Burma Update

News and updates on Burma

30 October 2004

 

Refugee status and IDs for Rohingyas

Claudia Theophilus
Oct 29, 04 9:53am

Details on the proposal for an identity card to be issued to Burmese Muslims or Rohingyas in Malaysia formally recognising them as refugees will be known next week, Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Mohd Nazri Abdul Aziz said today.

“Last week, I wrote to the Internal Security Ministry for more details on the issuance of the ID such as how it’s going to be implemented. I’m expecting a reply sometime next week,” he told malaysiakini when contacted.

“We will leave them (Rohingyas) be here while we sort out the procedures involved in issuing the IDs.”

He has also reminded ministry officials of the issue on the sidelines of the weekly cabinet meeting in Putrajaya yesterday.

“In fact, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office in Kuala Lumpur has also requested for the details,” he added.

He said only the Rohingyas would be covered by the new policy.

No documents

The government has decided to formally recognise only the Burmese Muslims as refugees so that they can secure jobs and ensure their children’s education.

How the government plans to deal with the estimated 10,000 undocumented Burmese Muslims in the country remains unclear.

Mohd Nazri explained earlier that the Rohingyans enter the country using valid documents and then later destroy them, automatically rendering them illegal or “stateless”.

“Another problem is that their own governments are refusing to recognise them as citizens because they don’t have related documents. This also hampers Malaysia’s repatriation efforts,” he said.

On Sept 27, the minister was quoted in the Parliament Hansard as saying that the government decided to accord formal recognition to the Rohingyas to prevent enforcement agencies from detaining them for deportation.

“The government can also use the ID to monitor their movements within the country but there is no citizenship status attached to the ID.

“If and when democracy is restored in Myanmar or Burma, these people will be repatriated,” he was quoted as saying in the House report.

MP’s poser

The minister was responding to questions raised by his Sabah counterparts on the presence of Rohingyas or Burmese Muslims in the East Malaysian state.

DAP MP Teresa Kok had then asked Mohd Nazri in Parliament to furnish the details of the ID application process.

“Since the government has agreed to grant them refugee status by issuing IDs, how are they supposed to apply for this and where? Who is the issuing authority?” she pressed on.

According to the Hansard, Kok also related how representatives from the Rohingya community in Malaysia had been arrested two days after meeting the Myanmar Parliamentary Caucus in mid-September.

Mohd Nazri had responded by referring her to the Immigration Department for any explanation over the detention.

29 October 2004

 

Activist jailed two years for one-man demonstration

scmp - Thursday, October 28, 2004

ASSOCIATED PRESS in Yangon
A political activist who staged a one-man protest outside UN offices in Myanmar's capital has been sentenced to two years in jail, relatives said yesterday.

Ohn Than, 58, a member of the opposition National League for Democracy, was handed the jail term by a special court that sat in the grounds of the notorious Insein Prison on the outskirts of Yangon.

He was convicted on Monday of charges of circulating statements with the intent to cause public alarm or induce others to commit public mischief.

Another opposition party official, Ko Thet Wei, who was arrested for alleged links to Ohn Than, was handed a two-year prison sentence by the same court, his wife said.

During the September 21 protest, Ohn Than waved a placard in front of the UN Development Programme office demanding that the military government convene a free parliament.

He also criticised the UN for not investigating an attack by government supporters on the motorcade of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers in northern Myanmar in May last year.

Ohn Than has been jailed twice before.

The military junta, which took power after crushing pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988, tolerates no dissent.

28 October 2004

 

Myanmar's Costless Shift to a Hard-Line

Drafted by Dr. Michael A. Weinstein on October 27, 2004

On October 20, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt of Myanmar was removed from his position and replaced by Soe Win after an apparent power struggle within the State Peace and Development Council, the military junta that has ruled the Southeast Asian country since 1988. Under military rule, Myanmar has had one of the most reclusive regimes in the world, limiting external contacts and refusing to participate fully in the globalization project, which involves free trade and investment, privatization, and democratic institutions. Nyunt, who assumed the post of prime minister in August, 2003, was seen by the international community as a figure who might move Myanmar -- if only tentatively -- toward greater participation in the globalization framework. Win, in contrast, is a hardliner who reportedly opposes any steps toward democratization and has little, if any, concern with satisfying foreign powers.

Given that Myanmar has been under diplomatic pressure to open up and undertake democratic reform from the United States and neighboring states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (A.S.E.A.N.), and has had economic sanctions imposed on it by the United States, the shift in leadership indicates that the military regime has decided that it does not have to submit to that pressure. Unlike other relatively isolated states, such as North Korea and Iran, Myanmar is not suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction, which places it outside the categories of "states of concern" or "rogue states."

The military regime, which has been fighting chronic wars with at least twenty insurgent ethnic groups and has been accused by human rights organizations of using prisoners as slave labor, has been able to persist without facing external military threats. Indeed, it has brisk trade relations with Thailand and China and has opened up its substantial oil resources (estimated at 3.2 billion barrels) to exploitation by British, Canadian, Australian, Malaysian, Indonesian and Chinese companies. Myanmar's experience exemplifies how a closed authoritarian regime that plays ball just enough can hold out against globalization.

Pragmatists and Hardliners

Nyunt's ouster was engineered by Senior General Than Shwe who has been Myanmar's strongman and chairman of the State Peace and Development Council since 1992. Shwe's rise to power followed parliamentary elections in 1990 that were canceled by the military after the reformist National League for Democracy (N.L.D.) won 396 seats, an assortment of minor parties took 79 seats and the pro-military National Unity Party won only ten.

Led by General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi, the N.L.D. has gained broad international diplomatic support, but has been repressed by the military within Myanmar. Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, has been under house arrest for nine of the past fifteen years. The tortuous relationship between the junta and the N.L.D. has been marked by brief periods of relaxed repression followed by clampdowns, the most recent of which followed an attack in May, 2003 mounted by supporters of the junta on an N.L.D. convoy that was touring northern Myanmar during the last period of relaxation. After the attack, reportedly organized by the new Prime Minister Win, Suu Kyi was again placed under house arrest.

International opposition to Suu Kyi's detention was reportedly responsible for the reformist gestures by Nyunt, which included in a seven-stage "road map" the convening of an assembly to restart work on a constitution for the country (the former constitution has been suspended by the junta), but did not make concessions to the N.L.D. The future of the assembly, which began work this year, is now in doubt.

The hopes of the pro-globalization sectors of the international community that Nyunt would inch Myanmar toward democratization were not only based on his road map, which was widely interpreted as in great part a symbolic move, but also on his success in negotiating cease-fire agreements with seventeen of Myanmar's approximately twenty dissident ethnic minorities, which are concentrated in the country's north. Those agreements, which are bound up with the success of the constitutional process, are also now in doubt. At present, Yangon seems to be poised to revert to its familiar pattern of military suppression of non-Burmese ethnic groups and intolerance of ethnic Burmese opposition, while attempting simultaneously to expand trade relations with its neighbors and procure aid from them for infrastructure development.

Although it is difficult to pin down the political maneuvering within Myanmar's secretive regime, analysts agree that Nyunt's downfall was the result of a power struggle between hard-line and pragmatist factions within the country's military establishment. Much narrower than the similar conflict between theocrats and reformers in Iran, the differences between Myanmar's factions hinge on tactics rather than strategy.

The pragmatists, centered in Yangon's intelligence apparatus and represented by Nyunt, believe that Myanmar's vital interests in economic development can only be met by prudent relaxation of repression and accords with ethnic minorities that in their judgment need not threaten the regime. The hardliners, concentrated in the regular army, believe that any loosening of repression will endanger the regime's hold on power and that economic development will not be threatened by the continuation of strong authoritarian measures.

Each faction represents an interpretation of the strategy of Myanmar's northern neighbor China, which pursues a policy of maintaining authoritarian rule as it pursues international economic relations, and rejects the market democracy formula of mainstream globalization. Both factions are eager for economic development -- if only to enrich the regime and blunt domestic opposition -- and both are committed to the regime's perpetuation.

The basic division between pragmatists and hardliners is complicated by their rivalry over control of border trade with Thailand and China, which provides opportunities for corruption. According to Transparency International's "Global Corruption Perceptions Index," released on October 20, Myanmar is the fourth most corrupt country on the list of 145 states, after Haiti, Bangladesh and Nigeria. Under Nyunt, the intelligence apparatus gained greater power over border security and it is not surprising that the former Prime Minister has reportedly been placed under house arrest on corruption charges.

Although an internal struggle for dominance in the junta and the spoils that go with it probably played a major role in Nyunt's replacement by Win, it is also reasonable to speculate that the hardliners were emboldened to make their move because they judged that in the current international environment they could proceed without threatening Yangon's vital interests. The partial vacuum created by the diminution of American power in the wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom has left all world and regional powers to fend for themselves, which means that pressure is reduced on regimes that do not cooperate fully with the globalization project. Yangon's hardliners have been able to take advantage of the more open global situation to try to preserve Myanmar's status as a relative hold out.

