Burma Update

scmp - Saturday, November 27, 2004

ASSOCIATED PRESS, REUTERS and AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE in Vientiane and Yangon
Military-ruled Myanmar remains committed to its "road map" to democracy despite drastic changes in the country's leadership, its foreign minister said yesterday, but sidestepped questions on when pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi would be freed.

The comments by Foreign Minister Nyan Win at an Asean conference in Laos were aimed at heading off any censure from neighbouring countries when leaders arrive for next week's summit. "Because we are committed to democracy, there is no turning back," he said.

It was the first international news conference by a minister of the junta since the ousting of relatively moderate Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt last month and hardliners' consolidation of power.

Nyan Win said questions had been raised about the future of the seven-point road map to democracy proposed by Khin Nyunt last August.

"The answer is clear. There will be no change. Recent changes will have no bearing on either the country's domestic or foreign policy. Our objectives and priorities will remain the same," he said.

"Our policies are not dependent on personalities. Individuals will come and go, but national policies will remain the same," Nyan Win said.

Khin Nyunt was considered more amenable to making concessions and was often seen as the soft face of the government while dealing with neighbouring countries frustrated with the junta's stubbornness in clinging to power. He is now believed to be under house arrest.

Nyan Win's comments were greeted with guarded optimism by Razali Ismail, the UN special envoy to Myanmar, who said he would leave it to Asean "to determine how clear are the signals coming from Myanmar".

"There are declared commitments made by the government of Myanmar to the Asean governments. I am sure they are anxious to know what steps Myanmar will now take," he said.

Mr Razali said he would fly to Vientiane today to meet Nyan Win.

The first step in Myanmar's seven-point road map was the convening of a National Convention in May to draw guidelines for a new constitution. Ms Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy boycotted the convention's first round in protest against her house arrest.

Nyan Win said the convention would resume in February. Once a constitution was adopted, multiparty elections could be held. He did not say when.

His comments came a day after Myanmar's military regime announced it was expanding its prisoner release programme to more than 9,000 people.

The junta said through state media it would free a further 5,311 prisoners in addition to the 3,937 announced last week, although only several hundred had been released by Yesterday, including three truckloads seen leaving Yangon's Insein prison.

It said the prisoners had been wrongly imprisoned by an intelligence bureau that was disbanded after the sacking and arrest of Khin Nyunt last month.

Irrawaddy - October 2004
By Yuki Akimoto

Demystifying Japan's resumption of aid to Burma.

Japanese people occasionally say "yes" when they really mean "no." This may often be simple politeness. But sometimes it is done more deliberately, to save face and buy time to pursue one's real agenda without attracting undue attention.

When it comes to discussing bilateral aid to Burma, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or MoFA, has proven adept at deflecting attention from its long-term policy toward Burma with short-term initiatives designed to appease international critics. A case in point is MoFA's calculated ambiguity about Japanese Official Development Assistance, or ODA, since the May 2003 Depayin Massacre, in which dozens, perhaps hundreds, of members of the main opposition National League for Democracy, or NLD, were bludgeoned to death by a government-orchestrated mob.

Following Depayin, Japan claimed to have suspended ODA to Burma, in response to the bloodbath and subsequent detention of NLD general-secretary Aung San Suu Kyi (who was lucky to escape Depayin alive). Given that Japan has long pursued an engagement policy with Burma, and has been the largest provider of economic aid to the country, a suspension of ODA would presumably have carried a certain weight with Rangoon. Some news articles even speculated that Japan had finally shifted to a tougher policy on Burma similar to that of the United States and the UK.

Not so fast! A year and a half later, with Aung San Suu Kyi still under house arrest, regime hardliners firmly in control and the overall dismal political situation in Rangoon unchanged, Tokyo has resumed ODA to Burma. Most notably, in June this year Japan gave the regime human resource development scholarships to the value of about US $4.86 million (532 million yen) and in July a grant of about $3.15 million for an afforestation project in Burma's central dry zone. In addition, Tokyo has provided nearly 30 smaller ODA grants to non-governmental organizations for various operations in Burma [see table, p. 18].

