a new state of affairs. As we know, there is no rule of law in Burma, and the generals do not adhere to legal frameworks. They use the law not to protect people’s rights, but to control the population and to serve the economic interests of the Burmese government primarily through extracting wealth. The country’s major income comes from selling off natural resources, including billions of dollars from gas, and hydropower development. In a post-election context, we can expect on-going human rights abuses and natural resource exploitation in the pursuit of economic development, as the markets will be increasingly opened up to foreign investment. However, little current foreign investment and state interventions for large-scale development projects (such as dams, gas pipelines, mining and biofuel plantations) actually benefit local communities. They are purely for the economic benefit of the investors and the state. Instead, they usually lead to disruption of local livelihoods and environmental destruction. There is no transparency, local consultation, appropriate compensation or participation in decision making about the development that affects these local communities. The fundamental problem lies in the current Constitution which gives the government control of natural resources. Article 37 states: “The Union is the ultimate owner of all lands, and all natural resources above and below the ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere.” Foreign investors already have their eye on opportunities that might exist after the election this year. In Burma, individuals are allowed 30-year leases on land, and foreign investors such as Thai property and tourism investors have already expressed interest in taking further advantage of this after the election. Thailand is the largest investor in Burma (47 percent), and it is likely that other countries such as China will increase their investment in the absence of any profound political reform. As the country opens itself up to further investment without the appropriate policies and mechanisms in place to protect basic human rights, incidents such as the bombings at the Myitsone site dam are likely to increase. Conflict over land and resources and displacement of communities in ethnic areas will increase. The livelihoods of rural communities in ethnic areas are under serious threat, along with the natural environment and natural resource management systems. Most significantly, human security will continue to be threatened and stability, peace, national reconciliation and democratization processes undermined. * Katrina Winters is an environmental researcher at the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) in Chiang Mai. Burmese monks said trying to raise political awareness with CD campaign – U Khin Maung Latt Democratic Voice of Burma Radio: Mon 17 May 2010 Text of report by Norway-based Burmese Democratic Voice of Burma website, on 15 May Monks in Burma have started distributing a CD to the people on 14 May to protest the transformation of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) into a political party. Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) correspondent U Khin Maung Latt filed this report. [Begin recording] [DVB] The All Monks Alliance and the Front to Protect the Sasana [Buddhism] published a CD on 14 May and started distributing it in 26 townships of Burma with the goal of raising the political awareness of the people. [Passage omitted on poorly recorded interview with a monk - Ashin Dhamma Raja] The CD was distributed in 26 townships of Rangoon, Pegu, Magwe, and Mandalay Divisions, said Ashin Dhamma Raja. A youth from Natmauk Township of Magwe Division who received the CD said: [Unidentified youth] I am from Natmauk of Magwe Division. We did not have anyone to guide us. When we received the CD, we became motivated. It gave us something to do. We received the CD from a monk while he was going around for alms. We have plans to distribute the CD. We will be taking further action and will discuss what to do with that monk. We are encouraged by what is written in the CD [words indistinct]. [DVB] Ashin Dhamma Raja also expresses his opinion about the USDA forming a political party. [Ashin Dhamma Raja] They have been committing political injustices, including ones against our Saffron Revolution [words indistinct]. For them to be transforming a social organization into a political party is totally unacceptable. [Passage omitted] [End recording] US extends sanctions on Burma Voice of America: Mon 17 May 2010 The United States has formally extended sanctions against Burma’s military government for another year. President Barack Obama informed Congress of the decision Friday, saying Burma poses a continuing threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy. He added that Burma’s actions and policies are hostile to U.S. interests. The existing sanctions on Burma must be renewed annually. They were set to expire next week. Despite the sanctions, President Obama has been making an effort to engage the isolated country. Earlier this week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell visited Burma for a two-day trip, during which he met with leaders of the military junta and detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The United States has strongly criticized Burma for upcoming election plans that effectively exclude Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy party. * Some information for this report was provided by AP, AFP and Reuters. US engagement with Myanmar falters – Brian McCartan Asia Times Online: Mon 17 May 2010 Bangkok – After the only outcomes of a visit to Myanmar by a high-level United States diplomat were “profound” disappointment over its election preparations and a stronger line over its nuclear links with North Korea, President Barack Obama on Friday formally extended