International Response to Yangon's Shift

Endowed with oil and gas reserves, yet impoverished and underdeveloped in great part because of regime-imposed isolation and a crony economy, Myanmar is embedded in an international force field in which the United Nations, the country's Southeast Asian neighbors (particularly Thailand), Japan and, most importantly, China are the major players. Each of these actors has interests or limitations that have prevented it from exerting sufficient pressure on Yangon to wring concessions from the junta or to threaten its existence. The responses to the political shake-up in Yangon by the organizations and states that are interested in Myanmar show the pattern that the junta counts on to make its hard-line policies successful.

Predictably, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, representing the pro-globalization tendency, called for Yangon "to remain committed to the process of national reconciliation and democratization," and to release Suu Kyi from house arrest. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher echoed Annan, adding that the replacement of Nyunt by Win appeared to be a step in the wrong direction. The United Nations special envoy to Myanmar Razali Ismail, a Malaysian diplomat who was appointed in 2000 to mediate reconciliation between the regime and the N.L.D., also expressed regret at Nyunt's downfall. These responses simply continue a line of diplomatic pressure that is backed materially only by American sanctions and has not been successful in altering Yangon's behavior.

The case is more complex for the A.S.E.A.N. states, which have pursued a policy of "constructive engagement" with Yangon, in contrast and opposition to the U.S. sanctions policy. Sharing a long border with Myanmar, Thailand, along with Malaysia, has been the strongest advocate of constructive engagement, which involves intensive trade and investment relations with Yangon. In contrast with the U.N. and U.S. position, Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman Sihasak Phuangketkeow said that the Yangon power shift was "an internal affair of Myanmar" and expressed hope for "political stability" there.

Bangkok's economic relations with Yangon stand in the way of its pressuring the junta to embrace reform. Thai Finance Minister Somkid Jatusripitak said that the power shift in the junta would have only a small effect on border trade with Myanmar. Sataporn Jinachitra, president of Thailand's Export-Import Bank, added that the shift was unlikely to affect its credit line to Yangon for development projects, although disbursements might be delayed for a short time until the political situation stabilized. Similar statements were made by Thailand's oil and gas industry, and by the Thai satellite communications company that is helping to build Myanmar's telecommunications infrastructure. For Bangkok, Yangon's power shift means business as usual.

Japan, which is Myanmar's biggest aid donor, falls between the U.S./U.N. and Thai positions. Pursuing a security strategy of winning influence in Southeast Asia through economic aid and investment, while remaining an essential player in the globalization project, Tokyo adopted a measured approach of calling for democratization and a market economy in Myanmar, but taking a "wait and see" attitude toward the new political alignment there. Reflecting its dual interests, Tokyo announced that it would temporarily suspend all but humanitarian aid to Yangon.

Myanmar's northern neighbor China has given Yangon its strongest support. China's trade with Myanmar exceeded one billion dollars in 2003, with Myanmar importing 900 million dollars worth of Chinese goods and exporting 170 million dollars worth of goods to its neighbor. In 2004, Beijing signed thirty-three aid and trade agreements with Yangon, and in September finalized a production-sharing contract to cooperate in oil exploration. Than Shwe has repeatedly said that China is Myanmar's "most important friend" and that Yangon will side with Beijing on all issues concerning China's interests. Similarly, Beijing has promised to continue its "friendly" policy toward Yangon.

Following similar policies of what Shwe calls development "in accordance with the country's own characteristics" (rejecting the market democracy paradigm), Beijing and Yangon have a common interest in holding out against full participation in the globalization project and in continuing their drive to expand "all-round cooperation" with one another.

Conclusion

Given its oil resources and its attractiveness to regional investors, it is unlikely that Myanmar will be hurt in any serious way by a shift to a hard-line position in Yangon. The split between A.S.E.A.N. and the United States on the proper policy to encourage democratization in Myanmar leaves the United Nations without any clear direction for its reconciliation efforts. Bangkok will not surrender its economic relations with Yangon, as long as the latter honors agreements. Tokyo will not want to lose the foothold that it has in Yangon. Beijing has every interest in keeping the junta in power and preventing the emergence of a reform government in Yangon that would tilt toward mainstream globalization and would welcome American investment and influence.

It is likely that the hardliners will get away with their takeover without suffering any significant loss.

** The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

27 October 2004

 

A Purge in Burma

TIME Asia magazine - 1 November 2004

By sacking Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, the junta abandons even the pretense of a more liberal future

BY ANDREW PERRIN BANGKOK
Monday, Oct. 25, 2004

If Burma's military junta had an incrementally gentler side, it was personified by General Khin Nyunt. No one would call him a liberal in the Western sense—he headed the dictatorship's military intelligence service—but diplomats from the outside world considered him more pragmatic and less xenophobic than the country's paramount leader, General Than Shwe. Khin Nyunt steered the country into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997. (Burma is set to chair the regional grouping in 2006.) He succeeded in brokering cease-fires with 17 of Burma's armed, rebellious tribes. And when he was elevated to Prime Minister 14 months ago, he announced a "road map to democracy" that envisaged a new constitution and the first national elections since 1990, and a possible reconciliation with detained Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta barely made a step down that path to peace, but Suu Kyi told U.N. envoy to Burma Razali Ismail in March that Khin Nyunt was someone she could deal with. After that endorsement, some residents of Rangoon started calling the Prime Minister the "second most popular figure in Burma"—after Suu Kyi.

It's not wise to get too popular when you share power with a bunch of hard men—and few come harder than the generals who run Burma. In July, Foreign Minister Win Aung told ASEAN officials at a regional gathering in Jakarta that Khin Nyunt was losing a struggle within the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). "He is in a dangerous position," said Win Aung, according to officials privy to the conversation. "Khin Nyunt may have to flee the country. If that happens, I will have to flee with him." They didn't leave fast enough: last month, Win Aung was replaced as Foreign Minister and is believed to be under house arrest. And last week, the Prime Minister was arrested by the army at Rangoon airport shortly after he arrived from Mandalay, where he had spent the day touring development projects. Burma's state-controlled media announced that Khin Nyunt had been permitted to "retire for health reasons." Khin Nyunt is now under house arrest in Rangoon; last Thursday, Burma's new Foreign Minister told diplomats that he had actually been removed on suspicion of "corruption."

If history is any guide, the Prime Minister's career is over and any hope of Suu Kyi's being released soon has been snuffed. It was Khin Nyunt who helped negotiate Suu Kyi's release in 2002 from her second stint under house arrest. She was detained again in May 2003—following an attack by government-sponsored goons on her convoy, in which scores of people were reported injured and killed—and is back under house arrest. Last week, Than Shwe replaced Khin Nyunt with Lieut. General Soe Win, a known hard-liner believed to have ordered the brutal attack on Suu Kyi's followers in May. "The removal of Khin Nyunt demonstrates that Than Shwe wasn't interested in 99% of power," says a senior Western diplomat in Bangkok. "He wanted 100%."

Than Shwe's power play is unlikely to please Burma's neighbors. While the U.S. and many other Western countries have persisted with economic sanctions, Japan, China, India and Thailand have actively pursued a policy of engagement with Burma, encouraging closer economic ties and increased trade in the hope that the generals would gradually ease their grip on society. Khin Nyunt traveled frequently, and appeared to accept that Burma needed to reduce its diplomatic isolation to avoid economic collapse. He was admired abroad for granting regional autonomy to the armed rebel groups that live along Burma's borders with its neighbors—deals that might now unravel. "China will be furious," says Panitan Wattanayagorn, a security and defense analyst at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. "They want stability along their borders, no matter what the cost. But Than Shwe has shown he doesn't care much about stability, just regime survival." India's porous border with Burma, which is exploited by insurgents on both sides, is bound to be discussed during Than Shwe's five-day visit to New Delhi this week.

On Friday, Than Shwe announced that Khin Nyunt had also been sacked as head of military intelligence and its operations closed down. Several hundred intelligence officers were also detained throughout the country, and businesses under military-intelligence control, including the lucrative black markets on the borders, have been shuttered or taken over by the junta. The power struggle barely registered among average Burmese. Life in Rangoon was normal, except for a slightly higher number of troops on the streets. "Nothing really changed in Burma," says a Western diplomat. "The reforms were only ever cosmetic, and done for an international audience." What Khin Nyunt's arrest really demonstrates is that the only real threat to the junta's survival comes from within its own ranks.

With reporting by Larry Jagan/Bangkok


24 October 2004

 

Leaders’ Biographies

Senior-General Than Shwe

As Chairman of the ruling State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Than Shwe is the paramount leader of the military regime, which he has helmed since April 23, 1992.

He worked in the postal service before joining the army’s Officer Training School at age 20 where he became a psychological warfare expert. A captain in 1960, by 1985 he was promoted to major-general and named Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army.

After the bloody demonstrations in 1988, Than Shwe became Vice Chairman of the then ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, Deputy Minister of Defense, and Army Chief of Staff. In 1990 he was promoted to general.

He planned the first National Convention to draft a new constitution, which first convened in 1993. The same year, the junta formed the Union Solidarity and Development Association, or USDA, the junta’s civilian mass organization, of which Than Shwe is patron.