This resumption of ODA has gone largely unnoticed. The question begs asking: if Japan froze ODA in response to the events at Depayin and the situation in Burma has not improved since, why would Japan revert to its prior, pro-engagement approach? Framed in this way, Tokyo's ODA resumption makes little sense. From a different perspective, however, Japan's policy is perhaps comprehensible.

That is, even after the Depayin Massacre, Tokyo never wanted to freeze ODA, and the suspension it did impose was motivated primarily by a desire to save face when confronted by international pressure in response to the event and Aung San Suu Kyi's subsequent detention. When the immediate crisis in Burma passed and the pressure eased, Japan quietly resumed business as usual.

Reluctant Freeze

Left to itself, it is unlikely that Japan would have taken any concrete action following Depayin at all. Indeed, Tokyo refused even to criticize the regime about the massacre. One of the first public comments by the Japanese government about the events of May 30 came from Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time Yoriko Kawaguchi. At a press conference on June 3, 2003, she attempted to play down the significance of the events, stating: "I do not think that the situation is getting worse. Although there was this incident, when we look at the release of political prisoners, there has been much progress, and progress is being made toward democratization." The foreign minister made her statement in Japanese and MoFA never published an English translation. This did not, however, prevent it from reaching the ears of government officials and the media elsewhere.

"Shame on the Japanese," said US Senator John McCain. "I find it hard to believe that any democratic government would stand by the junta as it takes Burma on a forced march back in time." "Reactions," asserted a Washington Post editorial following Depayin, "have ranged from the inappropriately cautious to the unspeakably fatuous. We're thinking in the latter case of Japan, whose foreign minister responded to the attack on and arrest of Burma's rightful leader with an expression of satisfaction in the pace of democratization."

Shortly afterwards, a flurry of articles in the Japanese and English-speaking press indicated that Japan would suspend economic assistance to Burma. There was, however, no official announcement from MoFA regarding the reported suspension, much less any statement concerning the suspension's terms.

In the absence of any public statement from MoFA, some press reports speculated that Japan "planned" to freeze aid to Burma, while others claimed that such a freeze had already been put in place. There was also confusion in the press about the duration of the supposed freeze. Most articles indicated that Japan would maintain the freeze until Aung San Suu Kyi was released. But Japanese daily newspaper Asahi Shimbun quoted an anonymous MoFA official, who stated vaguely: "We will . . . decide whether to resume [aid to Burma] depending on the situation."

Furthermore, the New York Times, Reuters and other media inadvertently did MoFA a public relations favor in 1989 when they reported that Japan froze "all" economic assistance to Burma. In fact, Japan had suspended only new yen loans in 1989, not other forms of assistance, nor the draw-down of lending already approved before 1989. (Even then, despite the freeze on new lending, in 1989 Tokyo approved a loan of about 25 billion yen to repair and expand Rangoon International Airport, arguing implausibly that the loan was not "new" as it had been promised to Burma before 1988.)

For most of the past decade, Japan's ODA to Burma has consisted mainly of non-lending aid such as grants and technical assistance. The suspension reported in June 2003 affected only new ODA in the form of these grants and technical assistance.

Sterilized Freeze-No Shift in Policy

Given that the suspension on new ODA was likely motivated by international criticism of Japan's response to Depayin, it is perhaps unsurprising that the freeze was less than enthusiastically endorsed. On June 24, 2003, for instance, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said that Japan's policy on Burma was necessarily "different from the policy taken by the US and EU." the implication being that Japan would not alter its policy to bring it closer in line with the tougher, sanctions-oriented approach of America and Europe.