sanctions against the country. Washington’s extension of the sanctions followed the visit of US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell to Naypyidaw, the capital, on May 9 for a two-day visit. Campbell met top officials such as Foreign Minister Nyan Win, Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, Science and Technology Minister U Thaung – the point man for US-Myanmar engagement – and Labor Minister U Aung Kyi. Charged with assessing Myanmar’s preparations for elections to be held on an as-yet unspecified date this year – its first polls since 1991 – Campbell also met members of the Union Election Commission, officials of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and other government-affiliated political parties. On May 10, Campbell travelled to Yangon, where he met senior leaders of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), representatives of major ethnic groups and pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi Campbell had earlier said he would only visit the country if he could meet opposition members and Suu Kyi. He previously met the 64-year-old last November, when he became the highest ranking US diplomat to visit Myanmar in 14 years. Before his visit, during a press conference in Bangkok on May 9, Campbell said the US was concerned with the lead-up to the elections. “We’re troubled by much of what we’ve seen and we have very real concerns about the elections laws and the environment that’s been created.” Campbell’s meetings in Naypyidaw seem to have only confirmed the US’s worst fears, with the envoy telling reporters in Yangon that he was “profoundly disappointed” in the junta’s approach to the elections. “Unfortunately, the regime has chosen to move ahead unilaterally – without consultation from key stakeholders – towards elections planned for this year,” he said. “As a direct result, what we have seen to date leads us to believe that these elections will lack international legitimacy.” The NLD was officially dissolved on May 7, two days before Campbell’s arrival, after it declined to meet a May 6 registration deadline stipulated by new election laws. The laws, which ban individuals serving prison sentences from being members, would have forced the party to oust Aung San Suu Kyi as its chairwoman due to her continued house arrest. The party’s headquarters in Yangon remains open and members are calling for a boycott of the vote. Some 25 senior members of the party have decided to form a new party and seek registration with the government, though no decision has been made on their participation in the polls. The government is yet to announce a date for the vote, though reports suggest it could be in October. Campbell also noted the junta’s continued pressure on the country’s ethnic minority groups to disarm before the elections. “The regime has ratcheted up the pressure on Burma’s [Myanmar's] ethnic groups in preparation for this year’s elections, forcing countless innocent civilians to flee. Burma cannot move forward while the government itself persists in launching attacks against its own people to force compliance with a proposal its ethnic groups cannot accept.” The last sentence refers to the regime’s proposal that the armed wings of ethnic groups relinquished to army control before the vote, a move many groups say would deprive them of leverage against a regime that has frequently resorted to force. Campbell also questioned Myanmar’s relations with North Korea and its commitment to implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which among other things bans the export of weapons and nuclear technology from North Korea and authorizes member states to search suspected cargos. Campbell mentioned “recent developments” that were likely related to reports of North Korean involvement in Myanmar’s nuclear program. North Korean military assistance to Myanmar in the past has consisted of hardware including artillery and surface-to-surface missiles. Myanmar-exile magazine The Irrawaddy claimed on May 10 that the junta had purchased mid-range missiles and rocket launchers from North Korea during the Myanmar New Year in April. In addition, the magazine claimed, “equipment necessary to build a nuclear capability was reportedly among imported military supplies from North Korea”. Analysts believe North Korea is assisting the generals with a nuclear program that includes the development of weapons. Two nuclear reactors are believed to be under construction in Myanmar. One, at Naung Laing near the town of Pyin Oo Lwin in central Mandalay Division, is being constructed with North Korean help. Several thousand Myanmar military personnel have undergone nuclear training in Russia and North Korea in recent years. Desmond Ball, a defense analyst at Australia National University, believes the reactor could be online in 2012 and a deliverable weapon could be developed by 2020. In order to build international confidence in Myanmar’s commitment to the UN Security Council resolution – imposed on Pyongyang in 2009 after conducted an underground nuclear test – Campbell asked the regime to put in place a “transparent process”. “Without such a process, the United States maintains the right to take independent action within the relevant frameworks established by the international community,” said Campbell. The US had applauded Myanmar in July for refusing to allow a North Korean-registered ship believed to be carrying weapons to dock, forcing the ship to turn back. The regime’s response to Campbell’s statement came in a long, rambling article in the state-run newspaper The New Light of Myanmar on May 12. The report was partly a description of Campbell’s meetings with government officials and partly an attempt to justify election laws and paint the NLD’s decision to not re-register as misguided. The article said the new election laws did not target a specific person, a