We hear: Than Shwe is said to think and act like a king and is rumored to seat visitors to his home in chairs lower than his, just as the dictator Ne Win did. His family members prefer to address each other with royal titles. In a recent meeting with an Asian ambassador, he reportedly said he wanted see the end of military rule in Burma. He also reportedly considers the constitution-drafting convention as his only exit from the political deadlock.



Deputy Senior-General Maung Aye

Deputy Sr-Gen Maung Aye is the army chief and vice chairman of the junta. In 1959 he graduated from the Defense Service Academy (first intake) with a Bachelor of Science degree.

He became commander of the Northeast Region in 1968, served in Infantry Battalion 68 as a lieutenant colonel and was promoted to colonel in 1979. In 1988, he became commander of the Eastern Region with the rank of brigadier-general.

Two years later he was promoted to major-general. In 1992 he was made Army Chief. In 1993 he was named lieutenant-general and the Deputy Commander in Chief of Defense Services. In 1994 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of SLORC, and now holds the same position in the SPDC.

A career soldier, he is believed to have long been at loggerheads with ex-PM Khin Nyunt. As a commander in Shan State, he forged close ties with influential businessmen such as Aung Ko Win, a.k.a. Sayar Kyaung, the chairman of Kanbawza Bank and the Billion Group.

But Maung Aye has generally been hostile toward the ethnic groups, particularly the Kachin and Karen; during a televised surrender ceremony with a battalion of Karen insurgents, he walked on the Karen flag. Karen were outraged.

Thai security advisors say that Maung Aye holds a grudge against the Thai Third Army, which is responsible for patrolling much of Thailand’s border with Burma. He was unhappy with Thailand’s joint military exercises with the US, some of which were held along the border.

Maung Aye is tipped to take over the junta if Than Shwe steps down. But some speculate that he will meet the same fate as Khin Nyunt and that Gen Thura Shwe Mann would become army chief and SPDC deputy chairman.

We hear: Aung San Suu Kyi has reportedly called Maung Aye the most charismatic of Burma’s top brass. His friendliness toward Suu Kyi when the two last dined together was described as unusual. Army sources have said Maung Aye wants to keep the army clear of politics. He has been reported to have been in poor health for several years.



Lieutenant-General Soe Win

Before his appointment as prime minister in October, Soe Win was best known for his part in the crackdown on democracy protestors in 1988—deploying troops around Rangoon University and ordering them to shoot at Rangoon General Hospital during the upheaval.

A graduate of the Defense Services Academy (12th intake), he became Tactical Operations Commander 3 of the Northwestern Regional Command in 1990. In 1997 he was named Regional Commander and a member of the junta. In November 2001 he was named Air Defense General of the War Office. In February 2003 he was promoted to Secretary-2 of the junta, which was vacant after Lt-Gen Tin Oo was killed in a helicopter crash two years before.

He is a senior member of the USDA and is close to Than Shwe. The two men see eye-to-eye on “nation building projects”, which include constructing dams, roads and bridges. He is widely regarded as the mastermind behind the deadly attack against Suu Kyi and her supporters in Depayin in May 2003. The same year he accompanied Than Shwe on state visits to Vietnam and China. Soe Win also signed the order to dismiss Foreign Minister Win Aung and his deputy in September.

A devout Buddhist, Soe Win upped the persecution against the predominantly Christian Chin when he was the Northwestern Regional Commander in Chin State.

We hear: Soe Win was once quoted as saying at a local gathering of the USDA in Prome that “the SPDC not only will not talk to the NLD but also would never handover power to the NLD.”



General Thura Shwe Mann

Gen Thura Shwe Mann is the Defense Services Chief of Staff. He graduated from the Defense Services Academy in 1969 (11th intake).

A year later he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and conferred the title ‘Thura’ for his bravery in action against Karen insurgents at their headquarters in Manerplaw, during his time as a regiment commander.

In 1991 he was promoted to colonel and became one of the tactical operations commanders of the Light Infantry Division, or LID, 66 based in Prome. In 1996, he was named a brigadier general and appointed as the commander of the elite LID 11, based in Htauk Kyant, 32 km west of Rangoon.

In 1997 he was appointed Commander of the Southwest Regional Command in Bassein. In 2000, he became a permanent member of the junta.

In 2001, he was transferred to the Ministry of Defense and named Joint-Chief of Staff of the armed forces. The following year, he was assigned to the newly created position of ‘Tatmadaw Nyi Hnying Kutkae Yay Hmu’ which authorized him to supervise the Army, Navy and Air Force commanders, the commanders of the four Bureaus of Special Operations, and the Commander of the Rangoon Command. In 2003, he was promoted to general.

Regarded as a loyal mililtary servant, Shwe Mann has earned the trust of senior and junior officers in the armed forces. Some suggest that Shwe Mann has been groomed to replace Than Shwe as Commander in Chief.

We hear: This year, Shwe Mann’s son married the daughter of prominent businessman Zaykabar Khin Shwe. At a lavish wedding party held in the Sedona Hotel, the keys to more than 50 new vehicles were presented as gifts.



Lieutenant-General Thein Sein

Recently appointed Secretary-1, Thein Sein was the Commander of the Triangle Regional Command in 2001, considered one of the most vital military positions. There he dealt with local drug lords in Shan State and with the Thais—whom he reportedly distrusts and dislikes—to resolve conflicts along the border. But he failed to convince several insurgent groups operating in the area to enter ceasefire agreements with the military.

He graduated from the Defense Services Academy (ninth intake) and became a colonel in 1986. He later was named Commander of Strategic Command 2 of the Eastern Regional Command, and in 1992 became a general staff officer at the War Office in Rangoon. In 1997 Thein Sein became a member of the SPDC.

In late 2001 he was promoted to major general and appointed Adjutant-General of the War Office. A year later he was elevated in rank to lieutenant-general.

Thein Sein also heads the National Convention Convening Commission and is the Chairman of the Central Organizing Committee for Burma’s War Veterans Organization. He is regarded as one of Than Shwe’s strongest supporters.

 

One Down, Two to Go

Irrawaddy - October 2004
By Aung Zaw

The purge in Rangoon heightens the political intrigue in Burma.

The sacking of Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt in mid-October came as no great surprise.

As Burma’s spymaster for 20 years, Khin Nyunt finally succumbed to his rival Deputy Sr-Gen Maung Aye, who is the vice-chairman of the ruling State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, and the army chief. Legions of officers associated with the ousted PM have been detained.

Appointed vice chairman of the ruling junta in 1992, Maung Aye is a career soldier who analysts said wanted to steer the armed forces away from politics. But, he once quipped to his close friends, “I can’t do anything because my hands are tied [by Khin Nyunt].”

Many Burma observers have predicted for years that the two generals would eventually have a showdown. Perhaps the army chief was waiting all this time for his boss, Sr-Gen Than Shwe, to give the green light to remove Khin Nyunt.

Junta chairman and Armed Forces Commander in Chief Than Shwe has long been engaged in a balancing act with the two strongmen, but finally sided with Maung Aye. It isn’t the first time a purge has shaken up the armed forces.

In 1983, powerful intelligence chief Brig-Gen Tin Oo (no relation to opposition leader Tin Oo) was arrested on corruption charges, and several hundred officers were forced to “retire”. His authority had grown to such an extent that he earned the tag “Number One and a Half”, a play on dictator Gen Ne Win’s nickname, “Number One”. Tin Oo’s growing intelligence empire finally convinced Ne Win to get rid of the head spook.

Similarly, Khin Nyunt’s expanding authority cramped the style of many high-powered army toughies. His workaholic tendencies and high profile allowed him to increase his influence to the point that several of Burma’s top brass felt their power was endangered.

Sometimes labeled a “moderate” or a “pragmatist”, Khin Nyunt was considered among the least corrupt of Burma’s top leaders (the Thai government spokesman said shortly after the purge that Khin Nyunt was detained on corruption charges).

Khin Nyunt, of course, is no angel; he and his MI units were involved in the 1988 massacre against democracy protestors and he instigated the chaos that paved the way for the army to take power. He also recruited skilled and shrewd military intelligence officers into the Office of Strategic Studies, or OSS, which he established in 1994, to help run everything from the economy, health and education policy, archaeological excavation and foreign affairs, to the ceasefire negotiations with ethnic insurgent armies.

Likewise, individual MI officers were ubiquitous in business, running massage parlors, hotels, karaoke lounges and issuing publishing licenses in Rangoon. They also controlled much of the business and international trade along the border. Khin Nyunt’s youngest son, Ye Naing Win, ran Burma’s only Internet service-provider.
But the “invisible government” of the MI grew too big for the army’s comfort and so was uprooted swiftly before it could overtake the entire military regime.

The End of the MI Era?

Less than a week after the purge, Gen Thura Shwe Mann, the junta’s third ranking member, told leading businessmen that Khin Nyunt was made to pay the price for “disobedience, corruption and bribery” by his military intelligence apparatus. The New Light of Myanmar reported him as saying, “In the military everybody is liable for their failure to abide by the law. Nobody is above the law.”

So what’s next now that Khin Nyunt is gone?

Reports from Rangoon say that Maj-Gen Myint Swe, the Commander of the Rangoon Military Command who has close relations with Than Shwe’s family and who led the operation to arrest Khin Nyunt, will take over as Burma’s chief spook. But it is still uncertain what form the new intelligence network will take.