On June 26, 2003, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Tetsuro Yano, who had just returned from a one-day trip to Rangoon, showed considerable discomfort about the suspension of new ODA. "Some may say that we should stop ODA unless the situation is resolved as soon as possible," he stated. "But I strongly conveyed our [the Japanese government's] request that Myanmar resolve the situation, in part so that Japan and Myanmar will be able to continue the friendly bilateral relations they have had so far . . . . I think that, under these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to extend further ODA, but on the other hand, I am increasingly determined that we should resolve the situation as soon as possible and resume our normal bilateral relations."

Moreover, despite formal statements from MoFA calling for the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the message conveyed to Rangoon by Japanese officials lacked any sense of urgency. For example, after Yano had delivered a letter (which presumably concerned the situation following Depayin) from Prime Minister Koizumi to the then Secretary-1 Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, Yano told Khin Nyunt that he expected him to discuss the letter with Prime Minister Sr-Gen Than Shwe. Yano also told Khin Nyunt that it was "all right if you put off answering for one day, two days; we will wait until the answer is given."

Similarly, foreign minister Kawaguchi, when asked whether she had any timeline or deadline in mind for Suu Kyi's release, said: "I think we should give the government of Myanmar enough time to [let our requests] sink in and lead to a decision."

ODA Resumption

Tokyo's ODA freeze, such as it existed, was lifted after only several months. In October 2003, MoFA began extending ODA to Burma in the form of "Grassroots Grant Assistance." Since then, approximately 30 such grants have been provided, primarily to NGOs. In addition, in January 2004 MoFA gave 159 million yen in grant aid for human resources development directly to the regime.

As noted above, in June 2004, another grant aid of 532 million yen was given for human resource development and 344 million yen for an afforestation project. All told, since October 2003, Japan has provided more than two billion yen ($18.6 million) in new ODA to Burma.

MoFA has never officially acknowledged the resumption of assistance. Some MoFA officials have even denied that it took place. In May 2004, six US congressmen wrote to foreign minister Kawaguchi asking for clarification of Japan's policy towards Burma in light of the military regime's continued intransigence. Thus far, MoFA has not answered the letter.

Irrawaddy - November 15, 2004
By Aung Zaw

After learning of Khin Nyunt's removal from the prime minister's post most Burmese were happy. However, leaders in the region were confused and worried by the news.

Khin Nyunt, regional leaders thought, was a man who was going to change Burma. The former spy chief was reform-minded and moderate, leaders in the region assumed.

There was no doubt that Khin Nyunt was the regime's PR man. Until recently, the ex-prime minister had served as front man of the military junta. He traveled around the region declaring that reform in the country was taking place and the road map plan was intact.

Though the Burmese knew Khin Nyunt was lying, leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, were ready to listen to his excuses. Using these excuses, Asean leaders could counter critics and western governments and appeal for the Burmese leadership to be given time and understanding.

Asean leaders may have been happy to put up with the Rangoon's lies and its style of diplomacy, but the sufferings of the Burmese people continued. Now, however, Asean leaders have been jolted awake by the junta’s intransigence and the recent major shake-up in the Rangoon cabinet.

With the departure of Khin Nyunt, Asean leaders were forced to face the reality of Burma. Who will now be the moderate or reform-minded general in Rangoon?

Asean has to open a line of communication with a new leadership the organization scarcely knows. It will be hard, but it is an inescapable reality.

Last week, Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda visited Rangoon and met with the new Prime Minister, Lt Gen Soe Win, who had been handpicked by Senior Gen Than Shwe. Wirajuda was the first high-ranking government member from an Asean nation to visit Burma following the removal of Khin Nyunt.

Analysts say the low-key visit, which had not been announced in advance, was initiated not by Asean but unilaterally by Jakarta. Foreign ministry spokesman Marty Natalegawa said the visit was intended “to communicate our view, and one may even say our concern," about developments in Burma.

Analysts attach importance to the visit because it indicates signs of growing concern in Asean over the situation in Burma.

Jakarta, like many Asean members, was shocked to see the sudden removal of Khin Nyunt. Although Asean officials made it clear that the removal was an internal Burmese affair, many in the region are now worried that Burma’s new army leadership, perceived as hawkish and hard-line, may lead the country into deeper isolation and devastation.