reference to Aung San Suu Kyi, and that the banning of convicts to stand in election is a normal practice in many countries, with all prisoners grouped together, political or criminal. It also said that if the NLD wants to carry out its aim of amending the controversial 2008 constitution, it should have joined the election process and tried to make changes in the new parliament. The constitution, passed through a referendum that observers say was rigged, cannot be changed without a majority in parliament, something that is almost impossible given the number of seats reserved for the military. In response to a question on the possibility of independent election monitors, the paper quoted retired Major General Thein Soe, head of the Election Commission, as saying, “the nation has a lot of experience with elections. We do not need election watchdogs to come here. Arrangements have been made to ensure a free and fair election.” Seemingly at odds with this was a request by Information Minister Hsan for unspecified American cooperation supporting the elections. “We would like to receive your kind cooperation so that the election can be held peacefully and successfully.” The New Light of Myanmar article welcomed the Barack Obama administration’s engagement policy and called on the US “to show a positive attitude towards our internal affairs such as the drafting of the constitution and measures for holding elections after issuing the necessary laws for democratization process”. Prior to Campbell’s visit to Myanmar there was no sign in Congress of a “positive attitude” with for increased pressure on Myanmar’s military rulers that reflecting concerns that the Obama administration’s seven-month old engagement policy is not reaping the desired benefits. On May 7, the senate called on the Obama administration to show solidarity with the NLD and consider tighter sanctions on the junta. Senators approved a resolution led by Judd Gregg, a Republican from New Hampshire, requesting the regime enter dialogue with the NLD, free Suu Kyi from house arrest and called for stronger US sanctions on Myanmar. Obama on Friday formally extended sanctions against Myanmar that were imposed in 1997, “because the actions and policies of the government of Burma continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”. The sanctions bar American firms from investing in Myanmar and bans Myanmar exports to the United States. A letter signed by nine senators was sent to Obama on March 26 urging full implementation of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 in response to the widely criticized election laws. The act, which targets US imports of Myanmar gemstones, also calls for the nomination of a special representative and policy coordinator for Myanmar and additional banking sanctions. >From the outset the Obama administration has said that it would consider maintaining or even increasing sanctions depending on the regime’s progress towards improving the human-rights situation and progressing towards an inclusive democracy. Opponents of the Obama’s engagement policy say the generals have given little indication of moving in that direction. The generals appear unfazed by American criticism and sanctions and most analysts believe election preparations will continue in the same vein regardless of international disapproval. The US, noting that a lack of engagement also produced little benefit, is not likely to revert to its previous strictly confrontational stance. This is especially so given Myanmar’s clear moves to acquire nuclear technology and North Korea’s perceived hand in the process. * Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. Oil and gas firms profit from rape in Burma – Zetty Brake The Scavenger (Australia): Mon 17 May 2010 Foreign investment and income from oil and gas companies have enabled the military dictatorship in Burma to greatly expand the country’s armed forces who use rape as a weapon against ethnic women and girls, writes Zetty Brake. Burmese soldiers entered Naw Shee Shee Paw’s village looking for a Karen girl. When told she wasn’t there, they demanded another girl, threatening to kill the village leader if he didn’t find one. Naw Shee Shee Paw’s aunt agreed to leave the village with the soldiers taking her 25-year-old niece with her. After a short time the soldiers ordered the aunt to turn back. Naw Shee Shee Paw said “I didn’t want to stay alone (with the soldiers) because I was afraid of them”. “After about 15 minutes walk two of them pulled me into the bushes and raped me. The other one stood guard. I tried to shout but they closed my mouth. They raped me one by one on the ground in the bushes. I was alone and afraid of them. While one of them closed my mouth, one raped me. I pushed them and tried to protect myself but they were too strong and there were two of them and so I could not defend myself”, Naw Shee Shee Paw said. Naw Shee Shee Paw’s story is tragic and all too common for women and girls in Burma. Rape is used by the Burmese military as a weapon against ethnic women and girls. Rape and sexual violence is an abuse that women and girls face, in addition to the human rights violations that male members of their community suffer. Groups run by women from Burma have been extensively documenting evidence over many years of the systematic rape of ethnic women by state actors. One report, License to Rape by the Shan Women’s Action Network, documented 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence in Shan State, north-eastern Burma. It found that 61% were gang rapes; 25% of rapes resulted in death and 83% of rapes were committed by officers, usually in front of their troops. Only one case out of the 173 documented was the perpetrator punished. Since 2002 the bodies of the UN and international community have consistently condemned Burma’s military regime for using sexual violence