A few days after the purge, the government abolished the National Intelligence Bureau, or NIB, and its existing laws. NIB controlled the MI, the police Special Branch and the investigation bureaus.

The new prime minister and Maung Aye will likely have some control over the new MI units, but Than Shwe will exercise ultimate control. The refashioned intelligence office will still be critical to the regime’s survival, and will be structured to prevent another Khin Nyunt or Brig-Gen Tin Oo from emerging.

The regime will also have to tackle several sensitive issues, like dealing with the ceasefire groups, which have expressed concern over the sudden leadership changes.

As the architect of the ceasefire agreements, Khin Nyunt maintained good relations with ethnic leaders. Already, however, new Prime Minister Lt-Gen Soe Win and Lt-Gen Thein Sein, the new Secretary-1 of the junta, have met with several ethnic ceasefire leaders in Rangoon and assured them that the conditions of the agreements remain unchanged.

Maung Aye’s past hostilities toward the ethnic minorities are no secret and analysts fear he will rekindle the armed conflict between the central government and the ceasefire groups. Full-scale conflict would be anathema to Rangoon, but military leaders need a modicum of “instability” in the country in order to justify and prolong its rule. Thus, the prospects of “limited civil war” in Burma linger.

It is also likely that the sacking of Khin Nyunt will have minimal impact on the constitution-drafting National Convention and the seven-point road map to political reform.

The road map, announced last August by Khin Nyunt, is actually the brainchild of Than Shwe. As it is considered the generals’ only viable exit strategy, the junta chairman will not backtrack at this point.

So where does that leave opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the dialogue process?

For starters, her safety may be in jeopardy. Soe Win is believed to have engineered the deadly “Black Friday” attack against the opposition’s motorcade in Upper Burma in May 2003. Furthermore, Than Shwe cringes when her name is mentioned in his presence. Don’t bet on her release from house arrest anytime soon.

But they will have to do something with her. “Than Shwe is a smart strategist,” said a Burmese analyst in Rangoon. “He will make another move. He knows he has to deal with Suu Kyi.” But first, he will make sure to consolidate his power and protect his family from danger.

In a display of confidence, just barely a week after the purge, Than Shwe flew to India for state visit. He told top Indian officials that his government is committed to bringing democracy and drafting a new constitution to end four decades of military rule.

Accompanying him on the trip were the wives of top army leaders Shwe Mann and the Commander of the Rangoon Command. Shwe Mann, Maung Aye and Soe Win, meanwhile, stayed home, prompting some skeptics to suggest that the spouses were taken to India as “hostages”, in order to prevent a counter-coup in his absence.

Reaction from the Neighbors

Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid expressed concern about the leadership changes. He said: “I think it has hurt us because of the suddenness of the thing. All of us were caught by surprise.” About Burma’s membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, he added that the regional group’s image now “depends on what Myanmar [Burma] does.”

So far, however, there is no indication that Asean will abandon its non-interference policy towards its members and prod Burma to put its house in order. Philippines President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo reiterated her support for the group’s “constructive engagement” policy. Thai Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai said that Soe Win is a nice, easy-going leader, with an international standing.”

But US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher thought otherwise: “We note that the new prime minister was reportedly directly involved in the decision to carry out the brutal attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy on May 30th, 2003.”

No matter who is prime minister, Than Shwe will call the shots in Burma for now. And if he is really driven by a desire to go down in history as Burma’s “benevolent king”, as some observers have indicated, and if his recent remark to an Asian diplomat that this military government will be Burma’s last is really true, then perhaps brighter days lie ahead.

“Than Shwe understands that his country will have to enter the mainstream,” said the diplomat. “He doesn’t want Burma to be isolated.”

Regardless of the speculation, it’s high time for Burma’s dynamic duo, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, to make a move. They can plunge Burma deeper into the Dark Ages, or they can begin to work for genuine reform. But in the dog-eat-dog world of Burma’s military culture, they are bound to encounter resistance from the country’s top brass.

With one down, and two to go, we will have to wait for next chapter in the power play in Rangoon.

23 October 2004

 

The Burmese Way to Confusion

Burma’s military regime has become more insular, if that could be possible. At least junta chairman Sr-Gen Than Shwe has retreated further from the firing line of international diplomats and activists who clamor for political change and a transition to a civilian government. He has placed a fresh crop of military men into the front lines to take the shots for him.

On September 18 Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council bounced its civilian Foreign Minister Win Aung—or, in the junta’s own words, “permitted him to retire. His replacement is the pure-blooded military loyalist Maj-Gen Nyan Win, a vice chief of Armed Forces Training and graduate of the Defense Services Academy.

Win Aung’s deputy and the ministers of agriculture and transport were also “permitted to retire” for unspecified reasons.

But the changes didn’t stop there. A month later, on October 18, the oft-described moderate or pragmatist (one newspaper even called him a “dove”) Gen Khin Nyunt was also “permitted to retire” as prime minister, this time “for health reasons”, said the state-run press. The military intelligence, or MI, apparatus that he presided over has been dismantled and most of his associates—in the MI and in business—have been rounded up [see cover story, p. 8].

Domestically, it is difficult to predict with any certainty what these changes mean for Burma’s future—the prospects for national reconciliation, the constitution-drafting National Convention, the fate the ceasefire agreements with ethnic insurgents and the fate of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, not to mention the fate of Khin Nyunt and the intelligence officers once under his command.

Although an ex-colonel, Win Aung also had much experience as a senior diplomat, serving as Ambassador to the United Kingdom before being appointed foreign minister. He was the international face of the introverted regime, skillfully fielding questions from foreign diplomats and reporters—oftentimes with a smile on his face—to assure the world that Burma was moving forward.

Win Aung took over his post from Ohn Gyaw, a civilian who was appointed foreign minister after the deadly crackdown on democracy protestors in 1988. Nine years later, Ohn Gyaw was dismissed for reasons that remain unclear. Both were considered puppets of the regime’s decision-makers.

Nyan Win’s tenure should not be any different. Before his appointment few people had ever even heard of Nyan Win. He survived the recent purge. Now, the major general is referred to as U Nyan Win—the state-run press choosing the Burmese honorific instead of military rank to put a civilian façade on the junta’s face.

But at the most recent Asia-Europe Meeting and the UN General Assembly, it was not the new foreign minister who spoke for Burma, it was Tin Win, Minister of Labor and of the Prime Minister Office.

Army chief Deputy Sr-Gen Maung Aye and Than Shwe are the last men standing from the junta that took power in 1988. It is unsure what this really means for democracy in Burma, but the climate of uncertainty and fear endures.

The two men will have to maintain control as long as they can or they risk a fate similar to that which befell their erstwhile colleagues and former superiors. But before that happens, you can bet that more military men will take the fall for them.

-Irrawaddy-


22 October 2004

 

Myanmar: Now it's three of a kind

AsiaTimes 21 Oct.04
By Richard Ehrlich

BANGKOK - Anti-American hardliners in Myanmar's military regime have arrested Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, also head of the country's military intelligence and architect of a tentative "roadmap to democracy", and placed him under house arrest for alleged corruption, according to conflicting reports from the secretive country.

The arrest occurred on Monday, but news only filtered out to the international community on Tuesday, when it was confirmed by Thailand. "Khin Nyunt was removed from his position," Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra told reporters.

Myanmar's government-controlled television and radio made no mention of any arrest and instead announced on Tuesday that Khin Nyunt had retired for health reasons and been replaced by army General Soe Win in an appointment signed by junta strongman Senior General Than Shwe, according to Reuters.

"The person who signed the order [to remove the prime minister] said Khin Nyunt had been involved in corruption and [was] not suitable to stay in his position," Thai government spokesman Jakrapob Penkair told reporters. "It is still unclear who issued the order," he added.

Myanmar soldiers took up positions outside Khin Nyunt's house in the capital, Yangon, where he has been confined to house arrest, and increased their presence in front of military intelligence headquarters, witnesses told the British Broadcasting Corp (BBC).

There were no immediate reports of unrest in Myanmar, mainland Southeast Asia's biggest country, and it is expected to continue its friendly commercial and diplomatic links with China, Thailand, India and other countries willing to circumvent US-led international sanctions.

Myanmar's military - hardened by more than 50 years of battle with minority ethnic insurgencies along its borders - was also expected to continue supporting hardline general Than Shwe and his right-hand man, General Maung Aye.

Myanmar currently is run by a military junta that had included Khin Nyunt among the top three in power. He had just marked a year on the job after being appointed prime minister in August 2003, crowning 20 years as head of the Defense Services Intelligence Directorate.

Some Myanmar watchers viewed Khin Nyunt as a moderate for plans he revealed soon after becoming prime minister - the most important of which was a seven-step roadmap toward democratic reform. The reconvening of the National Convention to draft a new constitution, first initiated in 1993 but adjourned in 1996, was described, at the time, as the preliminary step of this exercise.

Khin Nyunt's removal has dashed faint hopes for reform and an end to military rule as it will allow Than Shwe and other hardline generals to consolidate power. With Soe Win now installed as prime minister, the top three positions in the junta are effectively in the hands of the hardliners. Their domination heralds a setback for pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the world's most famous political prisoner, who has suffered more than seven years under house arrest in Yangon.