The ball is again in Asean's court. Now is the optimum time for Asean to open a direct communication with Burma’s paramount leader Senior Gen Than Shwe. Though Wirajuda did not meet Than Shwe in Rangoon, it could be safely said that what he learned from Soe Win was Than Shwe’s policy. At the moment, there is no man standing between Asean and Than Shwe.

Thus, now may be an opportune time for Asean leaders to press Rangoon for meaningful reform.

Encouraging current Burmese leaders to take reform seriously is not a bad idea, but Asean leaders must be firm. If Rangoon won't change, Asean should consider suspending Burma's membership of the organization or even expelling Burma.

It must be born in mind that Rangoon leaders cannot afford to be isolated and they need Asean and the help and support of their neighbors.

Asean can also tell Burmese leaders frankly that the planned Asean ministerial meeting in 2006 in Burma is in jeopardy if Rangoon fails to adopt reforms.

First of all, as a test of the junta’s promise of democratization and national reconciliation, Asean leaders can ask Rangoon leaders to free political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.

If there is political will, it will be much easier for the international community and Asean to adopt an effective policy on Burma since Khin Nyunt has disappeared from the scene.

It was a big mistake to let Burma unconditionally into Asean. Seven years after becoming a member, Burma is still a state in regression.

Now is indeed the time to speak to Than Shwe.

The Guardian - Thursday November 11, 2004
John Aglionby


Six months after Burma launched a 'roadmap to democracy' the prospects for political reform seem as illusory as ever, writes John Aglionby

When Burma's military junta convened a special national convention in May to begin the implementation of a seven-point roadmap to democracy, via free elections, analysts quickly dismissed the closely choreographed and heavily repressed event as a meaningless charade.

After all, neither detained Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, nor her National League for Democracy (NLD), nor western media or diplomats were allowed to attend.

Six months on and many of those same observers are looking back at the convention days with almost wistful nostalgia.

Now that the dust has settled, the firing and disgracing of prime minister Khin Nyunt last month was clearly a victim of a high-level power play.

It was a case of the hardliners in the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), as the government calls itself, tightening their grip both on political power and the nation's business interests.

At the time, the government said the premier, who had only held the post for a couple of years, was retiring for health reasons.

No one believed this and last week it was announced that the former head of military intelligence and third most powerful man in the regime had been involved in corruption and acts that were undermining the military and posing a threat to the nation, according to the new number three, General Thura Shwe Mann.

It is hard to tell if the allegations are true, although the chances are extremely high that they are because not only was Khin Nyunt purged but so were scores of people close to him, including two ministers and four deputy ministers.

Moreover, 14 publications were closed down, many with links to Khin Nyunt or his family, and three others shut temporarily.

In addition to Gen Thura Shwe Mann, three other people are behind the shake-up. Senior General Than Shwe allegedly wanted to curb Khin Nyunt's power early last month by removing his military intelligence portfolio.

It was when the latter objected and started plotting revenge, according to Gen Thura Shwe Mann, that the regime's strongman felt compelled to act.

He would have been fully supported by his effective deputy and the head of the army, General Maung Aye, a fellow hardliner who had actively sought to undermine Khin Nyunt and his supposedly democratic overtures for years.

Th final member of the cabal is Khin Nyunt's replacement, Lieutenant General Soe Win. He is believed to have played a key role in the attack on Ms Suu Kyi's convoy near the city of Mandalay in May 2003, since when she has been in detention or house arrest.

His goons are thought to have killed dozens and possibly more than 100 people that day.

According to the Irrawaddy news service, Gen Soe Win once said to a youth group that "the SPDC not only will not talk to the NLD but would never hand over power to the NLD".

The NLD won a landslide victory in Burma's last election, in 1990, but has never been allowed to take office by the military, which has ruled the state since independence from Britain in 1962.