against women, particularly women belonging to ethnic nationalities. The UN special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak’s 2006 report noted “Women and girls are subjected to violence by soldiers, especially sexual violence, as “punishment” for allegedly supporting ethnic armed groups. The authorities sanction violence against women and girls committed by military officers”. Burma has been ruled by a number of military dictatorships since 1962. The latest dictatorship, the State Peace and Development Council, has denied claims of rape by Burmese soldiers. “The allegations regarding sexual violence against ethnic women and children are baseless and aimed at discrediting the Government of Myanmar [Burma] and Myanmar [Burmese] Military,” said U Wunna Maung Lwin the SPDC’s permanent representative, during the 7th session of the UN Human Rights Council in March 2008. No one believes them. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar/Burma Professor Paulo Sergio Pinherio report in 2006 said “the failure to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for rape and sexual violence has contributed to an environment conducive to the perpetuation of violence against women and girls in Myanmar”. This system of impunity among soldiers that currently exists will be further entrenched under the 2008 military-drafted constitution. The constitution offers impunity to all members of the armed forces for actions they may have taken whilst performing their duties. This blanket amnesty for members of the armed forces in Burma who have violated human rights is just the last step in a long line of actions taken by the military regime to cover their crimes against women. Victims who make complaints against perpetrators are often harassed further by Burmese soldiers and have been detained, fined, tortured and even killed. The role of oil and gas companies in human rights violations When she was raped Naw Shee Shee Paw lived in a village close to a gas pipeline that built by Total and Chevron, in partnership with a state-owned company Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. Large infrastructure projects like gas pipelines have meant higher militarisation in surrounding areas, placing civilian populations at increased risk of human rights violations. Australia’s Twinza Oil is currently doing exploration for oil and gas in Burma. Should Twinza Oil’s project move forward, it is extremely likely a pipeline will be built which will cause more Burmese soldiers to be deployed along the pipeline, resulting increased human rights violations against villagers. Like Chevron and Total, Twinza Oil would go into partnership with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. It is estimate that the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise’ stake in the project will earn the military regime US$2.5 billion. At present there is nothing to stop Australian companies like Twinza Oil investing in Burma, despite the negative impacts and direct links to human rights violations these projects have. However, targeted sanctions could stop companies like Twinza Oil, profiting from the oppression of others. Foreign investment and income from projects like Twinza Oil’s have enabled the military dictatorship to greatly expand the country’s armed forces, while neglecting basic public services like health and education. The dictatorship spends between 40 and 60 per cent of the country’s budget on the military, the 12th largest in the world. In comparison less than US$1 per person per year is spent on health care. As a result of this economic mismanagement, Burma is facing a significant, continuing humanitarian crisis. This crisis is particularly severe in Burma’s border areas, where the Burmese army is carrying out military offensives targeting innocent civilians. These populations are extremely vulnerable and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. In eastern Burma one in five children dies before their fifth birthday, one in 12 women die during childbirth or from pregnancy and 12 per cent of the population is infected with malaria at anytime. Income from Burma’s extensive natural resources and foreign reserves, estimated to be at US$5 billion by economists from Macquarie University Australia, could be used to help address the humanitarian crisis. However the regime lacks the political to do so. Moreover, the military regime actively prevents aid workers inside the country from reaching vulnerable populations, like those in eastern Burma, in turn exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Grassroots activism However members of these communities, who have lived through this crisis, are doing something about it. Travelling by foot, refugees from Burma in neighbouring countries are becoming aid workers; crossing back into Burma to provide urgently needed assistance, like health care and food. These cross-border aid workers help thousands, including survivors of rape and sexual violence. Their efforts save hundreds, if not thousands of lives each year. Sadly, Australia’s aid program does not support these activities. Cross border aid organisations struggle to secure funding for their work, and when there is a budget shortfall desperately needed services are cut. For already vulnerable people this can be a question of life and death. Burma’s democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi asked, “Please use your liberty to promote ours”. Successive Australian Governments have lacked the political will to take strategic, practical actions that will help the people of Burma. It’s up to us to answer Aung San Suu Kyi’s call and become a part of this movement to change through grassroots activism and supporting the Burma Campaign Australia. * Zetty Brake is the campaign co-ordinator for Burma Campaign Australia. |
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