Suu Kyi had hoped to bring democracy to troubled, impoverished Myanmar, despite the junta blocking her National League for Democracy party from power after it won a landslide election victory in 1990.

The junta frequently criticizes Nobel Laureate Suu Kyi for being a puppet of the United States, Britain and other foreign powers interested in exploiting Myanmar's vast untapped natural resources. Khin Nyunt, who was reported to favor talks with Suu Kyi, met her at least twice and said, "I think of her as a younger sister."

On Monday, the regime's New Light of Myanmar newspaper prominently portrayed Khin Nyunt opening an HIV/AIDS exhibition in Mandalay and visiting Buddhist shrines with other officials. The paper, which frequently expresses the junta's anti-US stance, also warned if John Kerry was elected president in next month's election, "he would reduce the important role of democracy in the whole world".

Spreading its criticism to include Washington's current administration, a commentary last Saturday warned, "Economic sanctions, which cause deterioration of the [Myanmar] economy, will not bring democracy." The paper also blasted America's military for "occupying Iraq illegally".

It blamed the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, along with the BBC, for broadcasting the views of expatriate Myanmar dissidents, and favorably describing them as democracy activists. Myanmar's military has ruled through various juntas after a bloodless coup in 1962 brought the army's commander, Ne Win, to power. Since that time, the government has shown scant respect for political and civil liberties. Voices of dissent have always been met with brutal force in the form of batons and bullets.

After coming to power, Ne Win mired Myanmar in poverty and human-rights abuses, until younger generals shoved him aside in 1988 and locked him under house arrest in March 2002. Ne Win's daughter, Sandar Win, along with her husband and their three adult sons, were simultaneously arrested by the junta, charged with attempting a coup, and later convicted and sentenced to death. Ne Win died in December 2002 at the age of 91.

Earlier this year, Myanmar ordered about 1,000 delegates to start drafting a new constitution under the National Convention. The move was criticized by Suu Kyi and others as a charade to draw up a document that would give the military immunity for alleged crimes committed during its reign.

Khin Nyunt, who led a high-profile delegation to China in July along with other junta members and met Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing, enjoyed vast internal power through his manipulation of Myanmar's secret police.

Richard S Ehrlich is a Bangkok-based journalist from San Francisco, California. He has reported news from Asia since 1978 and is co-author of Hello My Big Big Honey! a nonfiction book of investigative journalism. He received a master's degree from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism.

 

Rock stars' album for Suu Kyi banned

scmp - Thursday, October 21, 2004

PETER KAMMERER
Border guards and immigration officers have been ordered to confiscate copies of an album of songs by some of the world's biggest music stars, dedicated to seeking Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom.

The ban was revealed by pro-democracy activists days before the release of For The Lady, which includes tracks by U2, Eric Clapton, Paul McCartney, Peter Gabriel, Coldplay, Pearl Jam and Avril Lavigne.

Myanmar's radio stations reported this week that military intelligence had ordered that people entering the country be searched for copies of the 27-track double compact disc, United States Coalition for Burma founder Jeremy Woodrum said yesterday.

"The fact that the country's dictators are threatened by songs from Paul McCartney, Eric Clapton, Sting and others shows how weak they truly are," he said from his Washington office. "Just as rock 'n' roll helped tear down the Iron Curtain, it can help bring freedom to Burma."

Proceeds from the album will go to the coalition.

21 October 2004

 

KNU says its negotiators arrested in Rangoon

Bangkokpost - Thursday 21 October 2004
POST REPORTERS, REUTERS

Karen National Union negotiators in Rangoon for official talks were arrested after Gen Khin Nyunt was removed as prime minister, KNU officials said yesterday.

They said their colleagues had been taken from a safe house in the capital where they were hiding after the prime minister's ouster.

The delegates were in Rangoon for a round of talks _ the third this year _ as part of a peace process engineered by the ousted general between the KNU and the junta which has ruled Burma in various guises since 1962.

"They are now all under house arrest in Rangoon,'' one KNU official told Reuters from the group's headquarters near the Thai-Burmese border.

"Forget the talks. Right now, we are just praying the military regime will feed them.''

Leaders of anti-Rangoon minority groups believe Khin Nyunt's removal will not improve the lives of the Burmese people.

Col Yod Serk, leader of the Shan State Army (SSA), did not think Rangoon would use force against ethnic minority rebels until the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) ends its internal rifts, and solves long-standing economic problems.

"While these matters are not yet settled, suppression of ethnic minority groups will be delayed,'' he said.

Chao Saen Suek, SDU spokesman, said he was afraid the people would lose their patience and rise up against the junta, leading to violent suppression.
"There will certainly be problems about aid from the Thai government as the new [Burmese] government is unlikely to pay attention to it,'' he said.

Gen Kyaw Ko, secretary-general of the All Burma Students Democratic Front, said the new prime minister was only a puppet of the SPDC and the change would do no good to the lives of the people who would continue to live in fear.

Tak governor Suwat Tanprasert said checkpoints with Burma at five border districts remained open and cross-border trade continued uninterrupted.

In Chiang Mai, Pithaya Jinawat, director of the Northern Region Narcotics Control Office, said his office was keeping a close watch on the situation for fear of an influx of drugs into Thailand, particularly by Red Wa and Kokang tribespeople as well as former Mong Tai Army soldiers.

In Prachuap Khiri Khan, Pisal Nakho, coordinator of Vantage Co which has been granted a concession to build a two-trillion-baht road from Singkhorn Pass in Muang district to Mergui in Burma, said he did not think the project would be affected.

 

Junta sacks and arrests reformist PM

scmp - Wednesday, October 20, 2004

REUTERS, ASSOCIATED PRESS and LARRY JAGAN in Bangkok
Myanmar's prime minister has been ousted and put under house arrest after a lengthy power struggle that has tightened the grip of hardliners in the military government.

Myanmar announced yesterday that the prime minister, intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt, had been replaced by a more hardline general, in a move that could hamper reconciliation with jailed pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The purging of Khin Nyunt, who was regarded as relatively reform-minded, was not expected to trigger a wider conflict within the military.

However, the prospects for political change now look dimmer than ever in a country considered a pariah by the west for its detention of democracy icon Suu Kyi and dismal rights record.

"Change has never looked farther off than it is now," a Bangkok-based western diplomat said.

State radio and television gave brief announcements stating Khin Nyunt was "permitted to retire for health reasons", a euphemism used in the past for the forced ousting of cabinet ministers.

Thai authorities said Khin Nyunt, 64, had been put under house arrest.

"The person who signed the order said Khin Nyunt had been involved in corruption and was not suitable to stay in his position," said a Thai government spokesman.

In a sign military strongman General Than Shwe had tightened his grip on power, Lieutenant-General Soe Win was named as Khin Nyunt's successor.

Soe Win is believed to be a hawkish and trusted deputy of Than Shwe.

Asian diplomats in the country's capital said Khin Nyunt had been replaced as intelligence chief by General Myint Swe who is currently Yangon military commander.

There was also a major movement of troops in the capital, according to diplomats there, but most military personnel have been confined to barracks. All government meetings were cancelled yesterday.

In the past 24 hours, several junior military intelligence officers have also been detained in a series of sweeps in the capital and border areas, especially along the frontier with China.

Observers said yesterday that many intelligence officers are known to be heavily involved with business and that the arrests were ostensibly part of a larger crackdown on corruption.

Last month, on the orders of the army chief, General Maung Aye, more than 20 intelligence officers were arrested in the town of Muse on the Chinese border. Several were reported to have held illegal Chinese bank accounts.

One Thai army general said he had been told that Maung Aye had pressed the prime minister to resign. But speculation has been rife for months of a widening rift between Khin Nyunt - who had struggled to implement his "roadmap to democracy" since he was appointed last year - and Than Shwe, de facto chief of the Yangon government.

The military has ruled the former Burma in various guises since 1962 and refused to hand over power to Nobel laureate Ms Suu Kyi after her National League for Democracy won a 1990 election.

The last leadership shakeup occurred in 1992, when Than Shwe ousted General Saw Maung.

Diplomats said they did not expect Khin Nyunt's supporters to put up a fight.

 

Ousting likely to disappoint Beijing

scmp - Wednesday, October 20, 2004

LARRY JAGAN
The removal as Myanmar's prime minister of pragmatist General Khin Nyunt is expected to be greeted with some dismay in Beijing, according to well-informed diplomatic sources.

Chinese leaders had been well aware that Khin Nyunt was in a power struggle with his hardline rival General Than Shwe and had been trying to shore up the premier's position.

Khin Nyunt came away from a trip to Beijing last month with an armful of trade deals and soft loans to boost his clout at home.

According to regional diplomats who follow Myanmar closely, Beijing was keen that Khin Nyunt remained in place, as he was seen as the best bet for maintaining stability in his country through his advocacy of albeit-glacial political reform.

Than Shwe's ultra-hardline approach was seen in Beijing as more likely to result in social unrest, diplomats said.