It's hard to know what will happen next. No one would be surprised if Khin Nyunt and his cohorts are put on trial and given lengthy jail terms. Meanwhile, their business empires are already being carved up.

On the larger economic canvas, the junta is clearly trying to juggle its few remaining friends, most notably neighbours India and China.

Since Khin Nyunt's departure, Gen Than Shwe has made the first ever state visit by a Burmese leader to India, while Gen Soe Win hurriedly went off to Beijing to appease the Chinese.

Politically things are very dubious. While in India Gen Than Shwe insisted Khin Nyunt's democratic road map was still on track but few outsiders are convinced.

Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the United Nations' special representative for human rights in Burma, has little time for the road map.

"I try to acknowledge everything positive that happens but I haven't seen too many positive things happen," he said last week. "In the beginning I said I had cautious optimism, but I'm no more in this mood.

"We always count on unexpected things, but not miracles. Unexpected things can happen, but miracles? It's hard."

Irrawaddy - November 11, 2004
By Aung Lwin Oo

Rangoon has done little to improve the human rights record in Burma says the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s annual human rights report for 2004, released on Wednesday.


The 310-page report assesses the human rights situation in 21 countries, including Burma and the US, which is condemned for its human rights abuses in Iraq.

The report blames Burma’s military regime for suppressing political opposition groups. It also highlights the attack on the entourage of Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, which was ambushed by government-backed thugs while traveling in upper Burma in May last year. The report claims that about 1,400 political prisoners are denied basic rights and healthcare.

“The gravest failures to respect human rights can provide fertile ground for terror and conflict, bringing mass killings, refugees, and the destruction of precarious livelihoods in their wake,” said Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, at a luncheon on Wednesday.

The report stresses that the government’s seven-point roadmap lacks democratic principles and that Rangoon has rebuffed international efforts to improve human rights conditions in the country.

The report cited other rights violations in Burma as well, including forced labor, the forced recruitment of child soldiers, religious persecution and abuses in ethnic minority areas.

“The UK will continue to do everything in its power to encourage national reconciliation and help restore democracy and the respect for human rights to Burma,” the report claims.

scmp - Thursday, November 11, 2004

BARADAN KUPPUSAMY in Kuala Lumpur
Behind a new high-rise in the upscale Kuala Lumpur suburb of Ampang is a narrow track that leads to the forgotten world of the Rohingyas - Muslims from Myanmar.

They fled to the Malaysian capital to escape a military pogrom but ended up shunned as social lepers and living a life of drudgery.

But now Rohingyas are smiling once again.

The government of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi unexpectedly announced this week that all Rohingyas will be granted refugee status in accordance with UN rules.

The administration's motives may be other than humanitarian, but the delighted Rohingyas are not questioning it.

Rohingyas will be accorded all the legal, social and economic benefits that come with refugee status - no bed of roses but much better than being non-persons.

"We had no official papers, no identity, disowned by Myanmar and barely tolerated by the authorities here," said Jaafar Hussein, 35, who runs a Rohingya help centre. "We were treated like pariahs, but not any more."

There is a festive air in the ramshackle settlement of about 200 shacks made of rusted zinc and discarded plywood, typical of several such communities in the city.

While the women cook in makeshift kitchens, the men speculate excitedly about the future. Some eke a living as rubbish collectors, cleaners and labourers - menial jobs that even other migrants reject. Others beg.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which had lobbied hard for refugee status for the Rohingyas, said the decision attested to the prime minister's humanity.

But human rights activists cautioned that mere recognition was insufficient and that Rohingyas needed help to move out of squatter settlements, find jobs, send their children to school and get medical attention.

scmp - Monday, November 8, 2004
LARRY JAGAN in Bangkok

Hardline leader Senior General Than Shwe has continued to tighten his grip on power, sacking more supporters of former prime minister and military chief Khin Nyunt and signalling a significant shift in the country's policy towards the outside world.