Beijing also backed Khin Nyunt because he was keen on developing economic ties with China. Not only is Myanmar resource-rich, but it can also provide China with access to the Indian Ocean. Than Shwe was seen in Beijing as a xenophobe.

 

Hard-drinking ally of supreme leader emerges from shadows

scmp - Wednesday, October 20, 2004

REUTERS in Bangkok
General Maung Aye, whose troops apparently arrested Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, is known to be second in the junta's pecking order and a hard-drinking loyalist of supreme leader General Than Shwe.

A Thai army general said it was Maung Aye who orchestrated the premier's removal after a meeting on Monday evening at which he expressed unhappiness with Khin Nyunt's leadership.

If true, it will have been a rare display of naked power by a man who has manoeuvred behind the scenes for decades to become Myanmar's second-most powerful man.

Born in the 1940s, when then Burma was under British imperial administration, Maung Aye joined the military in 1959, shortly before the army coup which plunged the nation into more than four decades of military rule.

Rising quickly through the ranks, he was promoted to colonel in 1979, a position from which he started to build up a major power base in the Shan state in the east of the country, along the border with China.

It is during this time that he is suspected of having established ties with the many rebel drug lords in the mountainous region, which includes the opium fields of the infamous and lawless Golden Triangle. A lieutenant-general by the early 1990s, he was appointed vice-chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc), the junta's preferred name, in 1993.

He retained this position as Slorc became the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, even though Khin Nyunt, a relative reformist who is one of his long-term adversaries, was the body's secretary.

As a close ally of Myanmar's supreme leader, Senior General Than Shwe, he is now regarded as the second-most-powerful man in the country but has rarely appeared in the limelight. "He has been quiet for a long time," said Aung Zaw, editor of the Thailand-based Irrawady magazine. "There have been lots of reports he was due to be retired because he was sick, and rumours he was drinking all the time because he was so depressed."

 

Stance on Suu Kyi caused PM's downfall, says expert

scmp - Wednesday, October 20, 2004

ANALYSIS by PETER KAMMERER, Foreign Editor
Although Myanmar's pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi is under house arrest and politically powerless, she is believed to be the reason for the apparent ousting of the prime minister, General Khin Nyunt.

Khin Nyunt, appointed last year by junta leader Senior General Than Shwe to improve the country's image, had instead tried to dictate the country's political and foreign policy direction, analysts said yesterday.

They claimed his independent-mindedness, most recently centred on espousing the participation of Ms Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) political party in a constitutional review, had created alliances perceived as threatening by the military strongman.

Researcher Win Min said foreign minister Win Aung's replacement in a cabinet shuffle last month and reports that intelligence chief Kyaw Win had tendered his resignation confirmed that belief. Ms Suu Kyi was indirectly behind all the incidents, he suggested.

"There has been tension between Khin Nyunt and the military for many years," Win Min, who studies civil and army relations for the pro-democracy Burma Fund, said from Chiang Mai. "The foreign minister was sacked because of his public support of Khin Nyunt. Kyaw Win tried to resign when he angered Than Shwe by not keeping him informed of statements by Win Aung that Suu Kyi and her party would join the national convention on political reform."

Myanmar's media reported a month ago that Win Aung, his deputy, Khin Maung Win, Agriculture and Irrigation Minister Nyunt Tin and Transport Minister Hla Myint Swe had been "permitted to retire".

In a reshuffle in 1997, Than Shwe fired 20 ministers.

Khin Nyunt surprised observers after his appointment in August last year by announcing a seven-point "road map for democracy". Although short on detail, its focus was the granting of greater political freedom to opposition groups.

The announcement deflected international pressure and improved relations with fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, but the prime minister had not been able to sustain the momentum, Win Min said.

Christina Fink, author of Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule, said Than Shwe, having seen his wishes remain unfulfilled, clearly perceived opposition.

"It seems to be another sign that Than Shwe is consolidating his power and that he wasn't happy with what Khin Nyunt was doing, which was trying to reach out a little bit to the international community and the opposition within the country," Dr Fink said.

NLD spokesman U Lwin said Khin Nyunt's departure was unlikely to have any impact on the party. "People talk about Khin Nyunt's moderation but ... his road map doesn't give us any chance anyway," he said.

13 October 2004

 

Mon Splinter Group Under Pressure

Irrawaddy - October 12, 2004
By Nandar Chann


The Hongsawatoi Restoration Party, or HRP, a small Mon splinter group that continued fighting Burma’s central government after the New Mon State Party signed a ceasefire with Rangoon three years ago, is under pressure to surrender its arms, said an HRP spokesman today.

Nai Kon Chan Nai, speaking by telephone from the Thai-Burma border, said Thailand’s National Security Council is pushing the HRP to surrender to Rangoon and to return to the Burmese side of the border. HRP leader Col Pan Nyunt and his wife are recuperating from wounds sustained during an assault on the party’s camp near the border, in a hospital in the Thai province of Prachuap Khiri Khan, which abuts Burma.

The spokesman said Thai authorities told HRP officials that Pan Nyunt, his wife and armed HRP soldiers would be sent back to Burma but he did not know when. He also said that he fears for the safety of the party members if they are forced back to Burma, and added: “We will have to hold ceasefire negotiations with the military government and [the Thai government] said it would guarantee our safety.”

He also said that the ceasefire negotiations should be based on “mutual respect” and held on “neutral ground”.

A Thai National Security Council officer is scheduled to meet Pan Nyunt some time this week, the spokesman said.

Sources close to the HRP said that former New Mon State Party member Nai Soe Nyunt recently tried to persuade Pan Nyunt to make peace with Rangoon, but that his efforts were rebuffed. Nai Soe Nyunt was an economics official in the NMSP but now lives in Rangoon.

On September 18, soldiers from the Karen National Union and a local armed Muslim group ambushed the HRP headquarters, reportedly because the HRP had been collecting tax in Karen-controlled territory. The attack killed Pan Nyunt’s five children and two HRP soldiers.

The HRP, which broke away from the NMSP in November 2001, has about 100 members who are scattered along the border.

Last March, 14 HRP members were reported to have been killed by Karen soldiers near Minhla village, about 10 miles northeast of the Mon State city of Ye.

 

URGENT APPEAL

ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION - URGENT APPEALS PROGRAM

Update on Urgent Appeal
12 October 2004

(UA-112-2004: BURMA: Complaints against forced labour blocked and victims punished issued on 2 September 2004; UP-50-2004: BURMA: Another complaint registered against local authorities in Henzada Township issued on 17 September 2004; UP-51-2004: BURMA: Henzada Township court throws out forced labour complaints issued on 28 September 2004)
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UP-55-2004: BURMA: Villagers given six-months' jail term for alleging forced labour

BURMA: Forced labour; impunity; judicial partiality; misuse of authority
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Dear friends,

The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has received news from the Yoma-3 news service that on 7 October 2004 the Henzada Township Court convicted U Ohn Myint and Ko Khin Zaw for criminal defamation after they had attempted to take complaints of forced labour to the courts. The same court threw out the forced labour cases against local government officials on 27 August 2004 that were filed by these two victims. (See further: UP-51-2004)

According to the information received, U Ohn Myint and Ko Khin Zaw were found guilty of criminally defaming the government officials for alleging that they had been forced to do labour in violation of the national law, after their allegations were thrown out of court without proper investigation. The presiding special judge Daw Htay Htay Win sentenced the two men on October 7 to six month's imprisonment or a fine of 10,000 Kyat each (US$10). After one hour have passed, judge Daw Htay Htay Win informed U Ohn Myint and Ko Khin Zaw that they had to pay the penalty immediately, and added that if they could not pay, their houses could be confiscated. After another hour passed, she called the two victims again and asked if they would pay the penalty by installments, however, the accused opted to go to prison.

The International Labor Office (ILO) in Yangon has reportedly been notified about this matter, and is said to be taking up the case with the Myanmar authorities.

Other villagers are also said to be planning legal action, therefore the sentencing of the two men for criminal defamation can be seen as an additional warning to those persons of the consequences of their planned actions. However, the choice of imprisonment over a relatively small fine by the two victims also speaks to their defiance of the court in this instance, and determination to take a strong position as human rights defenders, both in relation to international standards and the domestic law.

BRIEF REMINDER OF THE CASE

As outlined in our first urgent appeal on this case (UA-112-2004), starting from 10 July 2003, the Kanyinngu Village Tract Peace and Development Council instructed villagers of Oatpone village to act as sentries at the local Buddhist monastery. After U Ohn Myint and Ko Khin Zaw failed to serve, the chairman lodged charges against them. Both were subsequently imprisoned for refusing to follow the local government officer's orders.

The two men argued that they were punished in violation a number of orders issued by the government in 1999 and 2000, which banned forced labour in compliance with International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 29. They filed a case against the local authorities accordingly. The chairman of the village tract council then filed a counter-complaint to the effect that both he and the council had been defamed.

On 8 September 2004, another villager from the same place, U Mya Sein, also lodged a complaint alleging that he was obliged to serve as a sentry at the village monastery. In his case, the complaint was lodged on his behalf by a Supreme Court lawyer, and in it he averred that he was threatened to do the sentry duty with reference to the case of U Ohn Myint, who was imprisoned at the time (see further UP-50-2004).