Interior minister Colonel Tin Hlaing and labour minister U Tin Winn were "permitted to retire" on Friday, according to weekend reports in the state-run media.

Both ministers were the last of Khin Nyunt's supporters in the cabinet. They were also the only remaining senior ministers who had close contacts with diplomats and international organisations.

Four other ministers, the deputy ministers for agriculture Brigadier-General Khin Maung, industry Brigadier-General Kyaw Win, livestock breeding and fisheries Brigadier-General Aung Thein and science and technology Nyi Hla Nge were also sacked.

They were also believed to have been close to Khin Nyunt, who was sacked on October 19 and remains under house arrest.

Yesterday, state media accused Khin Nyunt of corruption, and said he was ousted to prevent the disintegration of the country's military. Initially, the junta said he had been "permitted to retire for health reasons".

But General Thura Shwe Mahn, the ruling council's third-ranked member, said Khin Nyunt was involved in a major corruption scandal and had also threatened the unity of the armed forces by launching an investigation of regional commanders.

Thura Shwe Mahn said Khin Nyunt's actions "could have led to the disintegration of the Tatmadaw [military] and posed extreme danger for the country".

Since then, hundreds of military intelligence officers have been detained, many of them also charged with corruption. A few have been allowed to retire and others have fled - and are in hiding along the border and in China and Thailand.

Many of the businesses that had been effectively run by military intelligence have also been seized, including the country's sole private internet company Bagan Cybertech, according to Myanmese business sources in the capital.

Sources said Myanmar's new leaders had become concerned that Khin Nyunt was steering the country on a course where it was becoming dependant on China.

"China has constantly tried to endorse Khin Nyunt and strengthen his position within the regime by providing financial and technical assistance," a Japanese government official said.

The much younger Lieutenant-General Soe Win has taken over as prime minister. Diplomats in Yangon believe he is a staunch Than Shwe ally. Exiled opposition activists allege he was the chief architect behind the violent attack on opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage in May last year.

The latest purges also signal a major shift in foreign policy. U Tin Winn and Tin Hlaing often led Myanmar's negotiations with international organisations such as the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation and their removal has ended, at least temporarily, Yangon's engagement with those bodies.

Additional reporting by Associated Press

Dirty list: Companies supporting the regime in Burma

Clean list: Companies that have either pulled out of Burma, or made a principled decision not to become involved in Burma.

AsiaTimes 4 Nov.04
By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE - India's decade-long efforts to engage Myanmar's ruling generals touched a new high last week when Delhi rolled out the red carpet to welcome Senior General Than Shwe on his six-day visit to the country. With Myanmar agreeing to help India fight insurgents in the northeast, it does seem that Delhi's quiet courting of the generals is slowly paying off.

General Than Shwe's visit is historic. He is the first head of state from Myanmar to visit India in 25 years. It has also been a hugely successful visit for both countries. The two sides signed agreements on security, cultural exchanges and hydroelectric power. While India has persuaded Myanmar to cooperate in tackling insurgents operating in the northeast of the country, Myanmar's military junta has won a stamp of approval from the world's largest democracy.

India's northeast has the dubious distinction of being home to Asia's longest-running insurgency. There has been a sharp surge in extremist violence in the northeastern states in recent months, particularly in Assam, while anti-India sentiment in Manipur is at an all-time high. In the wake of the surge in extremist violence in the northeast, support from Bangladesh and Myanmar - countries that share borders with the Indian northeast - has assumed importance. With Bangladesh denying the existence of anti-India militant camps on its territory and unlikely to cooperate with India at this juncture, courting Myanmar's generals has become all the more important. India needs the military junta's cooperation to ensure that the large number of insurgent outfits operating in the northeast are denied sanctuary in Myanmar's jungles.