SUGGESTED ACTION:

Please write to the Attorney General to call for a legal review of the decision. Send copies to the Minister for Home Affairs and Prime Minister, as they issued the orders prohibiting forced labour. You may also like to send a separate letter to the ILO to demand that it take steps to guarantee the security of persons bringing cases of forced labour to the courts or re-examine its mandate in Burma, and send copies to concerned UN officers. A suggested letter for the Attorney General follows. Please note that for the purposes of these letters, the country should be referred to by its official title of Myanmar, rather than Burma.

Sample letter:


Dear Director General,

Re: CONVICTION ON CRIMINAL DEFAMATION CHARGES IN HENZADA TOWNSHIP COURT OVER FORCED LABOUR ALLEGATIONS

I am most disappointed to hear that two villagers, Ko Khin Zaw & U Ohn Myint, were convicted by the Henzada Township Court on October 7 of criminally defaming the Kanyinngu Village Tract Peace and Development Council, and sentenced to six-months' imprisonment as a result.

The allegations brought by Ko Khin Zaw and U Ohn Myint against the members of the Council, under section 374 of the Penal Code and in accordance with Order 1/99 and the Supplementary Order prohibiting forced labour had credibility, but do not appear to have been properly investigated. After the same court, headed by special judge Daw Htay Htay Win (No. Ta/1767), threw out the section 374 complaint on 27 August 2004, it took up the counter-complaint lodged by the chairman, alleging criminal defamation. It comes as little surprise to hear that judge Daw Htay Htay Win found the two men guilty of this charge.

Criminal defamation has in recent years been condemned globally as offensive to basic rights. Many countries have recognised that criminal defamation is obsolete, and have removed it from the statute books. Among the principal reasons for its removal are that criminal defamation cases are used to intimidate citizens from asserting their basic rights, as in this instance. In particular, under no circumstances should criminal defamation be available to government agents criticised for their actions by citizens acting in the public interest, and with regards to the official duties of those concerned. I therefore urge you to review the statues in Myanmar, with a view to removing the charge of criminal defamation from existing legislation.

I further urge you to take steps to review the decisions made in the cases pertaining to Ko Khin Zaw and U Ohn Myint, with a view to overturning the grossly unjust sentence passed by the Henzada Township Court, and re-examining the allegations against the village tract council officials. This should be done particularly in light of another case brought by a villager from the same location against the same officials, that of U Mya Sein (Complaint No. 1542/2004), lodged on 8 September 2004 by Supreme Court lawyer Daw Mya Mya Aye. I am especially concerned that the complainant in this case will be subjected to the same treatment as Ko Khin Zaw and U Ohn Myint, and not given a proper opportunity to have his allegations seriously examined by the courts.

Finally, I urge you to hold discussions with the mission of the International Labour Office in Yangon to ensure that Order 1/99 and the Supplementary Order are effectively implemented without further delay, and that complainants under Penal Code section 374 are offered protection in making their complaints. These discussions should be undertaken both with specific reference to the above-mentioned cases, and any others pending.

Yours sincerely

---

PLEASE SEND YOUR LETTERS TO:

1. Dr. Tun Shin
Director General
Office of the Attorney General
101 Pansodan Street
Kyauktada Township
Yangon
MYANMAR
Fax: + 95 1 282 449 / 282 990

PLEASE SEND COPIES TO:

1. General Khin Nyunt
Prime Minister
c/o Ministry of Defence
Signal Pagoda Road
Yangon
MYANMAR
Fax: + 95 1 652 624

2. Colonel Tin Hlaing
Chairman
Myanmar Human Rights Committee & Minister for Home Affairs
c/o Ministry of Home Affairs
Corner of Saya San Street and No 1 Industrial Street,
Yankin Township
Yangon
MYANMAR
Fax: +95 1 549 663 / 549 208

3. Mr Leon de Riedmatten
Facilitator for ILO Liason Officer to Myanmar
Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
114 Rue de Lausanne
CH-1202
Geneva
Switzerland
Fax: +41 22 908 1140

4. Mr. Paulo Sergio Pineheiro
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
OCHR-UNOG, Palais Wilson,
Rue des Paquis 52, Geneva
SWITZERLAND
Fax: + 41 22 9179 018

5. Mr. Leandro Despouy
Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
OHCHR-UNOG,
1211 Geneva 10,
SWITZERLAND
Fax: +41 22 917 9006

6. Ms. Hina Jilani
Special Representative of the Secretary General for human rights defenders
Att: Ben Majekodunmi
Room 1-040
C/o OHCHR-UNOG
1211 Geneva 10
SWITZERLAND
Fax: +41 22 917 9006


Thank you.

Urgent Appeals Programme
Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)
19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building,
998 Canton Road, Kowloon, Hongkong S.A.R.
Tel: +(852) - 2698-6339 Fax: +(852) - 2698-6367

12 October 2004

 

EU Agree on New, Tighter Sanctions Against Burma

Irrawaddy - October 11, 2004
By Constant Brand/AP/Luxembourg

European Union foreign ministers agreed to tighten sanctions against Burma's military leadership on Monday to protest its failure to improve human rights.

The 25 EU ministers said "conditions had not been met" by Burma to improve its record and to release pro-democracy leader and Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest.

"The European Union will maintain the exiting measures against the military regime in Burma and tighten them," the ministers said in a statement.

Measures approved include extending the visa ban on high ranking generals. The travel ban to Europe would include all those ranked brigadier general and above, officials said.

EU governments also agreed to coordinate international bans at the World Bank and other organizations on giving financial loans to Burmese state-owned businesses or investing in other companies there.

France, however, which has several of its oil companies active in the Asian nation, was able to win an exclusion to such an investment ban for European companies who already have investment deals in place.

 

DEVELOPMENT IN BURMA

www.dictatorwatch.org - October 11, 2004
By Roland Watson

Note: This article was released to coincide with the conference, Managing Economic Transitions: The Role of Global Institutions and Lessons for Burma/Myanmar, October 13-14 in Washington, D.C.


There should be no significant economic transition in Burma, certainly no concerted engagement by international players, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and United Nations Development Program, until the military regime that rules the nation - the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) - is defeated and replaced by the democratic opposition. In other words, we must not put the cart before the water buffalo. Burma must achieve a real peace before economic development can legitimately proceed.

A significant concern at present is that such international players, and also state actors, particularly in Europe and Asia, are becoming impatient with the slow progress towards democracy. Some have even argued that there should be economic engagement now (many Asian nations are already promoting close economic ties with the SPDC), before democracy is achieved. Such "donor momentum" must be rejected out of hand. Economic engagement will only enrich and extend the dictatorship, and through it the suffering of the people.

Economic development in any case is only one type of development, and for Burma it is the least important at the present time, and, in the initial period following the establishment of democracy. What is critical now is political development, i.e., that the dictatorship be defeated. International actors should focus on doing everything they can to accomplish this end. The democracy movement continues to be plagued by a lack of action. The words out of Europe, and the United Nations, while comforting, mean nothing. They generate false hopes, and at the same time disguise such institutions' cowardice to take concrete steps. The European Union's dismissal of its own criteria for attending the ASEM meeting in Hanoi, and the arguments it introduced to rationalize this appeasement (including its weak sanctions), were particularly deceitful.

When the dictatorship is defeated Burma will require additional political development, and also social development. Only then should economic development be implemented. The people of the country must decide what type of external economic engagement they desire, if any at all.

Rapid economic development, motivated by international actors, and without the informed consent of the people, is a form of dictatorship. Its implicit goals are to undermine equality and to steal the wealth of the nation - to establish an economic hierarchy and class structure and unsustainable patterns of resource exploitation - before the public is educated and empowered.

Political development

The different forms of development that a post-dictatorial Burma needs to undergo must each have their own underlying objectives and goals. For example, a primary goal of Burma's political development should be to foster the unity that now exists among the many different groups that comprise the democracy movement. Burma is extraordinarily culturally diverse, yet it has few established traditions of multicultural cooperation. Because of this, the patterns of negotiation and compromise that will be required to restructure the government and create a functioning democracy may well be lacking. Plans for political development must directly address this concern.

The general issues that derive from this include communications and power-sharing. The formation of democratic institutions must be accomplished through forums that have broad participation, so all the viewpoints that exist in the nation are heard and addressed. For power-sharing, because of Burma's history, it is arguable that any federal structure that is implemented must grant significant power to the states, relative to the center, to satisfy the well-founded desire of the ethnic nationalities to finally achieve their right of self-determination.

Regarding specific objectives:

- The new government must start from scratch. The current regime, including ministry officials, the police, and the military command, is irrevocably tainted. It must be thrown out.
- Democratic institutions, starting with a constitution, to set the foundation for the rule of law, must be created.
- To repeat, an equitable power-sharing structure between the central government and the ethnic states must be established.
- The Tatmadaw must be shrunk, and culturally integrated, to include the forces from the democratic resistance.
- The dictators must be subjected to a war crimes tribunal.

Social development

The initial goal of social development is to facilitate as smooth and peaceful a transition period as possible.