During Than Shwe's visit, the two countries agreed to tackle terrorism jointly. Under the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Foreign Minister Natwar Singh and Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win, both sides have committed to enhancing cooperation against terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking, organized crime, international economic crimes and cyber crimes. The mechanism for cooperation includes the exchange of information and personnel, cooperation between law enforcement agencies and joint reviews. An expert consultative group, comprising senior officers, will meet annually to monitor and review the progress of the MoU. Myanmar assured India that it would not allow its territory to be used by insurgent groups pursuing objectives "inimical to Indian interests".

India has offered Myanmar a number of incentives for cooperation with Delhi. These include an MoU on the Tamanthi hydroelectric project in Myanmar, agreements on cultural exchanges and the upgrading of rail networks. Delhi has also offered to build more highways in addition to the one it has built between Tamu in Manipur and Mandalay. Above all, India's warm embrace of the visiting general would have provided the military junta with incentive in itself.

Other senior generals, including Maung Aye, have visited the country, but this was a handshake at the highest level between the world's largest democracy and a country that suffers considerable international isolation. Fighting the raging insurgency in its northeastern states, neutralizing China's substantial influence in Myanmar and growing economic interests in its eastern neighbor prompted India to revise its policy toward Myanmar a decade ago. Until then India's policy toward Myanmar was based on support to the struggle for restoration of democracy there. India was among the most vociferous of countries that called on Myanmar's military government to respect the mandate of the 1990 election in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a sweeping majority. India was therefore reluctant to engage the generals initially.

India's decision to tone down its opposition to Myanmar's generals and to do business with them led to a quiet engagement.

Cooperation with Myanmar's generals in fighting militancy is not new. In 1995, for instance, the Indian and Myanmarese security forces trapped scores of insurgents in a pincer movement along the Mizoram border. In February 2000, the Myanmar army cracked down on camps of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) and the United Liberation Front of Assam on its territory.

For those who expected Than Shwe's visit to result in joint counter-insurgency operations, the agreement would have come as a disappointment. But such expectations are unrealistic given that India's ties with the generals are still evolving. There are some who hope that Myanmar will carry out a Bhutan-like military offensive against the Indian insurgent camps on Myanmar soil. Late last year, the Royal Bhutan Army cracked down on Bhutan-based camps and hideouts of anti-India insurgents. However, India's relations with Myanmar are hardly on par with the close ties it has with Bhutan. India does not have with Myanmar the immense leverage it has with Bhutan. And even in the case of Bhutan, action against the Indian insurgent camps came only when they were seen by the Bhutanese government to be a threat to Bhutan's internal security.

A retired Indian army officer points out that Myanmar's military junta is in principle not averse to a crackdown against Indian insurgents operating from its territory. However, this might not be practically possible for Myanmar at this juncture, when its troops are concentrated on the border with Thailand. It simply does not have the requisite numbers to launch counter-insurgency operations against the Indian rebels, he points out.

In the past, India supported the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar and the pro-democracy activists based on Indian soil to push Myanmar to respond to its security interests. Delhi's attempts to pressure the generals backfired. For instance, when India awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding to NLD leader and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi in 1993, the generals struck back. They freed scores of Indian rebels in their custody, thus negating the gains of "Operation Golden Bird". When India alleged in December 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists with alleged links with al-Qaeda were in Myanmar, Yangon reacted by freeing about 200 militants it had detained the previous month.

Pressuring Myanmar's generals or rushing them to act against the rebel camps could therefore be counterproductive. Much of the groundwork for enhanced future cooperation has been laid over the years and strengthened by Than Shwe's visit. And India would need to move slowly, nudging the generals to step up cooperation in tackling India's insurgency problem by offering them incentives. That informed opinion in India has come around to accepting the need to engage the generals is evident from the fact that there were fewer protest demonstrations against Than Shwe's visit than those seen in the past when other members of the ruling junta visited India.

In the past, newspaper press editorials would have reminded the government that Myanmar's military junta has incarcerated that country's elected leader. Last week, the critical voices were muted. India might respect Suu Kyi and want democracy restored in Myanmar but for now it is willing to do business with the generals. Right now it believes it needs the generals more.