- During the transition itself, there may be a need for foreign peacekeepers, to prevent residual war crimes by the dictators and their supporters.
- Assistance will be required to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, in particular with de-mining and the supply of household essentials.
- The large population of Chinese migrants that have been allowed into the country under SPDC rule will also need to be considered.

As peace is established and the likely reverse migration back to Burma's towns and villages occurs, other goals will need to be pursued. These include the protection of cultural traditions and the natural environment, particularly from unregulated commercial development, and the eradication of real poverty.

Whatever steps are taken, political, social or economic, they should not undermine the country's rich cultural and environmental diversity. Such diversity, Burma's wide array of cultures and biodiversity hotspots, is what makes the nation special. The cost of development must not extend to the destruction of this diversity.

Regarding poverty, Dictator Watch's view, which puts us into conflict with most parties, is that it is a non-monetary phenomenon. The common perspective, though, is that poverty is the inability to achieve a certain level of personal or family income (typically from wage-based jobs). Our view is that this measure is one step removed from the real issue, which is the ability to fulfill one's basic needs. If the financial measure is used, it means, perforce, that all non-monetary societies, including barter societies, are poor.

Basic needs include sufficient nutritious food and clean water, decent medical care, and education. If a society can meet these needs, with limited money, or none at all, it is not poor. Indeed, it may well be wealthy, if in addition to satisfying such needs it has complex and rich values, arts and design, and environmental knowledge and spiritual belief.

Burma's social development must concentrate on fulfilling basic needs, because under the tyranny of dictatorship it truly has become poor. Malnutrition, disease and under-education are rampant. In addition to political development, this is the area where the greatest initial effort is required. The country needs to develop systems to guarantee that all residents have sufficient food and water, and also establish nation-wide networks of clinics and hospitals, and schools.

As a proviso, though, this does not imply that other infrastructure projects, including roads and energy and communications utilities, need to be rapidly initiated. Roads and energy projects inevitably lead to environmental destruction, and communications development (e.g., the TV) to cultural destruction. Also, they are expensive. A simple test for the direction and pace of Burma's development is its need to take on external debt. The goal should be to take on no external debt, hence development should be carefully planned and implemented and financing should be sought from external aid sources only in forms where repayment is not required.

Furthermore, the development of Burma must be the responsibility of the people of the country themselves, which in turn has implications for the receipt of external assistance.

Foreign aid almost always has strings attached, including that the recipient societies accept and implement the values and social development model favored by the sources of the aid. Dictator Watch believes that all societies can and should make their own determinations about how they would like to develop, including, if they so choose, to reject the western consumerism-industrialism paradigm that is now being imposed around the world. (Most aid programs are based on a number of assumptions, including: our way is better; people need help - they are unable to help themselves; and the aforementioned perspective that poverty is a monetary phenomenon. All of these are false.)

The people of Burma must create their own development, to ensure that (1) they do it - that they solve their own problems and through this learn the skill of problem solving and also reap the satisfaction of meeting their own needs (versus suffer the loss of self-esteem that comes from relying on others); and (2) that it is consistent with - that it represents positive growth in - their cultural traditions.

The only needs, post-the removal of the dictatorship, for which the people of Burma may require outside assistance include: humanitarian, to relieve the immediate crises caused by the SPDC (e.g., for refugees and internally displaced persons); and to construct a fundamental social infrastructure - one able to provide clean water, nutritious food, medical care, and education. Everything else, including roads, dams, power plants, electrical grids and communication utilities, should be left up to the people themselves, to decide via consensus, not through top down dictates by international institutions, if they truly want and need such things. (Then, if and where they do, the people themselves should fund and build them.)

Lastly, all of the above also implies that economic development is at the bottom of the development list, although multinational corporations and supranational financial institutions will surely argue that it should be the highest priority.

Economic development

Economic development must support social goals (not the other way around). And, more generally, economic institutions should not be society's dominant institutions. A society designed around institutions whose sole goal is to earn a profit is guaranteed to be dysfunctional.

Returning to the goal to preserve diversity, this is an objective that many societies around the world have wrestled with, and for the most part failed to achieve. In practical terms, one of the most important objectives must be to discourage urbanization, which degrades cultural diversity and also exacerbates poverty. One means to accomplish this is to proceed slowly with the development of the primary influence that motivates urbanization: commercial TV. Here, Burma can learn from the example of Laos, which has no commercial TV (other than Thai TV beamed in by satellite), and which as a consequence has seen little migration to its cities.

Similarly, there is no need to rush in with commercial development, either of consumer or industrial products. The legal and regulatory structure that applies to commercial development, including taxes, permits and land zoning, must be established first. Further, there should be no race to exploit the country's natural resources. The remaining natural diversity of Burma must be protected at all costs, not only to benefit future generations of Burmese, but also because such habitats and species have an inherent right to exist, and to continue to flourish and evolve, without regard to the needs of people at all.

This implies that resource exploitation should be halted until such time as its own regulatory framework is established (e.g., an Environmental Protection Ministry and related laws), but more importantly until such time as the people of Burma have been informed about the economic development and resource exploitation issues facing the nation and have made their wishes heard.

All of the above objectives and issues can be realized through sectoral prioritization. Rebuilding Burma's agriculture should be the first priority, so the nation can feed itself. All other sectors, including consumer products, industry, and resource exploitation, can wait.

Other factors complicating the task of economic development include:

- All ill-begotten wealth belonging to the dictators, their families and business partners, including international investors, should be confiscated.
- The SPDC is an illegal regime, hence the contracts it (and its predecessors) have signed are not enforceable. All contracts with international investors should be examined and where appropriate voided or re-bid.
- There is a large outstanding foreign debt, for which debt forgiveness should be sought.

In summary, the development challenge for Burma following the end of the dictatorship will be profound. The scale of the task cannot be overestimated, since a society of approximately fifty million people has limited infrastructure and is unable to fulfill its basic needs. This in turn raises the issue of capacity, of what such a population will be able to accomplish, and also where external offers of assistance should focus. Burma needs a major effort, and assistance, to fulfill the above-described tasks of political and social development. A civil, democratic society, and related institutions, must be designed and implemented, and fundamental social infrastructure constructed, as quickly as possible.

A reasonable time frame for this phase of Burma's reconstruction would be three to five years.

All other development, including major projects (energy, the construction of new roads - versus the refurbishment of existing roads, etc.), resource exploitation, and consumer and industrial economic development, should essentially be put on hold until the first is achieved.

09 October 2004

 

Burmese Workers Seal Legal Victory in Thailand

Irrawaddy - October 08, 2004
By Shah Paung

After two years of battling in the Thai courts, 18 Burmese migrant workers finally received compensation on Thursday for unpaid back wages and exploitation, said Moe Swe, director of the Mae Sot-based Yaung Chi Oo Burmese Workers’ Association, which backs Burmese migrants working in Thailand.

On August 24, the Thai labor court in Tak Province ruled that the owner of the Nut knitwear factory in Mae Sot, on the Thai-Burma border, must pay 18 of his former workers a total of 1,170,000 baht (US $29,250) in back pay and compensation for abusive treatment at the workplace.

The Nut factory workers complained that they were regularly forced to toil on shifts much longer than the regulation eight-hour day and for less than half the legal minimum wage of 133 baht. In October 2002, 40 of the factory’s workers protested publicly against their working conditions and low pay rates. The Nut company then dismissed the protesting workers.

The workers and the organizations that helped them were regularly harassed and intimidated by local thugs after complaining about their working conditions.

Initially, the Labor Protection Office awarded the workers 4.6 million baht in compensation. Some workers returned to Burma before the verdict was announced and others settled with the factory owner out of court. Although the 1.2 million baht compensation package awarded to the remaining 18 disaffected workers is only a fraction of the original settlement, it is the first time Burmese migrants have registered a legal victory over their employer in the Thai courts.

“This gives hope to the other Burmese migrant workers [working in Thailand],” said Moe Swe.

Yaung Chi Oo, the Chiang Mai-based Migrant Assistance Program, the Thai Human Rights Commission and the Law Society of Thailand provided the workers with legal assistance, protection, food and shelter.

03 October 2004

 

Rangoon to Circulate New Bank Notes

Irrawaddy.org - October 01, 2004
By Aung Lwin Oo

Burma’s Central Bank will circulate new currency notes this month, the government’s mouthpiece, the New Light of Myanmar, reported on Friday.

The new 1,000, 500 and 200 kyat notes are identical to those already in circulation except that they are smaller in size. All three notes will be reduced to a dimension of 15 x 7 cm, though the legal tender currently in use will continue to be in circulation.

The explanations and images of the new notes covered a full page in today’s edition of the New Light, although no reason was given for issuing the new notes.

A Rangoon resident said it is too early to gauge the impact of the Bank’s move, but added that “people are usually deeply suspicious of such news”.

Dr Zaw Oo, a Burmese economist who works with the US-based Burma Fund, said, “The inflation rate will surely increase if new bank notes are circulated.”

He also warned that the announcement could trigger a spree of panic buying, as consumers rush to purchase basic goods and foods in fear of an economic collapse.

In 1987, Burma’s military government demonetized several denominations of kyat, sparking an outrage among the public which some believe led to the nationwide democracy uprising in 1988.

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